Vides is further constrained by the knowledge that some of his most effective commanders are ambitious allies of D'Aubuisson. In addition, he almost certainly restizes that some of them have knowledge of, or are directly involved with, terrorist organizations. Mix "ful of the fate of his moderate predecessor, General Gardia, V", protectly is unwilling to risk his own position by forcing a half to extralegal activities.

The country's corrupt and paralyzed judicial system and weak and fractious civilian government also impede any national leader from clamping down on terrorism. This has been underscored by the lack of progress in a three-year legal case involving National Guardamen who publicly confessed to murdering two US tabor advisers

The killers have yet to be brought to trial. Moreover, two junior officers who are said to have ordered the murders and furnished the weapons are believed to be under protection from prosecution by rightist military officers aligned with D'Aubuisson's political party.

Outlook

Growing public scrutiny of death-squad activity may provide some temporary constraints on the ultraright as it weighs the possible effect of the squads' activities on US and other foreign support. Nevertheess, external pressure on the military to purge itself of extremists could provoke deep nationalistic resentment against foreign ps:sonnel. It also may increase tensions between moderates and the tar right as the elections approach.

The threat of extremist violence, therefore, is likely to grow in direct proportion to the level of rightist frustration with the political situation and, to a lesser extent, with the inability of the armed forces to wage a more effective counterinsurgency effort. Over time, such pressure could prompt conservative military officers and their civilian allies to pick against Vides and any other leaders whom they may come to see as threatening their interests.



Directorate of Intelligence

EL SALVADOR SITUATION REPORT #13

> reproved for Release NOV 1993

LATE NEWS

Info: mation as of 0830 16 March 1983

The military situation continues generally quiet, with a few isolated attacks and sabotage incidents.

have been 18 sightings of unidentified aircraft in the first nine days of March.

-- Some of the sightings may have been

commission named by President Magana to investigate the armed forces has recommended that he establish a new position of Commander-in-Chief, to fall between the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff.

- -- If Magana accepts the recommendation, he may attempt to keep Garcia on as Minister of Defense while elevating Vides Casanova to Commander-in-Chief and appointing a Garcia critic as Chief-of-Staff.
- -- Magana gave no indication, however, about how he would act, and there are no reports that Garcia's critics have asked for his removal in the last few days.

Treasury Police Commander Colonel Francisco Moran

can do little to

prevent unofficial killings by his personnel.

he does not dare bring charges against seven

MOTHER LEAST MOTHER MOTHER

officers he knows are quilty.

be cannot move against right-wing death squads because of their powerful political support.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence

EL SALVADOR SITUATION REPORT \$14



Intermedian as of 1610 to March 19

lorges were suffered early this month by government forces when querrillas overran several towns in Morazan Department.

- captured by the insurgents; most of their arms and equipment also fell into guerrilla hands.
- -- This is not the worst single defeat suffered by the Army perhaps, but demonstrates both the growing confidence and skill of the insurgents and the poor morale and training among Army regulars in this northeastern region.
- -- As a result of this defeat, the commanding officer in San Francisco was relieved of his command--the second such development for the Morazan garrison in three months.
- -- The military high command has attempted to keep the incident quiet both publicly and within the armed forces.

Another aspect of military performance requiring much improvement is that of human rights.

Police, at least seven of his officers are guilty of merious abuses but that he cannot afford to bring them up on charges--presumably because of the scarcity of experienced leaders in his organization.



- and is controlled by wealthy elite: The embly-a member of ARFSA--as one death Equal leader.
- -- Press reports yesterday may that five National Guardamen charged with murdering four DE churchweren in 1980 have been given temporary reprieve from trial proceedings by a civilian judge.

LATE NEWS

Information as of 0830 17 March 1983

Insurgent military activity continues at a low level.

-- Only a few isolated attacks have been reported in recent days.

Meanwhile,

that the new airborne battalion and long-range reconnaissance company would be combat ready by early April.

airbase in eastern El Salvador, but needed technical assistance and additional funds.


General Garcia has appointed a military liaison officer to the civilian human rights commission.

-- He also instructed the armed forces to report to this officer within 24 hours any civillan deaths or insurgent captures, as well as official abuses of authority.



100

*





The Edseiton Chalook in Ed Sabadia

July 20 37 3 10

Approved for Release.

NOV 1993

4 ... 16

SNIE 83.1-82

THE ELECTION OUTLOOK IN EL SALVADOR

information available as of 10 March 1992 was used to the preparation of the Estimate

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved (WNINTEL)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants

PROPIN- Coution-Proprietary Information Involved

NFIBONLY - NFIB Departments Only

ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator

REL This Information Hos Been Authorized for

Relative to

FGI- Foreign Government Information





THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and the Treasury.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Noval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps



KEY JUDGMENTS

We believe that the 28 March elections in 11 Salvador will take place on schedule. Although a sudden shift in the balance of power between the military and guerrilla forces, or a military coup, could result in cancellation or postponement of the vote, neither appears likely.

The vote is for a 50 member constitutent assembly that, on paper at least, will have the power to reconstitute the political system completely. The assembly will be empowered to draft a new constitution, appoint a new provisional government to replace the present ionta, and set dates for subsequent elections.

The "quality" of the voting on 28 March will be highly significant. An election process perceived by most Salvadorans and foreign observers as legitimate could provide a turning point for El Salvador. The legitimacy of the electoral process, of the assembly, and of the political reforms it could set inymotion will depend, however, on such factors as voter turnout, the impact of violence, the manner in which the election results are tabulated and announced, and international perceptions of the process.

The guerrillas will try to disrupt the election with an escalating series of military assaults and assassinations. They will probably try to knock out electrical power and take over towns. They will attack military outposts and interdict highways. We believe, nonetheless, that the guerrillas are incapable of seizing and holding simultaneously a large number of small towns or even a major city. Nonetheless, they have the capability to launch widespread disruptive and violent actions during the election period.

The violence will inevitably cause some voters to stay home, but it is possible that the guerrilla campaign will prove counterproductive. The extreme left and its international supporten will undoubtedly denounce the election no matter what the outcome.

If the turnout is large and the electoral result is widely accepted as legitimate, a blow could be dealt to the extreme left, isolating it and undermining its internal support. The chances for success may be enhanced by indications of increasing popular interest in the elections,





by the presence of a large and diverse group of forcest observers and by the government's promise to hold fraud free elections. Other factors, in particular the threat of extreme leftist violence, will make such a positive outcome inscertain, however.

It appears unlikely that any of the three major parties will emerge with an outright majority in the assembly. While the Christian Demoerats are likely to win the largest number of seats, anything less than a majority would leave them vulnerable to the conservative parties.

A Christian Democratic victory would be a strong affirmation of the balanced political strategy the government has followed over the last two years. It would also validate the Salvadoran military's efforts to work with progressive civilians. A Christian Democratic landslide, however, could exacerbate strains between the party and military leaders.

There is a chance that a coalition between Roberto D'Aubuisson's ultrarightwing National Republican Alliance (ARENA) and the conservative National Conciliation Party (PCN) could emerge. A government dominated by D'Aubuisson would be highly destabilizing, it would remove moderate leaders from the political scene, isolate El Salvador internationally, and probably foxist the strength and credibility of the guerrillas.

The most stable outcomes would be a narrow Christian Democratic victory or a Christian Democratic coalition with the PCN. If the Christian Democrats miss by only a seat or two, they could probably strike a deal with individual PCN or other representatives. If Duarte needs more than a few additional votes to form a majority, however, his only likely remaining alternative would be to form a coalition with the PCN.

The Salvadoran military will probably continue to support democratic processes as long as its critical interests are not threatened. It would, however, move swiftly to prevent any civilian challenge to its corporate identity and prerogatives. It would also seek to exercise a veto over any negotiations between a civilian government and the guerrillas.



DISCUSSION

The Electoral Process

- With only about two weeks remaining before the 28 March electrons in El Salvador, rampaigning is accelerating and violence is at high levels as groups across the political spectrum become more preservpied with the promise and perils of the vote The stakes are high for the political parties that have fielded candidates and for the imargent groups that are trying to disrupt or about the soting through sabotage, intimidation, and guerrilla actions The stakes are high, too, for the military, which has stood at the apea of political power in El Salvador for the last 50 years, but which has promised to hold and honor the elections and open the political system to broader participation Leaders of all these groups probably recognize that the electoral process has already begun to alter the country's political landscape, and that developments over the nest few weeks could result in decisive changes in the balance of political forces
- 2. Salvadorans are scheduled to vote for a constituent assembly that, on paper at least, will have the power completely to reconstitute the national political system. The 60-member assembly, with representatives to be elected from each of the country's 14 departments (see map), will be empowered to draft a new constitution, to appoint a new provisional government to succeed the present four-man sents, and to set dates for presidential and other elections its formal authority will be so sweeping that it could confirm or enlarge the junta, replace it with another, appoint an interim president, or convert itself into a parliament Thus, if the elections are conducted without major scandal or disruptions, the assembly will become the official governing power in El Salvador soon after the votes are counted, and the country will come under the rule of popularly elected officials
- 3. The "quality" of the voting on 28 March—measured by the presence or lack of fraud, the size of the vote, the impact of violence, the manner in which the results are tabulated and announced, and other intangibles—will be highly significant. An election process perceived by most Salvadorans and loreign.

observers present as legitimate could provide a turning point for a nation that long has been wracked 2s, juditical fragmentation and polarization, and since 1980 by savage civil war. It could also deal a major blow to the extreme left, isolating it and understrong its sources of internal support. Legitimizing elections would strengthen 125 interests and holster democracy locces in Central America and elsewhere in the region, while reducing the appeal of violent methods and groups. If, however, the elections are seriously married by violence, fraud, or low turnout, the legitimacs of the process would be undermined.

4 The credibility of the elections will depend significantly on their lairness and absence of muor. fraud. They have been planned and will be supervised by a three man elections council, one member of which was appointed by the governing junta, and the others chosen by the junta from lists submitted by the Supreme Court and the political parties. The electron law provides for poll oversight committees compand of party representatives who may observe the veting and the counting of ballots. The government has also indicated that international observers may do the same. Elections council chairman Bustamante chinas that 300 polling places with 4,500 voting tables will be open. The government intends to set up voting stations in 230 of the country's 261 municipalities and to provide protection.

The election council has taken pains to prevent from voting and propularities in setting tabulations. Each bellet a me becad for purposes of ballot inventory control, and only the properly related are counted. The voter teers off the see before voting, marks the party of his choice on the hallot, and de it into the ballet box As the balleting presents, officials at an enting table fill out report forms. Upon closing of the polic, the belief buses are broken open, votes counted, and the results em report forms. The ballets and the form-which is signed by of council representatives and witnessed by poll watchers are sailed in a peach, which is then carried to the departmental short rouncil From there posiches are sent to council headquarten a San Salvador Furthermore, at the time the form is signed, the utility table officials would a telegram with the results to the central energy The telegram, however, will not be official, only the form rep the official crosss. The council will use the telegrams on election mucht to announce preliminary results. We expect that the exerine left will try in disrupt these processes. The extreme right saw also Middle to de m





6 Furthermore, the guernila and front groups have a major campaign under way to discredit and nullify fraudulent because they are not represented, and claim that voting will be manipulated by the government. The strategy of the extreme left to disrupt the elections and keep voters from the polls is meant in part to provide it with potentially powerful propaganda to use later in defaunking the results. The left hopes to keep large numbers from voting and then to claim that they abstained voluntarily because they are in its camp Unless turnout is broadly perceived to be high, that position will be credible to many in El. Salvador and in influential sectors in other countries.

7. Criticism of the elections could also center on claims that voter furnous on 28 March compares unfavorably with past Salvadoran elections. Official statutics show that between 41 and 68 percent of





cherble cotery cast hallors are the 1 six construment and two prevalential electrons between 19,2 and 19. I but many of the cotes were togged The actual forment in those electrons was probable between to and 40 percent to the 1978 congressional electrons are duch only one many parts exposed the postument totally a third of the votes counted are telesced to have been translatent. The official inques to past cleature though inflated, could be used by the extreme left and other critics of the electrons to claim that this month's electrons had a comparatively small turnous and there fore lacked legitimacy.

of and interest in the elections and about their preferences and likely choices. Opinion pulls in 11 Salvador have been based on small samples and may be highly biased because of the voters, lears, the descriptions of the last few years, and improper sampling methods. One group of polliters found, for materier that many people would not answer then discs, much less state to urangers their political preferences and intentions. Any assumptions based on just purty, personality, or philosophical preferences would also be highly questionable because of the distinct possibility that events since 1979 have dramatically reshaped old attitudes. Thus, there is little basis on which to predict either the use of the turnout or the outcome of the vote.

9 Despite past electoral fraud, violence, threats from the left, and other reasons for opportunity, countervailing forces could contribute to a large turnout. The government has taken a number of steps that should facilitate voting Electoral laws have been revised so that citizens-many of whom have been displaced by revolutionary violence may vote out side their home departments. In response to guerrilla threats to kill those who vote, the government has also stipulated that personal identity cards will not be stamped and that invisible, inseed of indelible, ink will be used to mark voters' thumbs both to emure against multiple voting and to preserve their anonymmy The Catholic Church hierarchy has represedly supported the elections and ensured the populace concerning its "moral obligation" to vote

suggests that popular interest in the elections is growing as the parties intensity their campaigning and step up spending. With three major parties and a few minur ones competing, solers are

presented with the types of share losses that fend in other political settings at least to increase formulational President lose Napoleon Diante, leader of the Unistian Democratic Party, and Roberto D'Aubiussiu, the suchtwine Alli NA party leader, represent diametrically different philosophies styles and values. As they and their parties become more active over the next two weeks, presumely undecided and apathetic enters probably will be stundated to vote Interest in the clevium may already have risen in recent weeks because there has been less guerrilla inspired violence than expected.

11 The leginnary of the elections should also be cubanced by the presence of a large and diverse group of foreign observers So far about 20 governments have unformed that they will send observers, and there will also be a large contingent of media representatives from the United States and other countries, as well as vinters from independent political and labor groups from Europe and Latin America. The recent vote by 10 members of the Organization of American States to send observers marks a significant break with the majority's preference over the last several years to avoid appearing to line up with the United States on controversial mues that invoice the internal affairs of member states. The OAS vote-with three abstentions (Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Grenada), no diments, and four countries, including Nicaragua, absent-demonstrates an increasing resolve by member states to result external subversion and to support efforts to stem the spread of regional violence.

The Political Parties

12 Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Founded in 1960, Duarte's progressive reform party grew rapidly over the next duzen years. Its support, centered in San Salvador and the major provincial cities, has been derived in large part from Duarte's coduring popularity. In 1972 Duarte ran for the presidency in a condition with the social democratic party of Guillermo Ungo, who was the vice presidental candidate that year and is now head of the far left's political front group. Though they won a plurality of the vote, the results were overturned by the military and the Christian Democrats were forced underground or into extlemental late 1979.

طلا

. Since then, Christian Denos rato leaders have we see hard with support from international Clarktra: Democratic movements represally Venezuela tulese COPFI party to rebuild cadre and grassions. support. Although there is no they that the Christian Democrate support the party is a centimely national one that in the just, at least has attracted enters from diverse backgrounds and interest groups Christian Democrats serve as mayors of many town across the country, and others are department governors. It is Duarte, however, who remains the party's areatest asset. He probably is the lest known and most respected political funce in the country. even though his standing may for bugger translate automatically into votes for the party and its assembly candidates

however, by their participation universally 1980 in the present government, which has been beleaguesed by suring violence and steady economic deterioration. Economic activity fell by about 10 percent in 1981, matching the previous year's domal performance. As losses mount and businesses fail, unemployment hovers around 35 percent in the cities and a higher in the rural areas. The widespread perception that the government is unable to contain the guerrillas or to end the violence has contributed to a continuing serious flight of capital and to a 15-percent drop in real investment in 1981. Regardless of the election outcome, we believe that prospects for improvement in the economy remain bleak.

15 The Christian Democrats' chances on 28 March could be significantly affected by a serious generational split it has suffered over the last few years. Some of the best and brightest of the younger generation of party leaders joined with the extreme left in late 1979 and 1980 after Duarte moved to ally the party with the military. At 56, Duarte's age and long viaibility in public life could work either strongly for or against him and the Christian Democratic candidates for the assembly He could be seen alternatively as a relic of the past and the scapegoat for failed policies and turnioil, or as a familiar and trusted father figure. On balance, the fact that most of the Christian Democratic leaders are in their forties and fifties probably works to their doadvantage in a country where in the late 1970s about 86 percent of the people were under 40

that leading Chronau Democraty are increasingly remembed about their election prospects. They can that rights one parties may win a majority of assembly wais and form a condition that would dictate national policy changes. They characterized the party sympanging as tackfuster, and said that its support had precipitously declined in one department that had more been solidly behind the party. He complained that the Chronau Democrats have been imable perhaps for security reasons—for organize mass meetings. Party officials are also considered that senior indicates and regional troop commanders are secretly assisting the rightwing parties.

17 National Conciliation Party (PCN). Like the Christian Democrats, the PCN has existed for 20 years and still commands the allegance of many traditional and conservative voters, though its support probably has dwandled agnificantly since it left office. The party is no longer directly ned to the military establashment, with which it ruled from 1962 through October 1979, but still probably maintains solid suppart with retired and active-duty military, business, and middle class voters and with rural peasants previously accustomed to its paternalism. The party has moved over the last two years to broaden its support and shed its old rightwing, promilitary image. The present party leader. Raul Molina, has publicly claimed that the PCN is a centrist party, and he reportedly has approached the Christian Democrats concerning the possibility of an alliance. There are increasing signs that after the elections the PCN could he in position to tip the balance of power by choosing either of the other many parties as a coalition partner

IN National Republican Alliance (ARENA). The ultrarightwing ARENA is the personal vehicle of former Army major Hoberto "Bobby" D'Aubuisson It was founded in lete 1980 and has grown so rapidly through nationalistic appeals and by attracting former PCN stalwarts that it has nutured all of the minor parties combined, and is now challenging the PCN for the comervative vote Some analysts even suspect that it has already surpassed the PCN.

strides" and that it had acquired "momentum." There
is to support his claim, and concern has been



ers in recent weeks that ARENA is experienting a surge in public opinion. ARENA's appeal is based on the charismate and contribul leadership of the 38 year old D Auburson, and on the simplistic faw and order solutions that he projesses for El Salvador's complex problems.

19 D Aubarson's platform is strongly influenced by his antiquetty for the Christian Democrats and the agrarian and other reforms they have enacted in congeration with the military. In a televised appear a we last month, for example, he more again arranged the Christian Democrats of being 'the right wing of the Salvadoran Community Party and of Leng "trail tors" directed by international Marcot forces He often describes Duarte and his colleagues as "water melons -green on the outside, and red made His slogan, "El Salvador will be the tomb of the reds," and his promise to liquidate the imargents in short order are probably intended to recall the savage "metanza" of 1932, when the military put down a small Communest Party opening by massacring more than 10,000 peasants. D'Aubusson seems to command the almost blind loyalty of his subordinates

20 D'Aubusson's reputation for violence has been well established over the last few years. He is widely believed to have been involved in the assassination of Archbishop Romero in March 1980 and to be a key leader of rightwing death squads that have been responsible for thousands of murders in recent years In 1980 he was accessed by the junta for organising a coup attempt, and had his US visa revoked efter threatening a US deputy assistant secretary of state and accusing him of "playing the Communist game." D'Aubuisson has been highly critical of US policy in Central America and, If he gatns power, would be likely to seek military and other support from non-US sources. He probably has more clandestine support in the Salvadoran military, and will benefit from the help of regional commanders on 28 March. He also report edly receives lavish funding from conservative Salvadoran exiles.

21. The Small Parties. Three rightwase parties have also fielded candidates and one on the left may also be running. One or two are believed to have packets of support and thus may be able to win a lew seats. Their chances may be enhanced by the propor-

limital representation system that will be used as apparatum assembly scally. The extreme rightest Popular Circumstation Party (PCP) is headed by retured general loss. Chele: Medicano, a hero of El Salvador's war with Hondonas in 1969 and the mentor of Roberts. If Automount the inquisited stills has the backing of some traditional rightwing elements and of wear persons. The Henrical Arrivin Party (PAR), headed by Linestic Oyachide, has attempted to attract voters from the non-Christian Democratic left who otherwise are impresented in the elections.

being would like to offer his party's presidency to being monta member Adolfo Maiano, who for a time was the leader of progressive military officers. It is not rectain, however, that the PAR has met all the requirements set out by the elections council and may be disqualified. The rightist Salondoran Popular Party (PPS) is small, incomplication, and strongly opposed to the Christian Democrats. The Democratic Action (AD) party is a small, center-right party that was founded last year and so far has not attracted visible signs of popular support.

The Outlook for the Election Process

22 We believe that the 28 March elections will take place on schodule. Though a sudden shift in the balance of power between the military and guerrilla forces or a military coup could result in cancellation or praignment of the vote, neither appears likely Military leaders - notably junta Vice President Guties rez and Defense Minister Carcia-continue to post behind the scenes, but there is broad consensus in the military that it and the country are most likely to benefit from the elections. Even the most cynical and segrenive military leaders who lavor D'Aubuisma's approaches or other rightwing methods seem to recognize that the legitimacy and ultimate survivability of the military institution are best served by opening the pulitical system to a civilian government that has international support and legitimacy.

23. Though some guerrilla leaders are concerned that large-scale violence over the next two weeks could be counterproductive, major assaults in various parts of the country undoubtedly will be mounted. The guerrillas will probably try to orchestrate their campaigns so that they build momentum and achieve maximum effectiveness on election weeks.



cost. Here wall be a higher than usual chares that Dicirle president of the elections council bestamante senior government and indicars beaders and perhaps even foreign representatives and alwervers will be targeted for assassination. The guerrillas plan to after landitary outposts take over towns, intended major touch and lines of communication, and salictase the economic intrastructure. They may place high prouds on efforts to knock out electrical power in large areas of the country. Increased cooperation among the insurgent factions and continuous support from Cuba and Nicaragna—which are also determined to discredit the elections—have increased the potential of the extreme left.

21 II violence is widespiral and well condinated it could severely affect turnout and undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process. Mark will deserted on how effectively the military can defend cortical installations, lines of communication, and voting places On balance, however, we believe that the maurgents are meapable of seizing and holding simultuneously a large number of small towns or event a major city, and that a basic shift in the multiary balance is unlikely during the election period More over, even smid considerable violence on election day it is possible that Salvadorans will react indurantlyas voters in other Latin American countries have in similar circumstances—and vote in large numbers That possibility is perhaps buoyed by the unique resiliency and resourcefulness in the Selvadoren national character, which could prove even more formidable than the threats and amoults of the lar left

The Outlook for a One-Party Majority

25. It appears at present unlikely that any of the three major parties will emerge with an outright majority in the assembly after 28 March, and thus control the new government, though the Christian Democrats are likely to win the largest number of seats. A victory by them would constitute a strong public affirmation of their political strategy which combines reforms, opposition to the extreme right, and determination to defeat the estreme left in additionary victory by Duarte's party probably would result in increased support for it and a new government from international Christian Democratic parties and groups. labor organizations, and Latin American governments.

In frameally a commanding victors by any of the three many parties could exeate more problems than it would solve A threston Democratic Lindshife for example, resid examinate strains between the parts and some military feathers, General Carria and other leading conservative affords would be highly concertain that a squage Christian Democratic assembly would launch constitutional and other relocus that they could not assept Indeed, a landshife victory sould probably cause some party leaders to push aggresseds for "communitarian" and other reforms they have long advocated. Under such commistances, the chance of a coup by conservative nultiary officers would increase again anth. If Duarte's party wins a lamblede, there is even a small chance that such others would try to meant a coup immediately

27 A win by D Auburson's ABENA party would be even more desiglolizing. Most Christian Democrats, General Guiterrez, and many others from the political center and democratic left would go into hiding or early, many of them literally fearing for their lives The Catholic Church hierarchy would be greatly concerned about the likelihood of greater waves of counterterrorat violence, and prelates would speak out despite their lears that they would become targets of avastination. International opinion would be resoundingly pegative, and El Salvador would become even more unlated than it has been. For the United States, and other strong appearters such as Venezuela, such an outcome would be a repudiation of their backing for praceful political evolution and for human rights. US positions elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean probably would also be damaged. If D'Aubuisson actually carried out policies like those he has advocated, his government would be likely soon to face a much more powerful guerrills challenge, openly supported by a number of foreign governments

The Outlook for a Coalition Government

28 Even the Christian Democrats' own early and optimistic election forecasts had them winning only about 35 seats, and since then party leaders have become increasingly concerned that support has diminished. Thus, they may now be considering conlition possibilities in the event they fail to win a majority in the assembly. If they miss by only a seat or two, the Christian Democrats could probably strike a



deal with individual PCN or other representation. P. Duarte needs more than a few additional substitution a majority however, his offly likely remaining alternative would be to form a coalition with the PCN. He might have to negotiate with PCN leaders even as ARENA way also trying to won them. Though more PCN leaders district the Christian Democrate we believe that under most commissances they could be permaided that a government dominated by D Aubics son would be calamitous.

29 There is a chance, nonetheless, that an All N S
PCN condition could emerge, particularly if D'Aubus
son's party were to win a plurality. Despite efforts by
PCN leaders to transform the party's image, the tank
and file are probably deeply conservative. D'Aubus
son might be able to suborn some PCN leaders and
elected assembly delegates through intimidation or
promises of large financial payoffs. The prospects for
such a condition and the implications for relations with
the United States and other countries would be much
the same as those discussed in paragraph 27.

30 A Christian Democratic-PCN coalition after 28 March would be one of the most stabilizing possible outcomes of what will, after all, he an interim govern ment it would probably enjoy the statingest support from within the military, and would considerably broaden the legitimacy of the present military-Christian Democratic alliance. Even some of D'Aubussion's partisans would probably be persuaded to cooperate with such a government once the heat of the campaign had passed Such an alliance would be vulnerable to more extreme propaganda attacks from the far left because the PCN is associated with the conservative, military-dominated governments of the 1960s and 1970s Nonetheless, if the election process is widely seen as legitimate and honest, such a government would probably stand a good chance of maintaining broad international support. For their part, most of the Christian Democratic leaders would probably have few qualms about forming a condition with the PCN if it were the only means of their staying in power, though they would have to tone down and even dandon some of their pert programs. A few his conprobably including units member. Morales Ex. (i), would be likely to be high a content would leave

The Outlook for the Military

31 Despite the reservations of many top of secon holing terminal teams, the military is his continue supporting democrate, processes as long as upcritical interests are not threatened. The marries would however, more swiftly to prevent any sail lenge by a civilian government to its corporate so-city and pretogatives. Virtually all officers believe to instance, that they collectively should retain the eacht to clause then own leaders, to remain under the command of a uniformed defense minister, and to mentam control over decisions relating to present security and defense Under most circumstances for thermore, nearly all military leaders would see to exercise a veto over negotiations between a coultage government and the guerrillas A strong masters of commanders could also be expected to try to contain what they comider excessive reformist zeal is the elected anembly, especially if a left-of-center macrity emerges In addition, military leaders will see to uphold their influence over time by supporting the randidaces for high office of retired colleagues and by rollsburging with conservative and wealthy exiles

32. Through its 50 years in power the Salvadoran military has been nationalistic and institutionally independent. Unlike the military castes in neighboring countries, it never came under the strong influence of the United States, nor did it or any other elements in El Salvador ever have to deal with invading or occupying US forces. Those unusual attributes of autonomy and nationalism, combined with the military's willingness since 1978 to work with left-of-center civilian politicians, indicate that it is a strong institution. Unlike many other, more dependent military forces in less developed countries, it is probably one that is capable of surviving and working over the long term for constructive political and economic change in Fl Salvador.







M Salvailor Pactoengings on Chairfigation dangs

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved (WNINTEL)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Notemale NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or

Contractor/Consultants

PROPIN- Coution—Proprietary Information Involved

NFIBONIY- NFIB Dopos Iments Only

ORCON- / Dissemention and Extraction of Information


Controlled by Originator

REL ... This Information Hay Been Authorised for

Lebrose to ...

FGI- Foreign Government Information

01040 MPW WANTA ON WANTAN O B.



SNIE 83.1-83

EL SALVADOR: PERFORMANCE ON CERTIFICATION ISSUES

Information available to of 15 January 1963 was

خاد ، غاد

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Delense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

KEY JUDGMENTS

During the past six months we have seen signs of modest progress in some areas, and no signs of backshiding on the part of the government or the military in their commutment to unprove the human rights situation and reinforce democratic institutions in El Salvador. Nevertheless, positive efforts by the government in all areas continue to be hindered by deep-seated problems, and overall we conclude that there have been few dramatic changes since July. We expect progress to remain slow and archious.

The government has made limited progress on human rights issues in the past six months, although in at least one area—the rate of civilian deaths—the improvement has been substantial. Other positive trends, such as good treatment of political prisoners, remain overshadowed by a virtually nonfunctional criminal justice system that has proved unable to indict and prosecute the accused.

Although some progress has been made in curbing abuses by the armed forces, El Salvador continues to have serious problems in this respect. Major problem areas remain the lack of fire control in populated combat zones and arbitrary violence committed by unsupervised security forces. Nevertheless, the military has increased efforts to educate and discipline subordinate officers and troops.

In addition, replacement of a few commanders has been followed by a subsequent improvement in the human rights records of their units. Moreover, before launching operations some field commanders reportedly have received specific instructions to respect the rights of the local civilian population and to take guerrilla prisoners. They increasingly have adhered to these orders in operations of the past six months.

The government has demonstrated advances in political and economic programs, particularly in Phase III of the agrarian reforms, and the parties have shown a willingness to cooperate on major issues. A unity pact signed by the major parties has led to establishment of political and human rights commissions and a new Central Elections Council. A new constitution is scheduled to be completed this spring, and presidential elections are scheduled for March 1984.

The government continues its interparty discussions on reconciliation. On the issue of negotiations, the positions of all government and

101.13

military elements have coalesced against guerrilla terms for dialogue, but they will discuss a ole for the guerrillas in the ongoing political process. San Salvador has renewed offers to the left to compete in elections and is drafting an animesty law to help convince leftists to end the fighting. The government leaves the door open for possible informal talks to that end.

The killers of the US churchwomen have been identified, indicted, and have been remanded for trial in civilian criminal courts. There is no evidence of higher level complicity in these murders. Two members of the National Guard have confessed to killing two US representatives from the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) and the president of the Salvadoran land reform institute. They have been ordered to stand trial. However, the three accused authors of these crimes—two military officers and a businessman—remain free.



DISCUSSION

I The Intelligence Community has attempted during the past via months to broaden its coverage of FI Salvador's efforts to meet qualifications for continued and set both by the US Congress During this time we have realized some modest improvement in our

Embassy in San Salvador continues to provide our primary base of information on the fundamental issues involved in certification, the data provided appear objective and accurate and reflect the judgment of all elements of the mission

Human Rights

US Congress criterion for judging Salvadoran Government's performance "Making a concerted and significant effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights."

- 2 Overall, the Salvadoran Covernment has made limited progress on human rights issues in the past six months relative to the period covered in the last report, although in at least one area—the rate of civilian deaths—the improvement has been substantial Given the virtually productional criminal justice system in El Salvador, the standard for measuring progress in this regard is elesive. According to the US Embassy, only 300 criminals had been processed through civilian courts out of a national prisoner population of 4,000.
- 3. The government's record on treatment of prisoners, however, is good. Those abuses that do occur, according to the US Embass, usually happen during the process of arrest and not during detention. For example, the government chains to have under detention approximately 800 political prisoners. We know that some 700 are housed at the relatively modern Mariona: Prison outside the capital. These prisoners range in status from captured guerrillas to leftist intellectuals suspected of subversion. According to US Embassy officers who have cuited the prisoners, they are well fed and receive excellent treatment, including access to schooling, use of an industrial shod, and rights to conjugal visits in private dormitories.
- n The government is attempting to expedite trial proceedings for political prisoners and is drafting a new amnesty law that will further help in reducing the

number of detamers. The est dilishment of an amnests commission also is being considered to oversee the broader issue of assumitating guerrilla defectors into the political and economic mainstream as one phase of a democratic solution to the insurgent war. A seven member human rights commission was appointed in early December, charged with formulating an "institutional mechanism that will promote and protect human rights."

5 The insurent was has intensified since July, and the rate of combat deaths on both sides has increased. The rate of civilian political deaths, however, has continued to decline markedly. The monthly average of political deaths in 1981 was about 510, but for 1982 it dropped to 217—a decrease of 57 percent Since July the death rate has dropped more than 40 percent from that of the first sia months of 1982.

Control of the Armed Forces

"Is achieving substantial control over all elements of its own armed forces."

- 6 Our base of information has expanded in recent months regarding the behavior of armed forces personnel, although our ability to monitor military actions with any continuity or to confirm specific reports remains poor.

 Buroes over the past sia months essentially indicate that military leaders continue to have problems in curbing abuses by subordinate elements. It should, however, be noted that this may be less the product of an increase in human rights violations than of a greater volume of on the subject due to more appreciate.
- 7 For example, the general staff remains largely ineffective in promoting fire control among combat units, although some improvements have been made over the last six months. US military intelligence reporting indicates that poor planning and carelessness on the part of some Salvadoran commanders during

^{&#}x27;Political double are those that take place outside a zone of combat and which clearly suggest a political motive for example, exclusion murdered because of suspected complicity with the insurserup. Doubless killed as a result of being cought in a crossing or other unilitary-related activities are classified as combat deaths.



bembardments and large scale sweets against goernila strongholds sometimes result in cisahan loss of life and destruction of property. In some intranses, moreover the distinction between combatant and noncombatant can become biurred. We believe autimitars reports ——that "guernila" raunities often include unarmed insurgent support personel camp followers, and innocent civilians trapped in the battle zone. On the other hand, increased support and training have resulted in more selector targeting.

- 8 The tenuous and often nonembert control of senior officers over elements of the paramilitars security forces and civilian irregulars is a continuing cause for concern shoman rights violation by military personnel largely reflects the excesses of these small rural-based constabulary forces. In isolated area especially, where lawlessness is a way of life, semiliter ate personnel led by a corporal or a sergeant all too often assume the roles of prosecutor, sadge, and esecutioner.
- 9 Senior military leaders, however, are continuous their efforts to overcome human rights abuse. Over the last six months, members of the high command have stepped up visits to posts in the interior, emphasizing to subordinate officers the necessity of damplining troops guilty of abuses. The high command appears increasingly concerned that combat officers set a good example for their troops. The replacement of a few commanders has been followed by a subsequent improvement in the human rights record of their units.
- 10. Defense Minister Garcia continues to take a leading role in curbing military abuses. In October 1982 he ordered a conference in San Salvador of nearly 300 local commanders—essentially all enlisted personnel—and reaffiftmed the high command's commitment to human rights and the penalties for committing abuses. We lack these penalties are being rigorously enforced.
- 11. Nevertheless, Garcia's efforts to discipline and educate the military have shown some positive, although undramatic, results. Before launching an operation, some field commanders reportedly have received specific instructions to respect the rights of the local civilian population and to take guernila prisoners. They increasingly have adhered to these orders in operations of the past six months. They continue to take prisoners and interrogate them in a more professional manner.

Progress on Reform

Is making continued progress in implementitic essential economic and political reforms, including land selvani

- 12 The State Department and the Agency for international Development provide the bulk of multiformation on the relorm process. All available information indicates that the government has made progress in some areas of political and economic reform, but has accomplished little in others.
- in continuing tension between the major parties becreasing assertiveness by President Magana, however, has forestalled the kind of deadlocks that prevailed in the first months of his administration. Thus, despite periodic flareops within and among the diverse political groupings, moderates and hardliners have been able to lend off cines through compromise. For example, in September the three major parties agreed to divide the 261 mayoralities evenly, thus avoiding a government crisis.
- bey issues was underscared by the signing in August of the "Pact of Apaneca"—a unity document in which the major parties pledged to cooperate on political, social, and economic reforms. As stipulated by the agreement, human rights and political commissions since have been formed and are functioning, with the latter setting a formal timetable for drafting and ratifying a new constitution by early 1980 and scheduling presidential elections for March 1984. The formation of a peace commission, however, remains mired in partitum continuersy over its composition and mission. It reportedly will be formed by February, but Magana now envisions it as merely a subcommittee of the political commission.
- have been caused largely by intransigence on the part of the extreme right, led by Assembly President D'Aubusson. His tactics, however, have brought moderates closer together in an effort to limit his influence. We believe, therefore, that, while the coalition government remains vulnerable to partisan in-lighting, the overall trend points to increasing progress in policy formulation and implementation.
- 16. The additory remains the key to stability in San Salvador and continues to support the Magana admin-



istration. Magana's efforts to effect some degree of compromise have enabled the high command to reduce its involvement in civilian political battles over the last six months. Despite the revent dispute within the military, we believe the armed forces will remain the primary force for moderation. Should a change in the Delense Ministry take place in the next few months—as now appears probable, we believe the officer corps will again select a pragmator to assume the portfolio.

17. While escalating insurgent attacks have put new strains on the economy, they have not deterred the armed forces from keeping the agrarian reform process on track. On balance, the relationship between the peasant organizations and the military has improved, and the land reform process in recent months has not met with the kinds of wibacks and controverss that occurred following the March election, when former landowners illegally exicted several thousand peasant beneficiaries.

ed

-

rd.

nte

hty-

een

For

red

..

ome

u of

A 146

the

sions

h the

and

ched-

e for-

mains

n and

. but

tree of

nission

he part

endent

I mod-

luence

govern-

ng, the

policy

in San

admin-

18 Progress in Phase III (land to the tiller) has been particularly apparent since an Army colonel was appointed to head its administration and a top peasant leader was named to the presidential committee over-seeing legislative action on land reform. For instance, according to information provided by AID in El Salvador, 1,380 applications for land titles were submitted in August and September, more than three times the figure (454) for the previous two months.

19. Such increases also are attributable to a government publicity compount to inform eligible recipients of benefits and procedures. As of 1 October, applications for new titles since the beginning of the reform program totaled 38,615, according to AID. Since October, the government reportedly has set the goal of an additional 22,000 new applications by the end of Murch 1983. According to AID, more than 11,000 new applications had been received by year's end, indicaling that government efforts are on track. Meanwhile, as of 1 October, 32,952 provisional titles had been distributed. The government hopes to increase this figure by an additional 14,000 by the end of March 1983; but by year's end the total had increased by only 1,722, suggesting that the government is well behind in reaching that goal. In addition, 157 permanent land titles were granted under Phase III during the past six months, bringing the total number of permanent titles granted to more than 400

Electrons and Negatiations

Is committed to holding aree electrons at an early date and, to that end, has demonstrated good (arth elliotts to begin discussions with all major political factions in El Salvador."

It he government and military appear committed to holding presidential elections on schedule by March 1984. During a special plenary session in November, the combinent assembly appointed a new Central Elections Council to oversee the electoral process. The five political parties represented in the assembly each have one member and one alternate serving on the Council. The president of that body elected by his colleagues—represents the moderate Democratic Action party, which currently holds no posts in the provisional government.

- 21 The Council a charged primarily with
- Drafting a new electoral law
- Preparing a new voter registry.
- Authorizing political party activities
- Promoting the election process
- Regulating its own internal functions

22. The Council faces some fundamental hurdles, however, including at temporary status and the possibility that it could be restructured before the 1984 election. It also currently lacks financial and material resources, such as new computers to assure prompt and accurate voter talkes. Its predecessor's attempts to design a new voter registration system proved organizationally infeasible during the last election and probably also will be beyond reach for 1984.

23. National interest in the 1984 election, meanwhile, is already evident in the attempts of new parties to organize. To the disadvantage of D'Aubuisson, a conservative splinter party has emerged with considerable private funding and has successfully registered with well over the required 3,000 signatures. Two fledgling center right groups and one left-of-center party also plan to participate in 1984.

24. We believe the government and the military are willing to make some attempts at reconciliation with the left before the presidential election. The Magana administration repeatedly has stated its policy of allowing leftist parties to register, campaign, and field

-

. ccf ...

cambriates for office. Nevertheless, government and militars leaders of all stripes reget any proposals for negotiations aimed at achieving a power sharing at rangement outside the ongoing political process. According to the US Embassy, the five parties in the assembly have debated the issue and appear to agree on three mann points.

- Dialogue and/or negotiations at the initiative of the left are unacceptable
- The left must compete for power in democratic
- Any talks promoted by the government should have as their only objective the participation of the left in elections or its surrender
- 25 The left's negotiation efforts have been largely propagandistic.

rupport—domestically and internationally—by portraving itself as the more legitimate governing alternative to the civil-military power structure in San-Salvador. The Marxist-Leninist majorith of the insurgent alliance views negotiations as a megins of undermining the unity of the government and the military, while also buying time for the guerrillas to strengthen their political and military organizations. Even the concept of power sharing—totally unacceptable to guerrilla hardliners—is perceived by the less doctrinaire as a temporary phase before final victory.

26. Nevertheless, we believe that some leftus elements—such as Guillermo Ungo and his small coterie of moderate socialists—are sincerely interested in joining the electoral process and may be considering the possibilities for arranging a separate peace with San Salvador. Publicly and privately they have been pressing the government for concessors and guarantees that would make their participation viable.

27. We view as negligible the prospects for negotisting a comprehensive and binding solution over the next six months. The fundamental goals of the government and the Marxist-Lemmat insurgent leadership appear irreconcilable. If elections take place, therefore, they are likely to be held once again in an atmosphere of violence.

Murders of US Citizens

Canel tank efforts to proestigate murders of six [US criticen] and bring to justice those responsible for those morders.

- 28 Our dreason of this issue is based almost entirely on US I mbassy reporting
- the slavings of lour US churchwomen have yet to go to that Court appeared defense attorneys routinely have appealed the presiding sudge's order to begin trial proceedings on the basis of the available evidence. The appeal process is likely to be completed by the end of January and will determine whether the trial begins promptly or must be postponed pending further investigation. There is no additional reporting to suggest how the appellate court will rule.
 - 30 We also lack information to assets the testimony of one court witness that the accused guardsmen may have been acting on orders from above. The witness has implied that the sunior sergeant accused of planning and directing the killings might have only suggested they were under "higher orders," presumably to elect the exceptration of his peers.
 - 31 We have no evidence suggesting the guardsmen were ordered by higher authority to carry out the crime, although we suspect that some stiempts at a coverup probably occurred during initial investigation on the part of midlevel National Guard officials. The incident reflects the kind of arbitrary abuses by elements of the security forces that we believe still take place, albeit with less frequency.
 - 32. Two members of the National Guard have confessed to killing two US representatives from the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) and the president of the Salvadoran land reform institute. They have been ordered to stand trial The three accused authors of the crime—military officers 1.1 Lopes Sibrian and Captain Avils and businessman Ham Christ—remain free
 - Si The whereshouts of Captain Avilla and Hans Christ are unknown. Christ fled in 1981 to Miami, where he was detained by US authorities pending extradition to El Salvador on criminal charges. Charges were dropped by the Salvadoran Government for lack of evidence and with them the request for extradition. Christ may have left the United States for



-

Furnise or South America. Unition Avila, meanwhile field the country in September following his polygraph official indicates that Captain Avila's uncle is one of the most powerful members of the Supreme Count and has worked to block formal indictment proceedings against his nephew.

On active duty, has underscored the continuing weaknesses of the judicial process. He was twice ordered
released from military detention by two civilian
judges, even though the evidence against him was
formidable Some Salvadoran leaders have admitted
that his release for lack of sufficient
evidence was a "travesty" of justice, and a
has alleged that the civilian indiges
were intimidated and bribed by rightwing elements

35. Senior government and military officials are pressing the Salvadoran judiciary to rescind the release order and renew trial proceedings. The high command has denied Loper Sibrian permission to leave the

tomates and the government has appealed the telescent look have court indices and expects a decision sees to cording to 1.5.1 indices sources, if the appeal tage the government will attempt to employ Decree 5° istate of stepe law and detain him under the terrorism clause for his fide in a political crime against a publical sources in this effort will depend on the subgrant of the Supreme Court, which currently a second employing the state of stepe law.

36 In broad terms, the Lapez Sibrian case continues to point up the endemic weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the entire Salvadoran situation. Despite the efforts of government and military leaders to prograte, we have mated an increase in recent months of anonymous death threats and intimidation against court witnesses, civil and military officials, and US diplomats. The far right also has attempted to garner public support for the accused officers by painting them as innovent martyrs, and charging government and military officials with treason for colluding with the US Embassy. The events of the past six months make successful prosecution of Lopez Sibrian and the two other authors of the crime appear doubtful.

ts at a spation is. The sess by we still

J in

an to

nely

ergin.

nce.

the

trial

rther

sug-

mony

may

itness

plan-

y sug-

mably

d have om the opment in land o stand military tla and

Miami, pending charges ernment puest for states for



Al Salvailor: Teleption Outlook

districted At . The ...

NOV 1993

Warning Notice Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved (WHINTEL)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ASSESVIATIONS

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals HOFORNthat Releasable to Contractors or NOCONTRACT-

Contractor/Constrain Courties - Preprietory Information Involved

PROPIN-NEBONLY-

NFIS Department Only

ORCOH-

Dissemination and Extraction of Information

Controlled by Originater


REL ...

This Information Has Seen Authorized for

Reference to

FO+

Foreign Constraint, Inform



SNIE 83.1-84

EL SALVADOR: ELECTION OUTLOOK

Information evaluates as of 2 March 1964 was

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Society Agency, and the Intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Havel Intelligence, Department of the Novy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Diportment of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Carps

D'Aubutsion is exuding confidence at press conferences and political rallies, but it is doubtful that ARENA is significantly stronger than in 1982. Indeed, rather than enhancing its popular mandate on 25 March, ARENA could have problems maintaining its 1982 voting there of 50 percent Since the Assembly elections, have suggested that D'Aubusson has lost favor among some conservative backers because of his inability to control either the provisional government or the armed forces, and because of his ineffectiveness in blocking reform legislation. suggested that some followers recruited earlier from more moderate parties may have defected back, perhaps alienated by the political extremism and anti-US erntiment associated with ARENA and, in particular, by D'Aubulmon's notoriety as a sponsor of death squeds The 25 March belloting will see ARENA sharing the conservative vote with at least four other its leaders are concerned about parties, and their prospects if they face the Christian Democrats in a runoff. No moderate conservative party is commitred now to any coalition building with ARENA!

the human rights situation would be unlikely to improve. While death-equad activity might wane somewhat if the ultraright felt less compulsion to use this form of control so indiscriminately, the persecution and intimidation of political opponents could escalate, driving many of them to side with the insurgents or to leave the country.



El Salvador: Government and Insurgent Prospects

And An Special National Intelligence Estimate

Approved for Release

NOV 1993



Warning Notice

Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved (WNINTEL)

National Security Information Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Dispresidention Control	NOFORN (NF)	Not resessable to foreign metsonals		
Abbretation	NOCONTRACT (NC)	Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants		
	PROPIN (PR)	Causes propository information involved Disacratepison and extraction of information controlled by originator		
	ORCONIOCI			
	REL	This information has been authorized for release to		
	WN	WNINTEL -lesstligence sources or methods involved		
	A microfiche capy of this docu- ment is available from OTR / DLB (482-7177); printed copies from CPAS/TMC (482-5203) or ATM request to useful CPASTMC1	Clessified by 048839 Declassify OADR Declassify multiple sources		
	All material on this page is Unclassified			




El Salvador: Government and Insurgent Prospects

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Estimate. The Central Intelligence Agency. The Defense Intelligence Agency. The National Security Agency. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Department of State. The Office of Intelligence Support. Department of the Treasury.

also participating
The Deputy Chief of Staff for intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the As Force

This Estimate was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board





Key Judgments

El Salvador faces an increasingly unsettled political environment in the coming year—marked by a presidential election in March and changing strategies by the guerrillas. Events could have dramatic effect over the next 12 months or so on El Salvador's political landscape and the position and influence of the United States, which has been key to the country's political stability during the 1980s.

The resurgent rightist Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) appears likely (60 to 40) to capture the presidency from the incumbent Christian Democratic Party (PDC), which has been weakened by popular distillusionment with economic stagnation, corruption, incompetence, and deteriorating urban security. The Christian Democrats could still stage a comeback by combining a more aggressive campaign with smart tactical alliances, but the odds and momentum are against the party.

ARENA's candidate, businessman Alfredo Cristiani, is a capable modernte, but party President Roberto D'Aubuisson has taken an increasingly prominent campaign role, lending substance to suspicions that he and other extremists will be the real power if ARENA wins.

The guerrilla-allied Democratic Convergence continues to participate in the campaign, but apparently has been making little progress. There is a fair chance (1 in 3) that it will pull out if it appears headed for a dismal showing, is pressured by insurgent commanders, or if the government fails to deal seriously with the guerrillas' latest peace proposal. If it pulls out, the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) could make a more concerted—and at least partially successful—effort to disrupt the election.

The election is likely to be reasonably fraud free, and, although the turnout will probably be lower than in 1984, it should nonetheless be sufficient to buttress legitimacy.

The war itself is a complex arena where shifting insurgent strategies have allowed the guerrillas to mask a weakening military capability overall with more visible and politically successful efforts in the cities. The guerrillas have lost 15 to 19 percent of their force over the last two years, their base areas are less secure, and their attacks on military targets have been less effective. To compensate, they have tripled incidents in the capital, attacked previously unaffected areas, and assassinated and forced large

numbers of officials to abandon their posts, they are increasingly likely to target US nationals and facilities. The insurgents have the capability to boost less resource-intensive terrorist activities to a higher level and are likely to do so; they after the psychological and political rather than the purely military dimension of the war.

External support supplies more than 70 percent of all guerrilla ammunition needs and is critical to sustaining FMLN operations at current levels.

Suggests a recent increase in external supplies, probably through Nicaragua.

Salvadoran military performance has improved markedly since 1984, although the armed forces' efforts are still too piecemeal and not yet tied effectively to civic action. Assuming current trends, we believe that the government is likely to grind down the insurgency as a military force over the next three to five years, perhaps reducing its personnel size by one-third.

Nevertheless, the guerrillas—while unable to seize power—will still be able to conduct a prolonged war, depending ever more heavily on terrorism, sabotage, and small-scale attacks. The terror campaign has the potential to destroy the always weak civil administration in large parts of the country, while further undermining civil defense and civic action programs. The government's inability to counter these tactics is a major weakness of its counterinsurgency program.

We believe political trends in El Salvador—the weakening center and rightward drift of the electorate—could further polarize politics, enhance oligarchic influence, and encourage increased inaurgent support. There is a better-than-even chance that an ARENA victory would signal some rollback of reforms, a fougher political and military posture against the left, and less inclination than the PDC to investigate human rights violations—attitudes that probably would encourage vigilantism.

For their part, the guerrillas are likely to continue to pursue a more violent and headline-grabbing military strategy to make cooperation with the government too dangerous, convey the image that momentum favors their side, and provoke the military into further human rights abuses. If the hard right clearly dominates the new administration, the left would probably pursue an even more violent strategy—more assassinations of high-level officials and the acquisition of more advanced weapons. (5 NF)

In the last year, there has been some increase in armed forces' and probably rightwing killings, pointing to the potential for escalation under an ARENA administration. In such an atmosphere, the government could

lose legitimacy at home and abroad, resulting in pressures for a curtailing of US assistance and growing sympathy—and tangible assistance for the insurgents.

Because Salvadoran Government performance is so heavily dependent on US aid levels, decisions in Washington will continue to be crucial for the country. The Salvadoran economy will maintain positive growth only by virtue of US economic assistance and emigrant remittances. A 25-percent cut in US economic aid, for example, would translate into a GDP loss of perhaps 3 to 5 percent Some observers believe that a deep decline in annual US military aid levels would push the army toward a bloody now-or-never offensive against the insurgents or alternatively promote a highly conservative defensive posture—either of which would have negative consequences for the government.

Regional peace initiatives are likely to present growing problems to a new povernment, especially if ARENA is in power. Only a border verification mechanism capable of interfering with Sandinista assistance to the guerrillas—a highly unlikely eventuality—would be perceived as beneficial. Otherwise, regional initiatives threaten to force negotiations with the FMLN, which the armed forces are likely to resist.

The guerrillas clearly want to shift the political battle to Washington and reinvigorate US political opposition to continuing military and economic support for the Salvadoran Government, and their recent peace proposals are part of that effort. Although there are probably some linked with the guerrilla left who wish seriously to pursue these negotiations, the insurgent leadership intends the peace proposals principally to stave off military pressure and it expects rejection of the proposals to legitimate intensification of the war

Should the insurgents offer a proposal that has genuine promise for a political settlement, US involvement and pressures will be crucial to overcome institutional resistance to compromise and keep the renegade right wing from destroying the political environment. For such involvement to be effective, however, Salvadoran authorities will have to remain convinced—via US aid levels—that US commitment to preventing a guerrilla takeover remains firm.

A negotiated agreement to postpone the election for six months in response to recent guerrilla proposals would not affect our judgment of the likely election outcome. In addition, we doubt that it would lead to a lasting settlement because, at a minimum, hardline insurgent elements would renew the guerrilla struggle.



Contents

	Page
Key Judgments	101
Discussion	1
The Economic Equation	1
Impact of the War	1
Future Aid Levels	2
The Current Political Dynamic	3
PDC Prospects	4
The Challenge From ARENA	4
The Left and the Election	6
Role of the Smaller Parties	8
The Military and the Election	8
The Balloting	8
The Insurgents Shifting Political-Military Strafegy	9
Implementing the Counteroffensive Plan	10
FMLN Problems	10
Likely Insurgent Adjustments in 1989	11
External Support	12
Government Counterinsurgency Performance	16
Armed Forces Performance Over the Longer Term	20
Impact of the Election on the War	21
An ARENA Victory: Two Scenarios	22
The Left's Postelection Strategy	23
External Factors	24
Nicaragua	24
The Peace Process	24
Implications for US Interests	26
The state of the s	- 70

Discussion 1

The halting performance of the economy and a guerrills war that threatens to drag into a second decade have escalated political tension and fed popular disenchantment in the runup to the March 1989 election. At stake in the election are political, economic, and strategic issues -potentially including the bilateral relationship with the United States that has been key to stability in El Salvador during the 1980s. The country's primary political actors—the incumbent centrist Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the rightist Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), and the guerrilla and political left-dispute even the basic realities of the situation. Each of them seeks to persuade not only the domestic population but also important foreign actors to embrace its perspective and support its solutions for the economy and the war. Dramatically different scenarios are possible for the country-and US interests depending upon who triumphs.

The Economic Equation

El Salvador, in coping with its myriad economic problems, faces the troop of relative success—due, in large part, to US aid and emigrant remittances—that nonetheless falls substantially short of popular aspirations. In 1988, El Salvador's economy registered a sixth consecutive year of GDP growth—1.5 percent—despite war, costs and losses of about \$130 million. Still, economic advances have not kept pace with the rapid population growth (currently at 2.6 percent), and per capits income has declined to 75 percent of

1 This Estimate projects according, political, and military trends in El Salvador largely over the next year, although analysis outlines developments in some measurem that look beyond 12 months in addition, it places judgments within the framework of the 19 March presidential electrics, assessing the implications of a win by either the Christian Democrats or the Nationalist Republican Alliefor for the prosecution of the year and economic management, and for US interests in the region

1980 levels. Again this year, we expect real GDP growth at the outside will not exceed 3 percent, and will probably be lower—ruling out any improvement in living standards. (See figures 1 and 2.)


Tight credit and foreign exchange hisited avestment and production in both 1987 and 1988. The financial constraints damping agricultural and industrial production were compounded by disturbances in power and water supplies, transportation shutdowns, infrastructure damage, bad weather, bureaucratic delays in construction contracts, and high investment risk due to the war and elections. Last year, implementation of structural economic adjustments—including stility rate hikes, a federal hiring freeze, and curtailment of capital expenditures -mitigated a 30-percent fall in coffee tax revenue. Nonetheless, both underemployment and unemployment remain very high, totaling as much as 50 percent of the work force, and nutrient intake for most of the population is below international standards

Even modest growth rates remain highly dependent on revenue from external transfers. Salvadoran remittances from the United States totaled \$300-400 million last year, contributing significantly to consumer purchasing activity. Total US sid—\$395 million for FY 1989—is equivalent to about 50 percent of El Salvador's budget. (See table 1.) Disbursement of FY 1989 funding has been delayed due to programmatic difficulties, however, and, if the bolden is extended for several months, it could eliminate positive economic growth this year.

Impact of the War

Without significant change in the domestic situation that would allow a reallocation of resources away from the military and war-related destruction and at

Figure 1 El Salvador: Selected Economic Indicators, 1982-88




the same time improve the investment climate, the government probably will continue its high levels of external dependency through the early 1990s. Indeed, much of the foreign aid is consumed as an offset to the direct and indirect economic damage dose by the war. Since 1979, total economic losses are estimated at nearly \$2 billion. We estimate that in 1989 the cost of such repairs will be in the neighborhood of \$150 million (see figure 3), owing to the insurgents more intensive economic targeting. In addition, the war has prevented a needed influx of foreign investment and led to a deterioration of industrial and agricultural productive capacity that has serious long-term implications.

Future Aid Levels

If US economic aid levels were cut significantly, this would force the government's budget deficit higher and compel a further restriction of credit and imports

In addition, since most of the budget goes for salaries, the administration would also be confronted with the need 4b make politically unpaletable reductions in the public-sector work force. In rough terms, if the US economic allocment were slashed by about 25 percent, then a + 2 percent growth rate would probably be driven to a GDP loss—perhaps in the neighborhood of 3 to 5 percent—in the year following the aid cut. In addition to attendant political and social difficulties, there would be an immediate psychological impact. Left, right, and center would see it as a step toward US disengagement, and the guerrillas would redouble their efforts to sever the remaining bonds between Washington and San Salvador.





The Current Political Dynamic

The flagging economy, along with war weariness and government corruption, has helped shift political flends in El Salvador—a strengthening right; a weak-ening, more fractious center; and a newly formed proguerrilla, but legal, left. The national leadership of the ruling PDC has been tarnished by scandal, internal divisions, and, most important, by the lack of clear success with the insurgency or the economy. The

rightwing ARENA party, cultivating a more moderate image, is the key beneficiary of rising dissatisfaction with the Christian Democrats. On the left, the growing realization that military pressure has little near-term chance of overturning the existing political structure probably contributed to the decision of guerrills allies like Guillermo Ungo and Ruben Zamora to return from foreign exile and reenter Salvadoran politics. (5 NF) Table I US Economic and Military Aid to El Salvador, 1980-88 Million 10: 5

	Durci Economic Autorance	Security Assistance	Total
1980	58 5	47	447
1981	Link k	10.5	Des
1983	185.6	3) 5	217.1
1981	2619	MJ	343.3
1984	2211	204.6	429.7
1981	428 E	1.56.3	545.1
1986	3171	131.9	419.0
1987 .	506.5	111.6	4)8.1
1988	312 4	11.0	414.0

Includes Economic Support Funds, Development Assistance, and PL-480.

This table is Unclassified

PDC Prospects

The divided Christian Democrats face an uphill struggle, and we doubt they can finish on top in the first round of the election unless they energize their campaign and overcome the political trends evident in the last legislative and municipal elections, where they were convincingly beaten (See figure 4.) Because they occupy the political center and because the dying President Duarte is still a charismatic figure, the Christian Democrats could still make a comeback. Their best elience is to deny the rightwing ARENA a first-round majority and then attract some of the smaller parties in a second round of balloting. With astute alliances and an aggressive campaign, the second round could be a dogfight too close to call.

To do so, however, the Christian Democrats will have to demonstrate that they are more responsive to the legislative and municipal protest votes stemming from mismanagement and corruption charges. They will also have to win back supporters from the majority bloc that show want a new party in government. Although we cannot fully assess the

pervasiveness of official excuption, failure to do more over the last few years than reassign a few cabinet ministers for alleged mindeeds has seriously damaged the party's image and fucied the popular belief that PIX corruption is rampant

The Challenge From ARENA

ARENA is now the country's largest and best organized party, and its new, more moderate image, embodied by candidate Alfredo Cristiani, is enhancing the party's election prospects. ARENA's founder Roberto D'Aubuisson and others linked to past death squad activities have allowed the moderate faction a widened public role while still exerting significant influence. Most party leaders, including Cristiani, admit that the party's appeal to conservative peasants—and the businessmen who are bankrolling the campaign—would want significantly without the presepon'of the charismatic D'Aubuisson.


In addition to hammering the Christian Democrats on the corruption issue, we believe a major plus for ARENA will be its successful attack on the government's inability to provide public security in the face of increased leftist violence and its failure to deliver promised development programs. In contrast to the perceived inability of the Christian Democrats to remedy the security situation, we judge that the public perceives an ARENA government as more willing to take a tougher posture toward violent demonstrators and those suspected of terrorism and sabotage. ARENA also has spent the last several years organizing on the local level and using party resources to provide a range of services to lower income voters in the countryside.

Includes \$52.9 million in earthquake essistance and \$147.3 million in supplemental appropriations.

Figure 3 Direct and Indirect Guerrilla Damage to Infrastructure, 1987 and 1988

5





The Last and the Election

The emergence of a legal leftist party, Democratic Convergence, lends greater legitimacy to the current political system, although its activities also assist the insurgent cause by facilitating leftist opposition groups and serving as a vehicle for insurgent propagands. Two of the three parties is the Democratic Convergence coalition are allied with the insurgent movement, and presidential candidate Ungo already has asserted that his campaign is not a serious quest for the office, but a vehicle for mobilizing popular pressure for negotiations—a key insurgent objective.

Whather the Convergence stays in the presidential rece depends upon how it—and the guerrilles—read the campaign. Intimidation from rightwing extremists or the prospect of being embarrassed by its own lackingter performance at the polls could prompt a pallout. In addition, the Convergence would likely have to withdraw if pressured by guerrilla commanders. On balance, there is perhaps a 1-in-3 chance it will pull out of the presidential race before election day, and, to the extent that neither the Christian Democrats nor ARENA treats recent Convergence-fielded guerrilla negotiating proposals seriously, the code probably rise

The Presidential Contenders and Their Platforms

Fidel Angel CHAVEZ Mena PDC Nominee

Key platform elements

- * No preconditioned negotiations with FMLN.
- · Continuation of regional peace process.
- Agrarian reform: no further land expropriations and greater self-management of cooperatives.
- Fiscal and trade policy: reduce deficit, crackdown on tax evasion and no new taxes, selective import substitution and aggressive export policy.
- . Supports close ties to the United States. (C NF)

AUredo CRISTIANI Buckbard ARENA Nominee


Key platform elements:

- . Open to negotiations with FMLN.
- Continuation of regional peace process, but make certain El Salvador is not seen as US lackey.
- * Agrarian reform: no further land expropriations, provision for private ownership of cooperative form plots.
- Fiscal and trade policy: reduce the deficit, simplify tax code, reduction of nominal rates, expansion of tax base, export-led development.
- Considers US involvement in domestic policy excessive. [C NF]

(continued)







Role of the Smaller Parties

Other than the main contenders and the leftist Democratic Convergence, only the PDC splinter group, the Authentic Christian Movement, could play a potentially significant role in the election. While a reunifcation of the PDC could enhance Chavez Mena's chances in a runoff, we believe the bitter party aplit tast fall will make a conciliation difficult, Neither the Authentic Christian Movement—nor the leftist Convergence—is likely to win more than 10 percent of the vote, but each is vying for third place, which will entitle the winner to a coveted seat on the powerful Central Election Council. The remaining smaller parties realize that they age not likely to attract significant support, and most appear inclined to back the front-runner, ARENA, in a projected second round.

The Military and the Election

We believe the armod forces will remain impartial, despite reported attempts by some civilians to solicit military support for their party. Only in the unlikely event of uncontrollable domestic violence by the left or the right would the politicary) as elast resort, step in to restore order. In our view, however, the initiary is well aware that their involvement would discredit the election and propardize prospects for international aid.

The Balleting

The election itself could be turbulent, especially if the left pulls out and the guerrilles ratchet up their disruptive activities—which is within their capabilities. Given restrictive voting regulations and some disillusion with the national contest, the turnout may be somewhat lower than in past years, but high enough to buttress legitimacy. The presence of international observers will also lend credibility to the process.

More than ever, the guerrillas' atrategy is also focused on the political and diplomatic arena. This is partly because of necessity forced upon them by improving Salvadoran military performance and partly because of the realization that their own declining but still

The Insurgents: Shifting Political-Military Strategy

of the realization that their own declining but still beginned with a talk / fight strategy that boosts their legitime that the same time, their more sophisticated target their sootsene impact but also to exaggerate their military prowess. Especially effective psychologically has been the boost of attacks in urban areas and traditionally safe locales in the countryside.

The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrille coalition has undergone major strategic shifts (See inset, page 10.) Following its unsuccrasful "final offeneive" sarty in 1981, the insurgents attempted to mate armed forces' growth and tectics in an etiempi to defeat them in conventional warfare. FMLN strength peaked at 9,000 to 11,000 combetants in 1984, as the guerrillas were unable to keep pace with the government's growing superiority in firenower, mobility, and strength. By the end of 1985, the insurgents had reorganized and shifted to a strainery of prolonged worders that concentrated on attrition of the military and the economic infrastructure. During this period, insurgent strength fell to 7,000 to 8,000 combatants, and the FMLN force structure stressed a greater reliance on smaller, more mobile units

In late 1986, while continuing to fight a prolonged war, the insurgents again shifted emphasis, this time preparing for a strategic counteroffensive. Although this strategic counteroffensive planning contained unrealistic elements, at its heart was a military offensive in which local insurgents and a greatly expanded fortingent of militia forces would conduct widespread ambush and sabotage activity to tie down government forces. FMLN strategic and special forces would meanwhile attack major armed forces facilities.

More troubling and problematic will be whether the loser accepts the results. Both the PDC and ARENA have claimed publicly that the other is preparing to steal the election, and, while some of the rhetoric is only propagandizing, there are elements in the parties willing to cry foul, no matter what the process or outcome. Although it is not the most likely scenario, if one of the major candidates were to denounce the returns, the left would reap a propaganda windfall that could contribute to wider polarization and violence.



Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMIN)

The FMLN is generally Marxist-Leninist, pro-Cuban, and decidedly anti-US. All five guerrilla groups comprising the FMLN trace their origin, directly or indirectly, to the Salvedoran Communist Party. Many in the leadership of these groups drew their political training from Salvedoran student politics of the early 1970s: Marxist, violence prone, and antagonistic toward the United States.

Despite the dominance of Marxism-Leminism within the FMLN, there are periodic differences of opinion over strategic priorities and revolutionary tactics. The People's Revolutionary Army, for example, has long stressed the primacy of military action in bringing about revolution, while the Armed Forces of National Resistance has placed more emphasis on political organization. These differences do not, however, represent fundamental divisions regarding the FMLN's Marxist-Lexinist ideological underpinnings. In this regard, the FMLN shares many similarities with the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicarague. Were the FMLN to ever come to power, we believe that as with the FSLN-It would conlesce around a Leninist domestic policy of one party control and ultimate socialization of the economy and a foreign policy centered on close relations with Cuba and hostility toward the United States

Implementing the Counteroffensive Plan

Tactically, FMLN operations are influenced by both the strategic counteroffensive strategy and by government operations and capabilities. The insurgents continue to emphasize low-risk actions to wear down both the economy and the armed forces, and mass only for significant operations such as attacks against garrisons. (See figure 5.) In 1988, the insurgents staged 12 attacks against large- and medium-size targets—the same number as 1987. However, 1988 attacks were less effective in terms of casualties inflicted (28 percent less).

FMI.N military activity did increase dramatically in major urban centers during 1987 and 1988 with more visible and violent actions, especially in San Salvador where actions tripled between 1986 and 1988. (See figure 6.) The use of vehicle-taunched "rampas"—a locally manufactured mortar-like device—has permitted the FMLN to conduct headline-grabbing daylight attacks on major government facilities without a significant risk of insurgent assets.


Local government presence is a major, continuing target for the insurgency with attacks against town-halls and civil defense units rising over the past two years. Following the assassinations of nine mayors in 1988, large numbers of local officials have received death threats and some 49 mayors have resigned in the last year, representing 18 percent of the municipal posts.

FMLN Problems

Despite its aggressive activity in several areas, however, the FMLN has been able only partially to mitigate the effect of increasingly longer government incursions into its base areas. (See figure 7.) Diversionary operations and greater exhibitation of key support and command elements out of home areas by the guerribas have still left them vulnerable to armed forces disruptions of their operational planning, logistic, recruitment, and training activities.

We assess current FMLN combatant strength to be 6,000 to 7,000 (see figure 8)—a 15- to 19-percent drop from 1986 strength figures. Because of the counteroffensive philosophy, there has also been a major reordering in the composition of troops, reflecting FMLN emphasis on local forces and militis at the expense of strategic forces. Although this reordering is a sophisticated adjustment to government combat effectiveness, the drop in overall combatant strength indicates that the FMLN has been unsuccessful in its goal to increase greatly the number of local and militia forces through new recruitment.

Figure 5
El Salvador: Insurgent-Initiated Incidents by Type, 1982-88



"A ferrolal harde action against a Richaery growner.
Force (also exclud an annual).

"A military action against a moving professional form

"Military potions such as empires, bibling a small number of whether or display notions that more invested to become programmed operations reader than to default these."

*Demonstries of information by areas such as beafters and briefings. Distantic actions without websit tention are not required properties. *The descript of fading the supper greenwall advance;


Piece Date office the contents of the few years.
This work has provided an interest of the contents of the con

The FMLN's military emphasis on the urban theater is designed to be complemented by an increasingly militarized and active front group apparatus, but here the guerrillas have made little headway. While front group demonstrations have become more violent, they remain small—an indication that popular support is not expanding in the cities. More important, they have not drawn a repressive response from government security forces. Furthermore, in spite of continuing FMLN penetration of labor unions, the FMLN is not significantly closer to being able to call an effective general strike.

Likely Insurgent Adjustments in 1989
We judge that the FMLN cannot faunch a politicalmilitary offensive along the lines of its proposed
strategic counteroffensive in 1989:

 Although the FMLN has developed new militia units, these forces are concentrated in or near FMLN base areas, do not operate independently, and would be of only marginal value in a strategic counteroffensive.

Figure 6 Insurgent-Initiated Military Incidents 'In San Salvador Area, 1964-88



- Includes assets becomes ententes entent
- The FMLN has not greatly increased the pace of its purely military operations nor has it been able to bring about a lasting strategic dispersion of government forces.
- FMLN from groups and penetrations of the armed forces are not able to foment a popular or military insurrection.

Although the FMLN is unlikely to abandon its strategic counteroffensive strategy largely because of concerns about internal morals, we believe the insurgent leadership realizes that a near-form political-military victory is not possible. Without abandoning preparations for an eventual strategic counteroffensive, the FMLN new apparently believes its best opportunity is to exploit the existing domestic and international political climate to force a decrease in US aid to the Salvadoran Government and pressure the government to nepositive


We believe I MI N poblical military operations over the next year will focus on boosting the perception of the wability of the insurgency. Militarily, this means a heavy volume of high-visibility, low-risk operations. The insurgents already are conducting coordinated barasament sprees of up to eight actions in a single department in a single night. Electrical saborage also is being conducted in concentrated sports to enhance impact. The insurgents are capable of combining a horassment and sabotage spree with a significant attack to create the impression of military initiative. In terms of logistics and manpower, the insurgency probably can sustain a beavy volume of low-risk operations with only brief lulis (15 to 30 days). (See figure 9.) We judge that these operations, in spite of heavy publicity, will not significantly after the present military balance. They will, however, result in a somewhat greater threat to US facilities and personnel-particularly since the FMLN is becoming increasingly less hesitant to employ terrorut tactics and to attack US targets.

In addition, we believe the FMLN may publicly announce a shift from the preparatory phase to the preliminary phase of the strategic counteroffssive. This rhetorical leap will mean nothing in terms of insurgent military capabilities, but may receive international attention and bolster insurgent morals.

External Support

Still key to insurgent strategy and current force structure is the continuing flow of external support.

Such support—especially ammunition—remains the critical factor in allowing the FMLN to conduct military operations at current levels.



Portion timeration a

DC Filtermine

-







Base areas: Areas where strategic mobile forces.

focal guerrilla units, major command elements, and
service and support organizations are consistently
located in addition, these areas nonneally contain
a sophisticated, well-established guerrilla entrastructure

Desputed areas. Areas in which the guarrilles are contesting the military for control Such an area may evidence some of the characteristics of a base area to include hering communical elements and local guarrille units based in the area, with an occasional strategic mobile force until being camped in it.

715447 740





-

84

1987


The insurgents have attempted to alleviate their continuing dependence on external material support by locally manufacturing "popular" weapons. These efforts have produced an impressive number of homemade weapons that the insurgents are using with increasing success, but the programs produce little small-arms ammunition—the most critical insurgent requirement.

the FMLN must innitrate at least 70 percent of its basic ammunition needs—and 100 percent for such items as AK-47 rifles and RPG-2/7 rocket launchers. In addition, the insurgents must infiltrate large numbers of fuses and blasting caps to make homemede mines.

In 1987, the rebels captured only \$2,000 rounds of rifle ammunition from the government—compared to the 300,000 rounds stored in a single guerrilla ware-house. The insurgents have set up small ammunition manufacturing facilities, but these have done little to close the big gap between expended ammunition and domestic sources of supply and acquisition. Last year, army pairols uncovered more large caches of ammunition than previously, also pointing toward major external flows.


Weapons of various types also continue to be infiltrated into El Salvador. While weapons infiltration is at a lower level than in 1983 and 1984, the insurgents need to replace older Vietnam-era M-16s, arm their new forces, and replace weapons lust to the government. Currently, the insurgents are losing two weapons to the government for every one they capture. (See table 2.) Captured guerrillas also are reporting that some units are now being equipped with AK-47 rifles vice the M-16/AR-15. We believe that Nicaragus—often acting in concert with Cubs—continues to be the logical conduit for much of the insurgents' logistic needs.

Figure 9
FMLN Force Structure, Strength by Faction, and Type of Force



DESCRIPTION AND

Figure 10 Seaborne Logistic Deliveries to Salvadoran Insurgents, 1987-88



*Like 1967, 1965 and 1966 deliveres averaged a ustal of 26 per year

Table 2 FMLN Weapons Losses

	Last 10 Military *	Captered from Military	Nei Lou	
1965	1,235	254	961	
1984	710	334	383	
987	941	436	513	
1948	18)	400	574	

Name: This table shows that, in the last two years nions, the FMLN has been marry 1,100 overpoon more than it has captured from the military. These figures do not make into account the additional depictions of the generalis investory due to narmal wase and test of the party of the last of

Monetary donations from Western organizations. including some in the United States, continue to meet a significant portion of insurgent financial seeds the dimensions of financial sid is scattered, but sufficient to underline its continued importance to the war effort.

Tevesled that one of the largest guerrilla factions—but still only one of five—acquired \$2.5 million courier admitted to carrying from \$40,000 to \$70,000 per month, which would equate to \$480,000 to \$540,000 per year transported by a single individual from one faction.

Various ruses are used to attract and divers funds

a guerrilla-dominated labor coalition sought
in funding for a new building, and, while
organization estimated this was three
times the necessary amount, other organizations serviced the request.

the
guerrilla-dominated human rights group
COMADRES


the insurgent fections, although the money had originally been provided by a companization to aid displaced children.

Government Comissionary Performance

Over the past few years, the government has implemented a two-track counterinaurgency strategy to defeat the still well-supplied and reasonably well-funded FMLN. It is based on large-scale sustained military operations and a nationwide civic action/civil defense program; the military track has been much more successful than the latter.

Salvadoran military performance has improved markedly since 1984, and the armed forces are now able to conduct more frequent and effective large-scale sweep





operations throughout the country. Further, the military has become somewhat more aggressive offensively, and its development and use of tactical intelligence also has improved measurably, contributing to a greater effectiveness in defensive operations as well (See figure 12.)

Government casualties are relatively high to absolute terms, but the army will probably have little difficulty in replacing its losses in the next year or two. The morale of the armed forces is good and likely to remain so. Officers are generally optimistic about the course of the war, although for most this is predicated on continued support from the United States.

We do not expect this situation to substantially change in 1989. The military can continue to maintain pressure on the insurgents, to temporarily disrupt guerrilla hase areas, to preempt insurgent preparations for major attacks, and to incrementally reduce guerrilla strength. (See figure %) Its manpower and firepower superiorities will lead to continued measured progress that is likely to reduce the military effectiveness of the insurgency without dramatically reducing its scope.

Military operations tend not to be guided by overarching goals, however, but to be piecemeal. A good example are the multibattalion offensives that disrupt guerrilla base areas but only on a temporary basis since they do not result in a permanent expansion of government presence and control. Uneven leadership—because of an overreliance on seniority rather than merit for military promotion—leads to inconsistent application of the kind of aggressive small-unit tactics necessary to decisively engage and defeat the insurgents.

Perhaps more important, the civic action/civil defense program has never had atrong government or military support and continues to founder. The civic action program targets key rural areas with projects designed to extend government services and security, but, despite its ostensible importance, military and civilian support waned in 1988. Overall progress has been uneven over the years because of civilian bureaucratic ineptitude, inadequate funding, and the failure of a sometimes indifferent military to provide adequate security.

Within the past year, there has been increased rhetoric and emphasis on a new "hearts and minds" strategy, but operations have had mixed and somewhat limited results. The government and military attempted to effect a coordinated campaign in Chaletenango Department to displace the guerrillas both militarily and politically; the operation has been plagued with delays and has been short on results. Colonel Ponce, the new Chief of Stuff, also initiated a concerted campaign in eastern El Salvador by undertaking military/civil operations to establish a permanent military presence in certain FMLN rones (See inset.) The campaign provoked an intensive and ongoing guerrille campaign of threats and assassinations against civilians and elected officials, however, which the military was unprepared for and largely unable to counter.

The FMLN's use of terror and assassinations against mayors and other government officials, while distasteful to many Salvadorans, has underscored the government's inability to protect those who support it. The terror campaign has the potential to destroy the always weak civil administration in large parts of the country, while further undermining civil defense and civic action programs. The government's inability to counter these tactics is a major weakness of its counterinsurgency program.

With military assistance declining and the Salvadoran accommy stagnating, it is doubtful the government could expand current programs. Even when US assistance was higher, civic action programs foundered

Is Rightwing Violence Growing! .

The human rights situation appears to have worsened during the past year, although the overall level of politically inspired murders remains for below that of the early 1980s. While the Marxist insurgents continue to account for the majority of killings, we believe that rightwing extremists and some members of the armed forces increasingly are reacting to the government's seeming inability to control insurgent terrorism. (See figures 11 and 14.)

None of the confirmed cases of political killings has been attributed to the right, but extremists probably are responsible for some of what the haracterizes as "suspicious" killings. In which no clear motive can be established. Circumstances surrounding many of the crimes—torture, assassinations by groups, and bodies being dumped some distance from the scene of a crimeare trademarks of death squad killings in the

* Note on data: A number of organizations pather and publicate transaction information on political killings and other human rights abuses in El Salvador Some of their grants couples questionable methodologies, and others have been reposted to be fronts for the insurgency. The data and have were observed.

procise, we believe they accurately reflect trends in political

early 1980s. Three new groups have recently announced their existence—the Revolutionary AntiCommunist Extermination Action, the Central
American Anti-Communist Hand, and the Eastern
Anti-Communist Communi-and are threatening
to kill leftists in retaliation for guerrilla terrorism.
Rightists no doubt have perpetrated some of the
political killings, but we have no reidence they are
acting with the explicit sunction of ARENA leaders. Even party hardliness like Roberto D'Aubuitson probably are relucted to risk negative political fallout through the rockless use of illegal
violences.


la contrast to regarding rightwing killings, there has been a discernible increase in confirmed political killings by the armed forces. We attribute these mostly to low-ranking soldiers and policemen, rather than to a broad, high-level conspiracy. The afficer carps generally is aware of the political sensitivities associated with the human rights issue and wants to avoid a cutoff of vital US military assistance. Many afficers probably do cover up such crimes to avoid damage to the armed forces pressing and legitimacy.

because of inadequate funds. In addition, although there are few officers who advocate death squad methods, there is still no indication that the officer corps is ready to investigate and punish human rights violations by officers above the rank of lieutenant. This tends to undermine efforts to win and retain support in contested areas. (See inset and figures 13 and 14.)

Armed Forces Performance Over the Longer Term

The efforts to remedy deficiencies and pursue reforms, while not likely to have a dramatic short-term impact, will have an important bearing on the broader course of the war just as they have had a cumulative effect to date. Assuming current trends, we believe that the armed forces is likely to grind down the insurgency militarily over the next three to five years, perhaps reducing its personnel size by one-third. This would sharply reduce the FMLN's capability to conduct medium- to large-scale attacks on strategic targets. Nevertheless, the guerrillas will still be able to conduct a prolonged war, depending ever more heavily on terrorism, sabotage, and small-scale attacks. The guerrillas, while unable to seize power, will continue to threaten senously the security and stability of the country. (See figure 15.)

Figure 13 El Selvador: Human Rights Situation




Most critical to any projection remains the level of external aid to the government. The military is highly dependent on assistance from the United States, which provides nearly all its arms, munitions, spare parts, maintenance, training, and medical supplies US military aid has been declining since 1984-in part due to a leveling off in the growth of the armed forces. The military was able to cope with a sizable reduction in FY 1988 by utilizing unspent funds from the previous year. The present level of aid is sufficient to meet day-to-day operational needs, but further reductions would threaten to cer into combat capabilities and to provoke morale problems. Some observers believe that a deep decline in sanual assistance would push the military toward a bloody "now or never" offensive against the insurgents and their sympathizers or a highly conservative defensive posture. Either would have clearly negative consequences for human rights and the prospects of democratic government.

Impact of the Election on the War

Regardless of which party wins the presidential election, the general prosecution of the war will remain
the province of the armed forces, which tolerates little
interference from civilians. A new Christian Democrat government would be especially unlikely to deviate from the way the war has been conducted. While
many individual—and perhaps even the majority ofofficers and soldiers are pro-ARENA, we do not
believe the military would serrender very much of its
authority or sublimate its institutional interests even
to archeonservative politicians. The armed forces will
also continue to have a de facto veto over concessions
the guerrillas may demand in any future negotiations
regardless of the government in power. In a more

Figure 14
El Salvador: Confirmed Political Killings
Outside of Combat, 1987-88



general sense, however, the weakening of the political center threatens to interrupt the momentum of social and economic reforms, which could further polarize Salvadoran society, enhance oligarchic interests, and simultaneously encourage increased support for the insurgents.

An ARENA Victory: Two Scenarios

We believe that an ARENA victory could have an indirect—but profound—impact on the course of the war. The prospect of a government firmly in the hands of the right signals a tougher stand, politically and militarily, against the left. An ARENA government would be less inclined than a PDC administration to investigate political crimes by the right and to punish offenders—a process complicated in any event by

El Salvador's corrupt and mellicient judicial system It is also likely that the ascendancy of ARINA would be perceived by some extremists as giving tacit encouragement to anti-left vigilantism bailure by the next government to demonstrate a commitment to democratic values and human rights could result in the loss of vital US assistance and undermine the government's popular legitimacy. An ARENA government dominated by extremists like Roberto D'Aubuisson or Sigifredo Ochos might, in the name of nationalism, move to curtail or minimize US influence. It also could seek quick, dramatic gain against the insurgency by resurrecting death squads, prompting international condemnation of the government, and generating sympathy possibly even tangible support for the guerrillas

Alternatively, an ARENA administration either dominated by moderates, or in which the hardliners curb their behavior, probably would not try to alter the current approach to the war. Such a government, recognizing the importance of continued US assistance, would attempt to maintain reasonably good relations with Washington. Should US economic and military aid levels remain relatively constant and the new government do nothing to propardize its own political standing, we would expect a further weakening of the insurgency, albeit at the current measured page. ARENA, which already has contacts with rebel leaders, they continue talks in the hope of building domestic support, improving its own international image, and maintaining US funding levels.

At a minimum, however, we would expect an ARENA administration, whether moderate or extremist, to receitablish legislation—which lapsed in early 1987—limiting civil liberties for suspected guerrillas. Such a move would facilitate operations by the military and police but also would provide ammunition for human rights critics. Any ARENA government is also likely to crack down on guerrilla front groups and pursue an aggressive legislative agenda. It probably would not move wholesale to undo all of Duarte's social and economic reforms, but the party's

Figure 15		
El Salvador:	Key	Indicators

Strength	of the Construment	(994	1986	Strengt	t of the Selvadoran Imurguery	1984	1986
Patitical	o magazini			Publical			
	Portuge associates	•	•		Frange smotance		0
	Foreign mingroters/state of extension				Popular expert/assperation		0
	Government average usury			-	lamps where and unity	•	
	Legil/Bigd amagnion		•	-	Named Horigo	•	
	Local government control/pressure				Psychological operations		
	Over eriem/psychological operations	0		-	Interespond strape		0
	Popular support/ingramacy			Miles			
	toware perference	0	0	-	Military ministres		
Military					Comba profesorry	0	
	Strangy and Gatter	0		-	Wagens / Equation		
	Military aggregations	0		~	Troop distupless/execute		
	Onlymbury mission	0			Resident Australia	•	
	Military present in result areas.	0			Geographic maps of operations		
-	Urban control		0		Laure pres		
	Availability of mapons/Egypter		•		Litter of laterman	0	. 0
	Temp morale						
	the of inadigues	0					
	Respect for beaute rights	0	94				

strong ties to conservative businessmen and landowners will incline it to shift the country's economic program to loosen state control of marketing and probably to roll back at least some of the agrarian reform.

The future role and agenda of ARENA hardliners, most notably D'Aubuisson, remain the critical variables in how far and fast ARENA would try to move D'Aubuisson is politically savvy, and the moderate tone of the ARENA campaign reflects his appreciation for the practical need to distance the party from its extremist reputation. He probably understands the value of continued US assistance but is rash, and harbors deep resentment against the United States that could overwhelm other interests.

The Left's Postslection Strategy

We believe the insurgents and their allies will persist in their efforts to delink the United States from the Salvadoran Government, regardless of which party wins the presidency. An ARENA administration would sharpen the existing polarization in Salvadoran politics and enhance the effectiveness of insurgent propagands. Nonetheless, we believe the insurgents will pursue essentially the same postelection guidelines against an ARENA or a PDC government, albeit with some differences in degree and emphasis.

Resources have been a primary determinant of leftists' tactics and so limit their options. We expect they will attempt to intensify their urban campaign of sabotage, terrorism, strikes, and demonstrations in the capital and other cities. Militarily, the guerrillas will opt for additional high-visibility, low-risk attacks on military targets, similar to those carried out in the capital in late 1988 and early 1989.

An ARENA administration, however, maps also prompt the guerrillas to heighten a dirty war with efforts to assassinate high-level targets. The guerrillas would reason that the real and imagined reputations of ARENA party chiefs provide both bester justification and offer greater likelihood of sparking the hardline response they have unaucoessfully sought during the Christian Democrats' tenure. In addition, the guerrillas and their Cuban and Nicaraguan benefactors might come to believe that increased or more sophisticated arms were a more justified gamble in such an environment where international scrutiny would be directed more toward the government than the guerrillas.

External Factors

Micarague. Under most likely scenarios for Central America, the Sandinistas will be able to devote increased attention to their goal of promoting revolution in the region:

- In the event of a regional political settlement, the Sandinistas would continue to support the FMLN with logistics and material, even if they were bound by the settlement to cease such support.
- Absent a settlement, a winding down of the Nicaraguan Resistance effort would have limited, but positive, effect for El Salvador's insurpents, principally through freeing up some Nicaraguan military supplies for ultimate provision to the FMLN. Some Resistance weapons might also find their way to the FMLN.

Managua—in conjunction with Havana—would, however, carefully assess increased support of the FMLN, balancing its impact in El Salvador with likely US and other international reaction (See inset.) Managus would probably regard moderate increases

in the supply of equipment currently in the FMLN inventory as a relatively safe risk, although this would probably not have a decisive impact on the fighting. The Sandinistas probably would avoid dramatic measures -such as the introduction of new and more sophisticated weapons-that it believed could trigger a reestablishment of US lethel aid to the Resistance But if the Resistance were completely neutralized or if the Sandinistas did not regard US military action as a credible possibility-Niceragus would be positioned to expend the scope of its assistance. The FMLN would become a substantially more dangerous adversary were this assistance to include SA-7 surface-toair missiles and crew-served weapons such as heavy morters. The effect would not simply be the military impact but the psychological one. The Salvadoran military, like their counterparts in Nicaragua, would, after initial losses, adjust to the provision of SA-7s to guerrilla forces. The momentum, confidence, and morale of government forces could be substantially graded, however, especially if such escalation went unanswered by Washington.

The Peace Process Prospective regional peace agreements are a double-edged sword for the Salvadoran Government that on belance are likely to present growing political and public relations problems rather than practical solutions. This is likely to be especially true if an ARENA government is in power. In almost all cases, the guerrills left is the most obvious beneficiary.

The only regional peace initiative the government would welcome is a border verification mechanism capable of interfering with Sandinista logistic assistance to the FMLN—a highly unlikely outcome given demonstrated problems in terms of practical implementation and lack of political will. Otherwise, the Esquipulas II peace process and related regional initiatives threaten to force the government into negotiations with the FMLN, which the armed forces are likely to resist strongly, adding to civil-military problems. Indeed, if the Sandinistas and the Resistance resufte talks under the Sapus Agreement or a new

Cuban, Soviet, and Sandinista Perspectives on the Insurgency

Cuba and Nicaragua have long been the principal supporters of the Salvadoran insurpency Managua, probably reflecting Hovana's guidance, openly promotes a political settlement in El Salvador while continuing to surreptitiously provide the guerrillas with military aid Nicaragua's role consists primarily of providing transportation, warrhousing, and coordination for deliveries of supplies from Cuba, including arms and ammunition support. It also encompasses training, safehaven, safe transit, and secure communications facilities to support the insurgent military network. We have no convincing evidence that the Soviets are providing direct military assistance to the Salvadoren guerrillas. However, Mascow does give financial assistance and military training to the Communist Party of El Salvador, which is included in the FMLN.

We believe Cuba and Nicaragua over the short term will try to keep both the political and military options open. Havana's interest in the political track could begin to wane in the months ahead, however, and military pressure could be stepped fup if the political environment changes—for example, if the Central American Peace Plan digintegrates or if a radical rightist government is elected. Similarly, if the insurgency began to pase a

credible threat of a military overthrow, we believe Havana and Managua would throw their weight behind the attempt.

Havana also provides military training, arms, and logistic support to the FMLN, in addition to more visible medical and propaganda aid. Fidel Castro, who helped the disparate factions that comprise the FMLN to unite in 1980, also continues to mediate disputes within the group and to after tactical advice.

For their part, the Soviets see political action as the most promising means for the left to increase influence and to avoid being held responsible for any escalation in the fighting. While TASS coverage of insurgent activity is favorable. Moscow is critical of the guerrillas for being inflexible and thinks them naive for believing they can adeat the government militarily. The Soviets turned down an FMLN request for

the Soviets have expressed interest in the prospects of the Democratic Convergence and have invited the Democratic Convergence and have invited the Mascow. By trying to build relationships with such leaders, the Soviets hope over the longer term to broaden their influence in Son Salvador.

framework, international pressure for El Salvador to pursue a parallel process could enhance the FMLN's bargaining position.

The recent FMLN negotiating proposal suggests the possibility that the guerrillas are under pressure to consider more seriously a political settlement. The proposal—presented to the government by the church—involves postponement of the election respect for its outcome and elected officials, and drops longstanding demands for power sharing and restructuring of the armed forces. (See inset, page 26.) It is

intended at least as much for international as for domestic impact. Although there are probably some linked to the guerrilla left who wish seriously to pursue these negotiations, indicates the insurgent leadership views the peace proposal principally as designed to stave off military pressure, and it expects rejection of the proposal to legitimate intensification of the war.

particular, the armed forces' commitment to democracy and acceptable practices in the field continues to hinge on their dependence on US support.

Given the strong antigringo streak in D'Aubusson and his cohorts, if ARENA were in control of the government, a substantial reduction of US aid could spark a brutal military effort to wipe out the guer-rillas and their supporters, along with reciprocal FMLN atrocities. The quick result might be a temporary but pyrrhic gain, which would be eliminated as new insurgent recruits and higher levels of external aid would gradually turn the war back to 1983-84 levels.

Should the FMLN offer a proposal that has genuine promise for a political settlement. US involvement and pressures will almost certainly be crucial in overcoming institutional resistance to compromise and keeping the renegade right wing from destroying the political environment. For such involvement to be effective, however, Salvadoran civil and military authorities will have to remain convinced that US commitment to preventing a guerrilla takeover remains firm.

Other scenarios could include

 A negotiated agreement to postpone the election in response to recent guerrille proposals. This would not affect our judgment of the likely election outcome. In addition, we doubt that it would lead to a lasting settlement because, at a minimum, hardline elements in the FMLN would renew the guerrilla struggle

- The aplintering of the FMI N, with some factions pursuing interests through the system and others fighting on
- A degenerative weakening of the system caused by increased political polarization and intraparty factionalism combined with more rapid economic decline, enabling the FMLN to exploit the ensuing political chaos.

In the last case, uncertainty about the reliability of LIS economic and military support would be a key factor contributing to government paralysis and a deteriorating military situation, possibly facilitating a Sandinista-style revolution led by the FMLN



SPECIAL ANALYSIS

EL SALVADOR: The Significance of Popular Support

//The critical factor in El Salvador now is the military situation and arms flow. Over the medium term, however, the compaign to gain support from a disenchanted public will be a decisive factor.//

//The left came close to igniting a national insurrection early last year-well before the accelerated arms
flow--because of its popular backing. Membership in
axtremist-controlled front groups exceeded 60,000, and
guerrille groups were making inroads in urban labor.
The combination of street demonstrations--in some cases
drawing tens of thousands--and strikes was beginning to
threaten the government's control of San Salvedor.//

//The government arrested the left's momentum by launching reforms and by improving security measures in the capital, but these programs have virtually stalled. The majority of the population, repelled by the violence on both sides, is still uncommitted.//

drawbacks of alienating the populace. Previously, they had boasted publicly of accree of indiscriminate killings during takeovers of various towns. They are now more actively cultivating domestic support by reducing attacks on population centers and beveloctablished their own radio stations.//

//The insurgents, however, are not attracting much popular support. Recruitment for the everrilla forces does not appear to be picking up.//

..

-- continued

Pr-proved for Release NOV 1993 armed insurgents and perhaps several thousand part-time co'laborators. Moreover, querrills ranks were at least temporarily thinned by several hundred casualties during the recent offensive.//

- 1 / · · ·

need a spectacular military success or a continuation of government insensitivity and abuse. Conversely, if the government is able to curb the excesses that characterize life in £1 Salvador today and follow through on reforms, it will begin to turn the tide and gain adherents for its cause.//

popular support. They know that failure to push shead with their reform program leaves them vulnerable. Lack of technical and financial resources, however, and the continuing violence have permitted little forward movement on land reform, the heart of the junta's economic program.

/Most of El Zalvador's cultivated land has been targeted for expropriation and redistribution, but adequate
technical assistance, ferm credit, and marketing organization are simply not available. Phase one of the land
reform, redistribution of the largest estates, was largely
completed last year. Management problems on the cooperative, however, have reduced yields and encouraged shifting
from production of export to basic food crops.//

//Phase two, the expropriation of the medium-sized farms has been shelved because of the impact this would have on the country's already dwindling export earnings. Completion of the so-celled 'land-to-the-tiller' phase is far off in the future. Trained administrative and technical personnel to edminister this ambitious undertaking are not available.//

//The land reform program has enraged the right. It also is opposed by the left since it threatens to increase peasant support for the government. As a result, gunman



from both factions are killing peasants on the newly formed cooperatives and intimidating land reform administrators.//

//Despite the pressing military problems, the junta's greatest longer run vulnerability is violence that is officially tolerated. The murders in November of left-ist political leaders, including a minister of the first reform junta, were the work of security forces.//

//Summary execution of prisoners is a standard practice. Widespread, and often random, violence by private rightwing groups is viewed as part of government repression because there is no official move to curb it.//

Luarte and his Christian Democratic Party have been tarnished, and the conditional support for the government—among the populace and abroad—has been jeopardised. Many members of the 150,000-strong peasant union, the principal beneficiary of land reform, probably blame government—allied thugs for the murder of union leader viera in January.//

the government and have major influence, this month warned the government and have major influence, this month warned the government that it will lose their support if it does not improve labor relations witin 80 days. Salvadoran and US labor organisations want the government to open a genuine dialogue with union landers--rather than what they believe has been arrogant treatment. They also want ultraconservative officers eacked.//





SPECIAL ANALYSIS

ZEL SALVADOR: Government's Performance and Problems

El Salvador's provisional government is having some success in improving the numan rights record, carrying out the reform process, and professionalising the armed forces. The chaotic economic situation and political divisiveness, however, leave the government vulnerable to political crises and military setbacks.

The government has arrested and charged civilian vigilantes and security force personnel with specific political killings. Members of the official civil defense force have been apprehended for the murders of peasants suspected of supporting the left.

The military commission investigating the killings in January 1981 of two US labor advisers has made considerable progress. New witnesses have come forward, and Investigators believe they can now identify the killers and their accomplices -- several officers and enlisted members of the National Guard and wealthy businessmen.


The government and military also have publicly renewed their pledge to put the reform process into effect. The controversial assembly decree that postponed further distribution of most lands under Phase III of the agrarian reform has been clarified. A special committee that includes a senior military officer and a top leader of the largest farmworkers' union has been established to oversee future revisions in the reforms.

In addition, the government has accelerated the awarding of both provisional and permanent land titles to peasants, and the armed forces have begun to intervene against landowners who have illegally evicted peasant renters. Rural labor leaders, who earlier were concerned over possible reversals in the reform process, now say they are more confident of the regime's commitment to carry it out.

--continued

Approved for Raleasa NOV 1993







The agrarian reform issue underscores the government's difficulty in satisfying both the social needs of the peasant population and the economic concerns of the urban classes. Much of the land affected by the reform is devoted to export crops, which provide foreign exchange and funds needed to purchase imports for the productive sectors. As production declines, unemployment and underemployment—currently estimated at 50 percent—will worsen.

The government depends heavily on international financial aid to keep the economy afloat. The level of such aid is largely determined by foreign donors' views of the regime's political capabilities and intentions.


Deep personal and ideological rifts probably will continue to plaque the provisional government. Personal vendettas and lack of dialogue and compromise among politicians will complicate proceedings in a 60-member constituent assembly comprised of four disparate conservative parties and the liberal Christian Democrats. The lack of legal and parliamentary experience among most legislators also will continue to cause problems.

The executive branch is more professional. It also is divided, however, among the major parties and headed by a nonpartisan president who appears unwilling to test fully the powers of his office.

President Magana views himself as an interim mediator among rival political interests. Although strong willed and outspoken, he seeks to avoid straining the fragile power-sharing arrangement among the parties and the military.

The armed forces appear united in their support for the civilian government and in keeping their distance from partisan politics. Senior officers, however, will insist on the need to increase domestic and international confidence in the regime and to secure the foreign aid needed to rebuild the economy and defeat the insurgents. The high command has established its own policy committee to communicate its views to the civilian government.

--continued



Military Situation

The government's mixed political record is matched by the military's spotty performance on the battlefield. The costly recapture of the towns of San Fernando and Perquin, for example, highlighted both the strengths and deficiencies of the armed forces.

The fighting in Morazan Department was perhaps the most intense of the two-year conflict, and government forces suffered substantial casualties. They were handicapped by poor intelligence preparation and by command and control, logistic and communications problems.

The rapid deployment of several thousand well-equipped troops, however, showed significant improvement in quick-reaction capabilities. The armed forces also showed better coordination in the last days of the fighting. They were supported by six newly arrived US A-37 ground attack aircraft and by three Honduran infantry battalions that helped block insurgent escape routes across the border.

The guerrillas will be hard pressed to sustain their momentum by launching an offensive similar to the one in Morazan any time soon. Units elsewhere are not as large or well equipped and organized as those in the east. The insurgents probably will thus concentrate on localized attacks against military outposts and economic sabotage.

Guerrilla leaders remain divided over political and military strategy. In coming months, insurgent operations are likely to reflect more the priorities of individual factions than any blueprint of the joint command in Micaragua. Specially trained units, however, are still able to carry out spectacular offensive missions, such as the destruction of the Oro Bridge last October and the sabotage in January of the airbase at Ilopango.





The current trend of maint government gains and setbacks on both the political and military fronts seems likely to continue over the next several months. The insurgents, meanwhile, do not appear able to launch a renewed large-scale offensive in the near term. They retain their ability, however, to intensify the war of attrition periodically.



Special Analysis

EL SALVADOR:

Duarte's First 100 Days

President Duarte has markedly enhanced El Salvador's image at home and abroad by asserting his authority over the armed forces and working to improve the country's human rights situation. His first 100 days have been relatively calm, but have seen no real progress in resolving economic problems or developing a national war strategy.

Duarte's Achievements

The 58-year-old Christian Democrat has achieved several key objectives:

- Establishment of his authority as the first popularly elected civilian president in El Salvador in more than a half a century.
- Seizure of the political spotlight from the insurgents.
- Increased support from Western governments.

He also has made a good impression during trips to Europe and the US. Next week he will visit three of the four Contadors countries—Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama—to discuss regional issues and try to gain additional support for his government.


Duarte has calmed many of the fears among conservative civilians and the military that he is bent on partiesn retribution and reckless reform. He has shown patience and common sense in asserting his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

He appears to be gaining the respect of many top military leaders. Both Delense Minister Vides and Chief of Staff Blandon, for example, cooperated in implementing timely command changes designed to enhance presidential control of the military and to improve its human rights performance. Several Army field officers suspected of political intrious and human fights apuses have been transferred, and a new post has been created to oversee the operations of the various parallement security process.

Scores of police personnel have also been transferred or dismissed.
and stricter procedures have been established for the arrest and
interrogation or presoners. Leading church odicials have praised
Duariers efforts in helping to reduce political violence.

continued

Approved for Release NOV 1993



The legislative assembly recently approved Duarte's funding request for a judicial reform commission, which probably will act soon on his proposal to have a special unit investigate a variety of cases, including the assassination of Archbishop Romero and the murder or disappearance of US citizens

Major Problems

Duarte was elected without a clear political platform or peace plan and will be hard put to mobilize the military, the private sector, and the bureaucracy behind a coherent war strategy and pacification program in the near term.

Prospects remain poor for integrating the extreme left into the electoral process next March, insurgent leaders continue to decline to take part in peace talks aimed at a cease-fire and in elections, and Duarte rejects sharing power with the guerrillas

Duarte's administration is particularly weak on economic issues. The ruling Christian Democrats have opted not to include conservative financial leaders and technocrats in economic planning. believes Duarte's party is unlikely to win control of the legislature in March, however, which may force the administration to seek a working arrangement with the rightist opposition.

Outlook

The relative calm associated with Duarte's first months in office is unlikely to endure. Military, political, and economic pressures almost certainly will mount as the country approaches the legislative and municipal elections.

The most immediate challenge may be the guerrillas' planned fall offensive, although Duarte and his military advisers appear confident of containing any rebel initiative. In any event, US material, financial, and advisory support will be essential if Duarte is to transform his psychological successes into concrete solutions to deal with the national crisis.



NON. 26 Aug 1985

Special Analysis

EL SALVADOR:

Guerrilles Continue War of Attrition

The insurgents are trying to husband dwindling resources by concentrating on urban operations and emell-unit tectics. Government and rebel casualties alike have decreased significantly this year as the government maintains the initiative. Despite recently publicized afforts toward more efficient coordination, unitication efforts by the guarrilles seem destined to fall and, in any event, are designed more for propagands then for operational gains.

Despite continual Army attacks in recent weeks against insurgent atrongholds in rural areas, the rebels have evolded major battles in part by dispersing in ever-smaller units. Combat deaths for both the government and insurgents are down about 60 percent for the lirst six months of this year, as compared with the same period last year. This underscores the lower intensity of rural activity by the rebels.

When the guerrilles occasionally have mounted larger scale attacks, they have had little success against even poorly equipped Salvadoran units. A recent esseult by some 150 insurgents on one small town, for example, resulted in 17 guerrilles killed but only four National Guardsman wounded.


Defensive Tectics

tactics by the Army and the quick-strike capabilities of the Air Force are disrupting insurgent operations already hampered by poorer recruits and deficiencies in equipment.

ambushes, mines, and hit-and-run attacks on small outposts manned by Civil Defense forces as their most affective tactics under ourrent circumstances. Rebel mining of trails and secondary roads, for example, has become especially costly for the Army, which suffered 37 casualties from mines in two recent operations.

kionep civilian officials and military personnel in San Salvador and government supporters in outlying areas. The insurgents hope such terrorist acts will reduce public confidence in the government and perhaps provoke a rightlet backlash. Some urban guarrills leaders





NOV 1993

probably be are adverse public reaction is not sufficient reason to stop assassinations and bombings in the capital from their perspective urban terrorism helps to negate the armed forces advantages in artillery, air power, and battle-trained soldiers

At the same time, rebels are increasing attacks on civilian economic targets. In recent months, they have sabotaged power, communications, and transportation systems, cut highways, and destroyed farms and produce warehouses in an attempt to distract the armed forces and undermine the weak economy.

Possibility of Unification

Faced with a worsening military situation, the guerrillas are trying to combine the factions into one army. They have had some success in cooperating on tactics and logistics, but longstanding ideological and atrategic differences, as well as competition among rebal leaders, are serious stumblingblocks to effective unification.

One major faction, for example, continues to hold over a dozen kidnaped rural mayors despite objections from other groups. Windicate that leaders differ emong themselves on targeting civilians, forced recruitment of peasants, and execution of captured government troops, while others admit privately that unification is years away.

Outlook


A war of attrition might reduce the morale of the government forces somewhat but is unlikely to slow the government's military progress. Increased use of mine detectors, better training in mine deactivation, and more small-unit operations will help Salvadoran troops counter rebel moves.

in the cities, the government's improved use of evidenced by the capture of a dozen terrorists in the last month—will hamper guerrita efforts to expand urban warfare.

The provision of the country ordered its urban units to withdraw temporarity from San Salvador to svoid further arrests.

Economic sabotage will gain additional attention, but the guerrillas would have to intensify such activity substantially to demoralize the public or detail the government's efforts to extend its authority.





Special Analysis

EL SALVADOR:

Progress on Human Rights

El Selvador has made considerable progress in improving its human rights record since President Duerte was inaupurated in 1864. Official government links to rightwing death equads have anded, political killings have decreased drametically, and the inaurgents now are responsible for most of the vibiance against civilians. Problems remain, however, including a corrupt and inefficient judiciary, periodic abuses by individual military units and security forces, and the failure to prosecute high-ranking efficers for past violations.

guerrals-controlled front groups. A special UN report on El Salvador test year noted that one group consistently counts guerrals casualties as civilians. Moreover, the insurpents have falsely alleged indiscriminate bembings and mistreelment by the military in operations in rural areas.

An Improved Performance

Most observers give the povernment good marks for correcting human rights violations. That decisive government measures to end formal military links to death equads and appoint reform-minded officers to head the security services have reduced political murders from more than 8,000 in 1953 to about 250 in 1956. The guerrillas from more than 8,000 in rest of those.

The government measures to reduce violations continus. Police are required to attend courses on human rights, and soldiers receive periodic instructions from the Catholic Church and the Red Cross. In addition, state-of-emergency provisions that gave the authorities wide letitude in processing and interrogating prisoners are no longer in effect, although many officers want such measures reinstated. Furthermore, the police and Army must give the Red Cross and the government human rights commission access to arrested subversives.

continued



Approved for Release NOV 1993



Problems That Remain

sand from time to time some prisoners and human rights groups still make allegations of rape, electric shock, and beatings. The latter are seldum verified, however, in addition, some civilians have been killed by soldiers, but these have been altributed to personal vendetles or criminal activity.

The fact that no senior officer accused of human rights violations has been convicted also ternishes the military's reputation. A cumbersome, often incompetent, and corrupt judiciary, officer cronylam, and fear that the Army will retailed against jury members have inhibited the resolution of longstanding cases of abuse.

Meanwhile, guerrilla violence against civilians has increased. Most of the casualties are civilians involved in government civic action programs, peasants who refuse to cooperate with the guerrillas, or suspected informants. Indicate the insurgents maintain civilian not sate. The guerrillas also have indiscriminately machinegunned civilian road traffic and mined farmlands to intimidate the population. Guerrilla contact land mines killed at least 31 civilians and wounded another 172—many of them children—during the first half of 1988 alons.

Outlook

Unable to document significant government streeties since Duarte's human rights reforms were initiated, the guerrillas have begun to lose credibility, particularly as their own record has gotten worse. Nevertheless, Duarte's preoccupation with the war and his reliance on the milliary for political support will preclude much progress on cleaning up the judiciary or prosecuting officers involved in past abuses.

The guerrillas have also resorted to kidnaping to extort money and forms of support from the victime' families. In addition, they often use kidnapings to replanish their ranks.





DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

STATEMENT ON

EL SALVADOR -- CERTIFICATION ISSUES

BEFORE THE

SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

2 AUGUST 1982



Approved for Release WOV 15:13

DDCI STATEMENT

SFRC HEARING ON EL SALVADOR - CERTIFICATION ISSUES

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to discuss with you today the intelligence issues that bear on the President's recent certification that El Salvedor is making progress in its human rights program. I have with me today from the CIA, who are prepared to discuss any of the issues I raise in more details, if you so desire.

Representatives from the DIA and from the State Department are also here.

Mr. Chairman, Certification issues for El Salvador are not areas that the Central Intelligence Agency specifically has targetted for either collection or analysis.

Nevertheless, based on reporting largely from the will give you the Intelligence a variety of other services including the will give you the Intelligence Community's assessment of that country's performance concerning certification questions. This assessment was agreed upon by the National Foreign Intelligence Board during a meeting chaired by the DCI on 27 July 1982.

Although some abuses continue to occur, the monthly rate of political deaths is declining and the Salvadoran government and military leaders continue to work toward curbing human and civil rights abuses, and to respond to the public's interest in participatory government as underscored by the 22 March constituent assembly elections. Nevertheless, their efforts continue to be hampered by the weaknesses of El Salvador's unsophisticated body politic. These include arrinability to separate partisan and personal goals from common national priorities, and a failure to put aside ideological conflicts that in the past have thwarted the democratic process.

Despite the rigidity of the political system and the myopia of certain of its key



participants, the prospects for continuing progress—while slow and arduous—seem generally positive. The civilian government has so far been characterized generally by pragmatic compromise, with the result that political, economic, and social reforms are continuing and violence has been reduced. This position has been reinforced by the military high command, which distinguished itself as the major moderating force during the fractious political negotiations that followed the election. Led by Defense Minister Garcia, the armed forces appear increasingly aware of the psychological dimension of the war and cognizant that the insurgents are the ultimate beneficiaries of any abuses.

On the issue of El Salvador's efforts to comply with internationally recognized human rights:

Balvador's civil and criminal justice system, but some progress apparently has been made in strengthening the courts and improving enforcement of existing laws that protect the citizenry. The constituent assembly has, for example, unanimously appointed an independent surreme court and is preparing to write a new constitution. Political prisoners remanded to civil authorities, meanwhile, appear to be well-treated and are visited frequently by family members, church organizations, international relief agencies, and foreign diplomats. Persons are also held in facilities of the military and the security forces; their treatment varies from reasonable to harsh.

- Although violence remains endemic, the number of political killings is declining and is now at its lowest level since the insurgents' "final ها الله

offensive" of January 1981. The monthly average of political deaths for that year was 510, while the 1982 rate stands at 285—a decrease of 45 percent. In our judgment, this downward trend reflects the greater emphasis on large engagements between bonafide combatants—more in rural than urban areas—since January 1981, measures taken by government and insurgent leaders to reduce indiscriminate violence in an attempt to build greater popular support, extreme rightlet death squads which have been less active in 1982 than previously, and some potential victims on both the extreme left and right going underground or into exile—

- Senior military leaders have repeatedly demonstrated public and private concern over the need to improve the human rights conduct of their troops. We believe they recognize that official excesses attenute the civilian populace, damage the government internationally, reinforce the position of the insurgents, and most importantly jeopardize U.S. military and economic assistance.

On the issue of BI Salvador's progress in achieving control over all elements of its armed forces:

The military leadership is continuing its efforts to punish human rights violators within armed forces ranks and to curb abuses by rightwing paramilitary forces. We believe this resolve likely has been strengthened by recent indications that the emphasis on human rights is aiding the effort against the insurgents. During 1980 and 1981, the Army and the security

Impolitical deaths", includes deaths of civillans and off-duty military personnel with reports of circumstances which conform to the following basic criteria: (1) not reported as criminal deaths; (2) attributed to the extreme left or government forces; (3) victim reported apprehended (that is, taken from home or vehicle) and killed on the spot or later found dead. In addition, "political deaths" takes into account the modus operandi of armed forces of the extreme left and extreme right. It is a partial interpretation since press reports—the basis for violence reports—do not attribute deaths to "political violence." On occasion, uriminal violence may be intentionally disguised as political violence.

صلا

charged with assault, rape, or murder. Since January of this year, an additional 50 personnel have been arrested for these crimes and are in jail awaiting trial by civilian courts. Moreover, several civilian members of rightist death squads have been apprehended and charged with specific political killings.

- The human rights doctrine that is now part of the curriculum for new cadets in El Salvador's military ecademy underscores the armed forces' growing sansitivity to the political fallout of continued abuses. The military's decision to modernize its policies and methods complements the efforts of U.S. trainers, who are schooling Salvadoran officers and enlisted men to respect the rights of civilians and improve their treatment of prisoners and defectors. We believe the performance of U.S.-trained units is not only tactically superior to that of regular troops, but that their sensitivity to civilians has diminished popular support for the guerrillas in certain areas of the country.
- Other military units, meanwhile, have begun using improved human relations techniques to inspire defections among the insurgents and enlist the confidence of the local population. Although the number of defections appears modest so far—due largely to the insurgents strict control over their cadre and support elements—some villagers are returning to their towns and fields because of the improved image of the local armed forces. In a few cases, Army commanders have ordered their troops to spare settlements known to house guerrillas in order to provide civilian refugees with a home to return to.
- The military's growing awareness of the psychological aspect of warfare has been particularly pronounced in Cabanas Department. Last

ساكات

year, this northern border region was the focus of intense guerrilla activity, and government forces appeared as politically isolated from the local populace as they were militarily from the insurgents. Through humanitarian and material support to peasant communities—combined with a new strategy of small unit patrolling and stricter control over civil defense groups—the department commander has all but credicated guerrilla operations in the region and has won the confidence of the local populace.

- Abuses continue to occur in all parts of the country, of course,
particularly with regard to taking prisoners, treatment of non-combatant
guarrilla supporters, and fire discipline in populated areas. Nevertheless,
on balance we believe the trand toward improved control over the armed
forces has continued this year.

On the issue of implementing essential economic and political reforms, including land reform:

- Progress on political reforms clearly is evident in the successful transition from a four-men civil-military junts to a civilian government comprising a popularly-elected 50-man constituent assembly, an independent civilian executive branch, and a suprema court. In accition, banking and commercial programs are being implemented. Implementation of agrarian reforms has continue this year, with a full third of all land titles under the two-year-old Phase III program having been distributed since January. Phase I is on track, with compensatory payments to a few former landowners beginning. Nearly 180,000 beneficiaries of the program are preparing for a third successful harvest in the fall.
- Prospects are favorable for further advances in socio-economic and political reforms—though with occasional lapses and problems with implementation. Reform issues are subject to heated disputes, almost as



much within parties as among them. Moderates and hardliners seek in varying degrees to maintain, expand, limit, or reverse the process of all reforms. Nevertheless, the final referes will continue to be the military, whose leaders appear convinced that the agrarian and other programs must continue if the government is to receive the domestic and international support necessary to rebuild the economy and defeat the insurgents.

The military has demonstrated its commitment on the political front by honoring its pledge to initiate democratization. Senior military officers were instrumental in treaking the political deadlock in the weeks following the 28 March election. Their prescription for building a government of national unity has resulted in securing a share of power for the liberal Christian Democrats and has helped reduce the influence of far right groups in the government. The military recently formed a six-man committee to help the executive over major policy hurdles and to mediate serious partisan disputes.

The military's commitment to reforms seems borne out by the strong response of the armed forces to the confusion caused by the assembly decree of 1r May revising implementation of Phase III of the agrarian reform. At that time, President Magans, in an attempt to bolster sagging export production caused by landowners' fears that renting their lands would be tantamount to forfeiting them to tenant farmers, sent a proposal to the constituent assembly. The proposal stipulated that peasants seeking to cultivate new cash crop lands in the next growing season would not be eligible to receive titles to those lands for that time period. The conservative majority in the assembly, however, expanded the proposal to include lands used for livestock and basic food crops, thus effectively postponing new claims by renters to most land available under Phase III.

Domestic and international reaction to what was viewed as a potential rollback in the whole reform process inspired immediate action by the Christian Democrats, peasant organizations, the military, and the Magana government to ensure that no such rollback would take place.

- Senior military officers thus pressed for an acceleration of the land titling process. Since early June, members of the high command—in tandem with leading government officials—have distributed some 2,000 provisional and permanent titles to peasant beneficiaries. Moreover, the armed forces have quickly intervened to reinstate about half of some 3,800 peasant renters whom landowners had illegally evicted.
- Prospects for continued progress in the land reform seem
 favorable. The recent appointment of an Army colonel to head the
 government agency in charge of distributing titles to peasants underscores
 the military's resolve to accelerate the process. Moreover, a senior
 military officer has been appointed to the new five-man presidential
 committee that will oversee any further legislative action on land reform.
 A top leader of the country's largest peasant organization also serves on
 the committee.

On the issue of El Salvador's commitment to hold free elections and begin discussions with all major political factions:

- All political parties, including those allied with the extreme left (FMLN), were invited to participate in the constituent assembly elections of 28 March 1982. The 1.5 million ballots cast constituted a severe political and psychological setback to the far left. Though a few allegations of electoral fraud have been made, little or no evidence has been produced to substantiate these, and we share the broadly held judgment that the integrity of the electoral process was maintained. The

military showed professionalism in safeguarding the integrity of the balloting by providing effective logistical support to the elections commission, accommodating over 200 foreign observers in their trips around the country, and protecting the voters against insurgent attacks.

- For months guerrilla leaders had said they would kill anyone who participated in the elections. When it was evident that the elections would occur as scheduled, Guillermo Ungo and other political leaders of the extreme left coalition made pledges that they would not hinder the balloting. Nevertheless, the guerrillas launched a long prepared, major military campaign to disrupt the electoral process; they succeeded only in pre-empting the voting in certain eastern towns where they concentrated their largest forces.
- In our judgment, the massive turnout was attributable to a number of factors, including:
 - Unprecedented open registration, which enabled participants to case their ballots anywhere in the country while reducing the chances of reprisals by the extreme left and right.
 - Higher than anticipated public confidence in the fairness of the proceedings.
 - Public anger and frustration over the economic and social impact of two years of guarrilla violence.
- Fulfilling the mandate of the electorate, however, will be difficult.

 Alleviating El Salvador's traditional socio-economic disparities and political backwardness would prove challenging even in the absence of a guerrilla war—and it is our judgment that a protracted struggle will continue for some time, probably into the period of the next elections. Nevertheless, the government appears relatively stable, and we expect that the elections

El Salvador

Rebel Fronts Disagree Over Suspension of Peace Talks

The recent decision by Salvadoran insurgents to suspend peace talks with the government constitutes a setback for President Duarte's affort to meet the terms of the Central American peace plan. However, the suspension liself appears to be a source of contention between the military and political wings of the Salvadoran rebel movement.

The decision to break off the talks was announced in a communique from the General Command of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), the military wing of the Salvadoran rabel movement, sired on San Salvador radio on 29 October, and broadcast subsequently by the rabels' "official voice," Radio Venceremos. The communique linked the suspension to the 26 October assassination of Herbert Anaya, who headed the country's nongovernmental Human Rights Commission. It stated that continuation of the talks is the wake of the killing, which it blamed on the government, would only "create false expectations" and "divert national and international attention" from the human rights situation in the country.

In line with the rebels' iongstanding effort to discredit the government, the communique pointed to the assessination as "evidence" that President Duarte and the Armed Forces High Command "have decided to intensify the policy of killing" the leaders of popular organizations and press on with their "policy of war." The communique also impagned Duarte's motives in resuming talks with the rebels lest month ' and dismissed his statements of support for the regional pasce plan's stipulation on autional reconciliation as "nothing more than a coverap" for his "real objective" so "repress all political opposition" in El Salvador.

While the sespension of the telks affectively bers Duerte from claiming any real progress toward resolving the conflict as the 5 November terget date for implementing the provisions of The regional accord approaches, the

See the Trends of 15 October, pages 9-11.



communique implied that the rebels would return to the dislogue at some future date. It said the rebels "will continue to review developments to further the dislogue" while striving to achieve "a broad national consensus to ensure a patriotic solution" to the conflict.

Signs of Contention Aithough Guillermo Ungo, president of the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), the political wing of the revolutionary movement, has echoed the FMLN's assessment that Anaya's assassination signals heightened repression in El Salvador, he has made it clear that his organization opposes the decision to break off the dialogue. In remarks published in the San Salvador newspaper El Mundo on 2 November, Ungo frankly admitted that the FDR and the FMLN hold "different views" on this matter. While he denied that the disagreement has divided the two fronts, he said the dialogue must be resumed "immediately." At the same time, he put the onus for this on the government, stressing that it will have to put forward "serious" proposals.

The FMLN's strong reaction to Anaya's assessination may reflect an effort to discourage FDR leaders from following through with their announced plan to return to El Salvador to participate in a political system that the FMLN has repeatedly decounced as "antidemocratic." Judging by Ungo's remarks on this subject in an interview with AFP on I November, the FDR is continuing to make plans to send its top leaders to El Salvador, despite the assessination. Ungo said that while he and FDR Vice Precident Rubes Zamora "have yet to work out the details" of their return, "we expect to do so very soon."

FDR leaders dony that their plan to engage in political activity inside El Salvador is a source of contention between the two fronts. However, Zamora, in discussing his possible return in an interview aired on Salvadoran television on 28 September, appeared to discount the FMLN's oft-stated claim that El Salvador lacks the necessary conditions for leftlet political activity. While Zamora acknowledged that "the matter of conditions has to be taken into account," he stressed that "the important point" is that "democracy is not given as a gift to anyone," but, rather, "something that has to be constructed, built." He went on to say that "it would not be right" for him to remain outside the country because "there is so democracy" there. "On the contrary," he said, "my attitude and my party's attitude is to return and work to outid a democracy, which means taking risks."

Weekly Situation Report

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

approved for Release

NOV 1993

000

24 Acre 1004

24 June 1981



El Salvador Requests Extradition of Hans Christ

The Government of El Salvador (GOES) has formally requested that the United States extradite Hans Christ (Krist), who is wanted in connection with the murders of two American labor officials. (See the issues of 7 January and 3 June.) Christ's attorney intends to fight the extradition attempt and stated that his client passed a polygraph test. A key witness for the GOES, Teresa de Jesus Torres, testified that she saw Christ and his brother-in-law, Ricardo Soi Mesa, standing over the bodies immediately after the shooting. According to Torres, Sol Mesa and Christ threatened to kill her if she told any ne what she saw. In her latest affidavit, Torres apparently has retracted her statements.

Approved for Release

NOV 1993



Weekly Situation Report

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM



•

Approved for Release

NOV 1993



6 January 1982

NOTES

Charges Dropped Against Salvadoran Murder Suspects

Charges against Ricardo Sol Meza and Hans Christ for the murders of Michael Hammer and Mark Pearlman, U.S. land reform specialists have been dropped for lack of evidence.

who was with Hammer and Pearlman at the time of the shooting. Christ has been free on bond in Miami while Sol Meza has been held in San Salvedor.



El Salvador: Comtrolling Rightwing Terrorism

Introduction

Politically motivared civilian billiers in El Salvador fell sharply in 1984 as the government took action on a variety of fronts to rein in death squads. That reduction, is communities with tigrificant political and military developments, has aided democracy and the promise of an eventual resolution of the civil war. Recent death thrusts against President Duarts and other government officials over the laste of dialogue with the insurgent left, bowever, have underscored the truculence of powerful rightwise terrorist groups that in the past actod with virtual impenity. Some recent events, such as resmort of imprechanget maneuvers against Duarte in the Amembly and coup plotting within the military, suggest that the President may be approaching the limits of his ability to constrain extremist violences. Moreover, the grees of political. military, and sommeconomic losses may make Duarte's task manu difficult over the coming year.

This assessment in a descriptive and analytic overview of the structure and goals of the Salvadoran extreme right and its termerist capabilities. It reviews these factors that have contributed to a reduction to rightlet terrorism, examines prospects for resurgent violence, and outlines the implications for US policy.

Legacy of Violence

Violence is part off the cultural history of El Salvador, just as it is in maighboring countries. Salvadorans are at once intensely untionalistic and community oriented, while also busing floros champions of personal gain. Highly ingrainmed in the national psyche are the interlocking values of ownership of property, loyalty to family and fraunds, and pride of the individual. The historical records above that retribution can be swift against those wino challenge such principles, and the practice of violence vendetta traditionally has been common among all socioeconomic classes and along

the entire political spectrum. Even during the comparatively peaceful and prosperous years of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the relative level of common domestic violence—resulting from property feuds, spontaneous duels, and crimes of passion—was among the highest in the world, according to international statistical references. By the mid-1970s, homicide was the third leading cause of death in the country.

Political violence, similarly, has occurred for generations. We believe that, before the Marxist insurgency
in 1979, such violence largely reflected the various
military regimes' efforts to neutralize what were
perceived to be subversive elements. During the past
five years of insurgent war and transition toward
democracy, the public record shows that thousands of
noncombatants have disappeared or have been killed
by unidentified persons and vaguely identified groups.
President Duarte has publicly placed the death toll at
over 40,000 and has primarily blamed rightwing
death squade.' We agree that a large but unknowable
percentage of the political violence in recent years has
been carried out by rightwing civilian and military
extremists.

there have been just over 10,000 tellings confirmed by sivil sotherisis and the botal modes sions January 1961. Many thousand more specially were hilled during 1960, before records were representative makes more extends to the best sides of the proportionally makes and the best proportional to the best proportiona

do. DOOD to at high an expensive state of the state of th

Evolution of the Extreme Right

Rightwing political violence had its genesis in El Salvador's late-19th-century conversion from mercantilism to capitalism. At that time the government confiscated peasant farmers' subsistence holdings and turned them over to large caffee growers in order to develop an agricultural export system. A semifeudal, social-Darwinian system toon evolved around landless wage-earning laborers, a tiny managerial aristocracy, and a constabulary army to maintain order.

By December 1931, however, the world depression had guited the economy, and a newly elected civilian government was threatened by growing unrest. The Army staged a coup and established a military dictatorship. A month later, impoverished Indian laborers seeking return of their lands launched a small uprising in the western provinces. According to a variety of academic sources, the rebellion was fomented in part by Communist Party militarist who were attempting to integrate rural workers with the fledgling socialist trade union movement in the capital. Fearing a widespread conspiracy, the Army and the civilian elites reacted by massacring as many as 30,000 peasants in a few weeks.

The resulting endemic national paranole over the Communist threat reinforced authoritation rule by the armed forces and its affluent civilian backers for the nest half century. The chain of military regimes provided order and stability, and largely gene the plantation owners and monopolist businessmen a free hand over the economy. Combining with favorable international economic trends and fareign aid, this system of rule resulted in substantial material progress for the upper and middle classes, and development of a strong physical and institutional economic base. Given these historical roots, order and stability

also became closely idensified with institutionalized violence against dissident leftist elements, as well as intimidation of the rural peasant and urban labor classes.

Control over society was handled by the military government and civilian elites largely through paramilitary constabulary forces, regular Army units, and numerous afficial and private vigilante organizations. The historical record shows that, given the inherent weaknesses of the formal judicial process, these security bodies would aften function at the local level as judge, jury, and executioner of individuals perceived to be criminals or subversives.

The Sandinista victory in Niceragua in July 1979 shocked Salvadoran military leaders and provided the catalyst for a reformist coup in October, as

vinced that dramatic political, social, and economic changes were needed to deter a popular insurrection among the urban and rural poor during a period of economic downturn and leftist narest, the new armed forces leadership formed a civil-military junta with the moderate Christian Democrats that was committed to democratic elections and socio-economic reforms.

perhaps 30 percent of the entire officer corps was subsequently purged, which, in part, had the offect of neutralizing many corrupt senior officers and their subordinates who had long ago been co-opted by rightlest civilian eities. With the Army backing reform, the political and economic power of the oligarchy was quickly reduced, with many of its key members liquidating assets and opting for self-impassed exile in Guatemale and the United States.

...

Structure and Operations of the Extreme Right

In our view, the violent attitudes and actions of the extreme right represent much more than just the conservative political spectrum. We believe that the extreme right is dissinguishable from the mainstream right wing by two basic characteristics:

- Absolute intolerance of any element that has contributed to change in the pre-1979 status quo.
- Williagness to comfront that change with active subversion of the constitutional system and with violent terrorism.

In our view, the entireme right does not predominate in any one social, economic, or political sector. Rather, it is a fanatic fringe drawn from all elements of society

Indeed, despite a seletive neutralization of the old order by the 1979 coup, we judge that El Salvador remains a decidedly conservative society, with rightlet political tendencies running deep in the military, the private sector, send the general public. This was illustrated in the 6 May 1984 presidential election. which gave only a marrow margin of vicasy to Napoleon Duartes. Nearly half of the vote-in the largest and most Bennet election in the action's history-went to the emergens rightist candidate, Roberto D'Aubuisson. Desgation repeated public ellegations of his terrorist links, 25 Aubaisson was 10 of 14 departments and a magnetity of the raral rots over the progressive Description suggests that somey Salvadorans perceived D'Aubelsson as representing a no-accesses comercian that would lend itself no recetabiliting haw and order and eradicating the immergency.

Furthermore, in clies absence of an effective criminal justice system small, useful recently, as Army capable of containing the immergency, the extreme right has been fighting what it commiders a legitimate claudation was against the left.

rightwing extrements have viewed government reformers as national summerity threats equal to those posed by the guarrille measurement. Hence, rightwing violence—as reflected in comment levels of civilian political deaths—has generated levels of civilian political deaths—has generated, when the bettlefield performance of the armed formers has diminished, or when political and economic immers have been intensely debuted in the Logislative Assessmbly.

The Public View of Rightwing Terrorism

The phenomenon of rightist violence, while publicly denounced by the leaders of virtually all sectors of Salvadoran society, evokes mixed feelings among average citizens in private discussion. While some talk about "death squads" only in hushed tones, others express detachment and even gallows humor over the disappearance or assassination of individuals. Occasionally, some will claim to have close friends on the right who allegedly engage in violence or who have personal knowledge of specific terrorist activities. Conversely, others choose to believe that rightwing surrorist groups do not exist

These contrasting attitudes are evident throughout society and reflect a great ambivalence about the national role played by rightwing terrorists. Many Selvadorans, of all economic classes, believe that, however repugnant the methods used by rightlet vigilantes, their toward on Marxist subversion has been largely poetitive. Such people applicud government efforts to professionalise the armed forces and creck down on official corruption and abuse. At the same time, benefier, they denounce the US "obsertion" with human rights and rationalize the need to fight lighwing surriviers with "whatever means are escessory." Often cited in ruch arguments is the efficial treatment metal out during the 1970s to the Tupamarou in Uruguey, the Montonerou in Argentina, and the Miriam in Chile, at examples of extraordimany impassives sometimes medad to save a society from chaos.

Against this backdrop, local criminals probably can continue to operate as mercenaries for hire to settle personal scores or fill the ranks of ad hoc death squads for fauntic rightists. Such an environment, moreover, will continue to make it difficult for San Salvador to investigate, prosecute, and convict local security force personnel who may still feel compelled to act on their sum against suspected insurpents and their sympathioers

The rightwing extremist minorities of the various social sectors often wield enough power to influence events in ways disproportionate to their numbers. Important members of large agricultural, industrial. and commercial organizations are well-known rightindicate, for examwing zealots. ple, that a number of wealthy Salvadoran expetriates living in Miami have lent both overt and covert financial and organizational support to paramilitary groups associated with coffee exporter Orlando De-Sola and others. Money and personal connections in El Salvador permit such individuals to sid or even participate in illegal activities in that country with relative freedom from prosecution because of their ability to bribe and intimidate Salvadoran Government and military officials. Accountability for extremist activities is constrained further because most of the Salvadoran media are privately owned by archeonervatives, whose editorial policies include herce craicism of even moderate government programs and praise for the hardline positions of the far right.

that some civilians are "unseechable," moreover, because of the power they wind through control of death squada.

D'Anbeisse and ARENA

The creation of rightwing political parties over the years also has served the interests of the extremist minority in El Salvador. The most powerful of these groupings is the Nationalist Republicas Alliance (ARENA) Founded in 1981 by Roberto D'Aubuisson - a former Army intelligence officer who was cashiered by the military following the 1979 coup-ARENA has evolved into the second-largest political party after the ruling Christian Democrated election results show that it commands enthusiastic support from a broad spectrum of society and, as a multifaceted organization with important contacts among foreign governments and groups, it has beload legitimize extremist cells for retreachment on reforms and eradication of the insurgent left through more radical use of force.

behind ARENA's legitimate exterior lies a terrorist network led by D'Aubuisson benchmen and funded by wealthy Salvedoran expatriates residing in Guatemals and the United States:



ARENA perty leader Roberto D'Anbeitem empelgaing with then refe Telenda Mungia for the 1963 Assembly election.

D'Aubaimon loyalists in the 1981 murder of two US labor edvisors. Public confessions by the two National Guard triggermen and reports by syswitnesses have connected various civilian and military associates of D'Aubaimon to the crime. A pro-ARENA Supreme Court judge has been successful in using legal maneuvers and personal influence to free Army Capt.

Eduardo Avila from prosecution for the crime.

that D'Aubulason personally arranged for lower courts to drop charges against Lt. Isidro Leper Sibrian, another junior officer implicated in the merden.

la 1983, D'Aubuisson confided plans
by security force personnel to eliminate suspected
leftists. He claimed that safeguarding human rights

was impossible in an impression was and advocated
"extraoficial" operations to combat the enemy. Since
that time, "extraoficial have indicated that
ARENA's terrorist components—directly managed
by some of D'Aubuisson's closest advisory—remain
intact and are preparing for future operations against
the left, government officials, foreign journalists, and
diplomatic personnel.

ARENA's clandestine activities appear to be largely the responsibility of party security chief Dr. Hectur Regulado. former polloames for work in death squade.

commissioned triggermen to eliminate key leaders of the Popular Democratic Unity (UPD), a large labor coelition that has joined the Christian Democratic government to administer agrarian reform programs. ARENA has cast its net wide im identifying the threat from the "left." Following Prepadent Duarte's election in May 1984.

ndicated that the marry's security apparatus also was targeting members: of the Christian Democratic Party for assassimation. Former National Police personnel

for their participation is this special project.

UMI ARENX

resistance against the Duarue government. The group seeks to conduct terrorist operations against the Christian Democratic Purty and the US Embassy in San Salvador. The group what ARENA leaders and other extreme regulate the Duarue administration might launch inventigations against ampacted terrorists and thus interrupt their domestic activities.

assassination attempts against President Duarte and other Christian Democratic Innders

These and other operations are often pleased and implemented by individuals working one of safehouses belonging to known rightlet circlian or safetary officials.

a wealthy ARENA party member and close personal friend of D'Aubuisson owns a home that is used as a base for provist operations and to store weapons and ammenition. The house.

the Secret Anti-Communic Army (ESA) a rightwing terrorist group that the been ARENA's primary instrument for clandestine operations over the past three years.

hould)

where a large cache of dynamics, time fuses, and blasting caps also is hidden. Rural Vigilances

Violence linked to ARENA is only one manifestation of rightwing terrorism in El Salvador. To eliminate challenges to its power, the extreme right traditionally has used civilian vigilante organizations, elements of the armed forces, and death squads led by ideologues and mercenaries.

In the 1960s and 1970s, a surge of political activity among left-of-center opposition parties, peasants, arban workers, and student groups inspired the creation of several official and clandestine rightwing organizations, both ad boc and permanent. The National Democratic Organization (ORDEN), for szample, was a government-sponsored civic group formed in 1966 and comprising tens of thousands of conservative peasants, many of them former Army enlisted personnel who were part of the nation's inactive reserve Until its official force. dissolution if 1979, ORDEN served both as an intelligence-gathering body and instrument of saforcement assiss real or suspected enemies of the regime

Although that such poverament-directed groups have b tive for several years, vigilants violence—albeit dethe continue clining. in the code system. ORDEN'S structure possessily like New load Black with many of its former members having joined the Territorial Service and Civil Defense Forces-Armyrun militias that provide local security is outlying villages and tectical intelligence to the military. We believe these milities too often function without offcial authorization as peasant vigilantes. The abduction in late 1983 of nine agraries reform workers from the sown of San Pedro Mesahuet in La Paz Department, and their subsequent torture and murder in the Zaragors jumies of Le Liberted Department, was to local Civil attributed Defense personnel. So, too, was the 1962 massacre of present farmers in the La Florida hamlet of Santa Ana Department and killings of Christian Democratic party members in the jurisdictions of El Paisanl and Aguillares in San Salvedor Department

More recently in San Salvador Department, in the town of Nejapa, Civil Defense personnel have been engaging in abuses against peasant farmers affiliated with one of the larger democratic labor unions.

employed by their local commander as a "death squad."

that the local commander was being assisted by elements within the regular armed forces and is responsible for the deaths of 11 people in the immediate area, including two children. Labor officials have delivered a protest note to the military high command in San Salvador.

In addition, the government's Humas
Rights Commission is investigating a case involving
the murders of some 30 local passents near the town
of Armenia in Someonate Department. During 1981
and 1982;
Civil Defence
personnel from the Armenia jurisdiction abdected
neighbors suspected of subversion and, after brutally
killing them, threw their bodies into a deep well. Four
vigilantes have been arrested in this own, and one has
confessed to the crimes.

Rural vigilantism is augmented in the towns and cities by civilian mercenaries and fanatics allied with specific individuals or groups who routinely have waged their own vendettes against suspected subversives and political enemies. For example,

by rightwing paramilitary organism and
ARENA loyalist Mario Radeell as a "hit man" in
unspecified operations. Rightist terrorist cells also use
both active-duty and retired military personnel is
their compaigns,
in the security forces.

Armed Forces Death Squade

In addition to ARENA and rural vigilantes, the military has also been responsible for a share of ; rightwing violence in El Salvador. Despite the new relatively moderate character of the military high command, the armed forces' staff and field command are largely controlled by a younger generation of ambitious officers who have proved themselves to be among the best trained and motivated in a talent-deficient officer corputation.

Unfortunately for the Duarte administration, many of these officers are former academy classimates and military colleagues of D'Aubuisson who share his ultrarightist views. Although they generally have abided by the moderate doctrine of their superiors in San Salvador, several, are alleged to have associations with rightwing terrorist organizations and, in some cases, to have been leaders of death squads within the Army and the security forces.

equads in the armed forces operate out of both urban military bendquarters and rural outposts. They are led by senior enlisted personnel and junior officers, and they may function with or without the knowledge of immediate superiors. In 1983, for example, at least 20 and perhaps as many as 75 members of an indian agrarian reform cooperative in the Las Hojas hamlet of fonsonate Department were abducted and later exacuted by regular troops of the 6th Detachment,

indicate that some military officers in Socionate very influenced by diagrantied landowners to take action against the Indians. Neither the leader of the operation, Capt. Salvador Figuerus Morales, nor his commanding officer, Lt. Col. Elmer Gonzalez Aranjo, have been disciplined by their reperiors. Indeed, Implicated both Gonzalez and Figueros in a pict to assessinate Julio Ray Presides, Minister of the Presidency and a my Chris-

The November murder of a Lutheran minister in San Mignel Department Illustrates that some actions are committed by regular military personnel without supervision. Spokesmen for the armed forces have asnovaced publicly that two Army culisted men from the 3rd Brigade confessed to killing the minister on a whim, apparently assuming he had links to insurgents in the area.

tian Democratic leader.

Rightwing terrorists have been accustomed to operating with wide letitude, and it is almost certain that some Army and security force personnel continue to Two young girls become notime of a Salvadoran methoda death iquad. Their alleged offenses and the name of the group that killed them are probably insembed on the pieres of paper attacked to their wirebound thumbs.



cooperate with and participate in death squad activi-

National Police, and Treasury Police have all harbored terrorist elements within their ranks. In addition to the 6th Detachment in Someonata, other regular military units implicated.

in abductions and death squad sources include components of the Army Signal Corps, the Air Force, and the let Brigade, all three located in San Salvador; the Cavalry Regiment in San Andres; the Artillery Brigade in San Juan Opico; the Engineers Center in Zacatectiucs; the former 4th Infantry Detachment in Usulutan; and the 2nd Brigade in Santa Ana. That several of these are key units with strong political sway within the military institution underscores the difficulty facing the high command in its efforts to improve the human rights record of the armed forces.

Scope and Mathel of Operation

While we are certain of the broad sponsorship for rightwing serrories by ARENA, rural vigilantes, and elements of the military, the precise scope and operations of serroriet groups is more difficult to assess. The methods used by the extreme right—such as interrogating or killing victims for from where they were abducted—suggest a autionwide capability within at least some of the claudestine organizations. Compartmentation, a rigid code of secrety, and the shifting whims of extremist leaders make estimating the numbers of terrorist organizations and their members difficult. The geographic breadth and frequent simultaneity of rightist convitors.

suggest to us that at many as a dozen bit squads may exist in El Salvador during any given period of time. It is our judgment that most are nameless and largely ad hoc groups, keyed to specific missions in local areas. Some appear more permanently organized, however, and wider ranging. Perhaps the most notorious of these is the Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Anti-Communiat Brigade, named for the military dictator who carried out the 1932 peasant massacre. This group has operated for several years, frequently publicizing its abductions and executions of leftist student and labor leaders with notes attached to bodies, newspaper advertisements, and radiobroad-casts.

indicates that such groups occasionally constitute their activities with the security forces, and in some cases specific missions and personnel probably overlap different organizations. Perhaps the most outrageous lastance of this occurred in November 1980, when masked guamen abducted leftist political leaders during a news conference held in a Josuit school near the LIS Embassy. Security for the affair was provided by a large number of uniformed National Police personnel, yet the abduction of six top leftists occurred in broad daylight without any interference from the authorities. The victims' mutilated bodies were found the following morning a few miles from the capital

working relationing among such clanderties terrorist organizations as the Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA), the National Salvation Movement (MS-25), and the Salvadoran Anti-Communist Communion (CAS). South moreover, believe that the Martinez Brigade and the ESA have a common leadership whose ultimate loyalties are to D'Aubulmon and his financial beckers in Miami.

Coestraints on Rightwing Visioner

Although the various rightwing terrorist groups remain active and appear organizationally intact, they are being utilized with far less frequency than in past years. Indeed, the level of righties terrorism in 1984 was surprisingly low, given the stakes involved in the presidential elections, expectations of summer and fall guerrilla offensives, and rule by the moderate Chratian Democrats. New policies by the government and the military high command designed to present terrorists with a less hospitable climate have probably given pause to some extreme rightist elements.

Following Street Military

A number of a new willingness among a military omcers to attempt to control rank-and-lie extremists Indicated that the high command wo US demands such as transferring certain unsevery officers out of the country-because the armed forces badly needed US aid. Several Army and security force officers have since been sent overseas to diplomatic posts. that Defense Minister Vide warmer by ARENA security advisory essigned by D'Aubaisson to manage security at the Legislative Assembly—that if they remained in El Salvador they would be investigated for their involvement in terrorist activities. One of these advisers, Dr. Hector, Ragalado, later told that he resigned his public position as chief of scity to avoid ternishing ARENA's image during the spring election campaign.

These actions came in the wake of arrests by the National Police of three other D'Aubuisson security operatives on kidnaping charges. Moreoverifferences and the National Police were respected of involvement with rightwing death squade. The callers threatened them with prosecution if they did not leave the country. The National Police at that time also arrested Army Capt. Eduardo Avila, implicated in the 1981 marrier of two US labor advisors. Logal maneuvers by extreme rightist supporters, however, som secured Avila's freedom, and all sections charges against him were dropped.

Ministry believed there was growing willingness withis the officer corps to investigate extremist elements. The casting card of the Mana Blance where head) rightwent drait neved appears on the doors of a schoolhouse where assassmend members of a leftwing low her I union were emplayed.



Notices were placed in the local media announcing a campaign by the armed forces against the "death squads," and calling for help from the public and the justice system in identification and presecution of the squads' members. One such notice was signed by most of the armed forces' staff and field commanders. In addition, the Ministry set up an ad hoc military commission at the beginning of 1964 to investigate reports of criminal activities and human rights above within the armed forces.

Throughout 1984, moreover, the Defense Ministry under orders from President Duarts—moved to exact greater control over the three accurity forces.

moderates were placed to charge of the National Police and Treasury Police, with the latter having undergone a major personnel reorganization that transferred or discharged some 110 officers and enlisted men from its notorious intelligence and investigations section. Colonel Lopez Nulla—staunchly critical of rightist violence—was appointed Vice Minister of Defense in charge of public security. This new position was created to better coordinate and control the activities of the two police organizations and the National Guard,

The present military leadership continues to recognize that US aid levels and the effective prosecution of the war rest in part on the Salvadoras armed forces' human rights performance.

As a result, such actions as the telliphone warnings to civilians suspected of involvement with the death squads and a relievation of strict guidelines for around forces conduct are likely to continue. In our judgment, the close relationship between key military officers and extreme rightlet civilian politicians—as indicated by

New Year holidays—provides an effective conduit for the military to constrain extreme rightist actions.

Revenuelag the Justice System

Despite their preoccupation with establishing the credibility of the political process while escalating the war affort, both the provisional conlition government of President Magana and the successor Duarts administration pushed through judicial measures almed at controlling the terrorist element. Early in 1984, a

Rightwing Terrorist Organizations

Salvadoran Anti-Communist Command (CAS)
Created in late 1983. Largely engaged in propaganda
Publicly denounced Defense Ministry for imposing
human rights doctrine on the security forces.

believes the group may only be front for
other clandestine organisations.

Death Squadron (EM)

May not be an organized group but rather a generic label used loosely by ad hoc hit squads probably operating out of military posts. Trademark since at least 1979 has been initials EM carved into bodies of victimal

Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA)

One of the most active groups in recent years. Believed by some the second power been formed in
mid-1980 by elements that since have been integrated
into ARENA's paramilliary structure.

White Hand (MB)

Like the EM and other nameless groups, a probable ad hoc name for terrorists working out of the Army and security forces. Trademark traditionally was a handprint in white paint left on the property of victims or near their bodies.

Maximiliano Hornandes Martines Auti-Communist Brigade (MHM)

Responsible for many high-profile killings over the past five years. Victims often found clutching leaflets with the group's mussage on them. MHM has used newspapers, radio, and even television to make announcements of acts committed and operations planned.

Salvation Movement of 18 March (MS-18)
Group first appeared on the scene in late 1983. Its
propagande and name—28 March 1980 was the last
day of Phase I government expropriation of large
plantations—evegest the group represents the interests of a tiny group of fanatic coffee barons, many of
whom probably reside in Miamil

Organization for Liberation From Communism

A group that appeared on the scene at about the time of the October 1979 coup; its current status is unknown. May have been absorbed by one or another of the above groups, possibly the ESA, which some believe comprises personnel from Johnst terrorist organizations such as the White Warriors Union and the Salvadoran Anti-Communist Brigade.

White Warriors Unjec (UGB)

Formed in May 1977 following the leftwing kidnaping and murder of Foreign Minister Mauricio Borgonomo. The group was led by Roberto D'Aubuisson and other National Guard afficers

and emphasized the distalling istin of Catholic prioris perceived to be active supporters of the insurgent movement. The UGB appears to have been disbanded soon after the October 1979 coup and D'Aubuisson's release from active duty.

special investigations unit was created with US financial and technical aid to help the government energys terrorist activities and bring to justice perpetrators of rightwing violence. The much-publicized case againgt five National Guard enlisted mes charged with terturing and killing four US churchwomen in late 1980 was finally resolved. All five were convicted in May by a civilian jury and sentenced to 30 years in prison.

Although an initial coverup of the affair probably was orchestrated by midlevel National Guard officers, there has sever been any credible evidence that the killings of the churchwomen were ordered by higher authority.



Conservative warmen's group confronts visiting libered US ingleioturs in January 1983 with present signs demanding that Submides on President Magana refers to dialogue or arguitate with the robels and calling Senator Guid a "white res."

Judicial proceedings against civilian and military personnel arrested for past terrorist acts also continue to progress, afbeit unevenly. One satback in this effort was the Supreme Court's review of the case of LL. Lopez Sibrian, which is November 1984 resulted in his acquittal of all charges stamming from the 1981. murders of two US labor advisors. As suggested by bowever, US pressure recountly helped Duarte in December to convince a rejectant military high command to have the lieutenant dropped from the list of active-duty officers. Moreover, Duarte's government in November warned local media owners of fines and other legal sanctions if they continued to publish or broadcast declarations from self-proclaimed rightwing terrorist organizations. After e two-month histm, bowever, extremist communiques and death threats are once again being published.

The administration is now struggling with the rightist-dominated Legislative Assembly to create a judicial commission to ownsee broad reforms proposed by
Duarte for the civil and criminal justice system.

a recent Assembly bill
would cut off funding to this and other presidential
commissions, probably forcing Duarte to veto this
legislation. These obstacles could also affect plans by
the President to activate a "criminological institute"
to investigate specific rightwing terrorist acts.

that its first priorities would

tion of Archbishop Komero, said by other to have been authored by D'Aubuisson and his backers

Self-Imposed Constraints

In addition to changes in the military and judicial systems, last year's reduction in rightist violence is also attributable, in our opinion, to a variety of self-imposed constraints. Some extreme rightists probably concluded that, in the wake of the visit by Vioc President Bush in 1981, at least a temporary stand-down in terrorist activities would be required to direct the attention of the US administration away from the issue of human rights. Almost certainty, in our view, the US Congressional focus on political violence in El Salvador and the need for continued US military and economic aid provided astrone rightists additional incentives to certail terrorist operations.

The right wing probably also has been encouraged by the upture in government fortunes on the battlefield since January 1984 and a commensurate loss in political support for the rebel alliance. The far right may believe that favorable trands in the military situation have temporarily reduced the need for civilian terrorist operations against insurgest elements.

The election compaign last year ironically also played a role in reducing rightwing terrorism. It is our judgment that many rightist leaders genuinely believed that D'Aubuisson and his ARENA party could wis the 1984 presidential elections. Hence, there was an incentive for extremists not to undermine their leader's public appeal with high-profile terrorist violence. Following the electoral defeat of ARENA, moreover, the party became less cohesive.

ments, therefore, may have been preoccupied ion with fomenting violence and more with sorting out their options in dealing with the new Duarte government and the scheduled Legisletive Assembly and municipal elections in March 1985.

Some Prominent Cases of Rightwing Terrorism.

Salvadoran Cases

- In December 1980, National Guardsmen killed eight members of a rural cooperative in San Vicente after they were denounced as subversives by the local Civil Defense. Disposition: The Guard commander who ordered the killings was transferred to another department. The military promised financial remuneration to families of the victims.
- In March 1980, Archbishop Oscar Romero was assassinated while performing Mass in a San Salvador chapel, presumably by right wing. Dispesition: No government investigation or arrests.
- During 1981, atrocities accurred in two weakingclass neighborhoods of the capital. Some 40 suspected leftists were summarily executed by elements of the 1st Infantry Brigade and Treasury Police. Disposition: No investigations or arrests.
- During 1981-87, some 30 passents from Sonsonate Department were abducted and killed by local Civil Defense forces and their bodies thrown into a well in the town of Armenia. Disposition: Government investigation recently begun; three suspects arrested.
- In November 1982, Army troops stationed in Usulutan abducted at least 15 youths from nearby Santa Elena and murdered them. Disposition: No investigation or arrests.
- The same month, Army and Civil Defense personnel tortured and killed at least seven members of La Florida form cooperative in Santa Ana Department. Disposition: No investigation or arrests.
- In February 1983, between 30 and 75 Indian farmworkers from Las Hajas jurisdiction of Sonsonate Department were abducted and killed by Army and Civil Defense troops commanded by Captain Figueroa Morales of the 6th Detachment. Disposition: Figueroa was transferred, and three Civil Defense suspects detained last May. No further information.

- In November 1983. Civil Defense forces tortured and murdered nine peasant men and women in Zaragosa hamlet in La Libertad Department. Army Li. Col. Denis Moran—reputed death squad leader—ordered the killings. Disposition. No investigation and no arrests. Lieutenam Colonel Moran recently transferred to the Inter-American Defense School in Washington, D.C.
- In February 1984, seven Civil Defense members
 were on trial in Santa Ana for murders
 committed over a four-year period. Disposition: No
 information on the outcome.
- The April 1984 trial of notorious ex-Army Maj.
 Guilliermo Raeder—arrested in 1982 for crimes ranging from embessioness to murder—was considered a key test of the Salvadoran justice system.
 Disputition: Roeder was acquitted of all charges.
- In November 1984, a Salvadoran Lutheron minister was murdered by two Army personnel in San Miguel. Disposition: The perpetrators confessed and were remanded to chill authorities.

Cases of US Children

- The murder of four US churchwomen in December 1980 was resolved in May 1984, when five National Guardsmen were convicted by a civilian jury and sentenced to 30 years in juil.
- The case of John Sullivan—a freelance journalist abducted and killed by presumed rightists in December 1980—is unlikely to ever be fully investigations have yielded no solid leads.
- The case of two US labor advisers assassinated in January 1981 remains tenuous. Two National Guard triggermen confessed in 1982, but two officers who ordered the killings and wealthy civilian conspirators have escaped prosecution in civilian course. One of the officers was released from active duty in December under orders from President Duarie.

3-1



2 January 1981

KEMORANDUM

El miveder: Military Prosperts

The armed forces, despite training, equipment, and logistical problems, here contained insurgent operations with present
weaponry and personnel. But it has been a military struggle
between two weak appendents and the left is clearly in the process
of upgrading its measurest. Especially with increased external
support, the querrillas sould relatively quistly present a more
formidable threat—one that would severely tax both the resources
and the will of corernment forces. Major external aid probably
will be essential for the Salvadoran armed forces to survive. To
be effective in forcestalling victory by a querrilla movement. be effective in freetalling victory by a guerfilla movement totally ininical to the DB, such aid probably would have to be of a magnitude several times the \$5-6 million and small number of advisors presently under consideration. From with increased assistance there would be no quarantee of success.

Current Strategy of the Par Left

left to upgrade its war of attrition and to initiate new "insur-

There is, however, no reliable estimate of the Salvadoran armed forces military seeds.

This neverthe was proposed by the of Political Analysis and secretizated with the Office of Swellegie Research, the Charlestine Service, and the Office of Boonsie Research, the Ravional Intelligence Officer for Marin Fice. It reflects information evellable as of & mary 1991

Approved for Raise

rectional activities aimed at weakening the government domestically and further undermining its credentials abroad. Increased arms shipments to the insurgents from Bicaragua, Cuba, other Communist blor members, and governments and groups from the Middle East have been reported since mid-Hovember. This aid has encouraged leftists to reject negotiations and press the insurgency. It has also so far compensated for the continued arceim of their domestic political base as well as recruiting and organistical deficiencies.

of stepped up support setivities including sharply increased military operations at the major Minaraguan base at Nontelinary some unusual night flights at Managua's airport; and the departure of Cuban and other third sountry personnal from Micaragua,

Cremeive in the morthermost department of Chalatenango also.

Vers overblown. The quarrillas had indicated that for the present

they were pursuise hit and run tacrics.

Mevertheless, Chalatenango is the logical starting point for a campaign to demonstrate military and political momentum as a prolude to a major offensive in 1921. The insurgents' present tactics appear to be to sustain a high level of assassinations and other spectarular terrorist attacks, and to escalate rural military assaults. An immediate meal is to control a "liberated military assaults. An immediate meal is to control a "liberated sone" in which to set up a provisional government. The far left cone" in which to set up a provisional government. The far left is assured of receiving more than token recognition for such a landow government. They believe this further international shadow government. They believe this further international isolation of the civil-military junta would undercut any plant by isolation of the civil-military junta would undercut any plant the incoming US administration to boost military support for the junta.

continued improvements in armment would put a final offensive strategy within reach once the guarrillas overcome the
logistical and training problems associated with an influx of new
equipment. At the moment, both Salvadoran radicals and Revant
might assegnests the extent of the ourrent leftist push, hoping
might assegnests the extent of the ourrent leftist push, hoping
to precipitate a rightwing soup or a Christian Democratic withto precipitate a rightwing soup or a Christian Democratic withdrawal from the government prior to the change in M minimistradrawal from the government prior to the change in M minimistrations. It is clear, however, that both Cube and Micaragum are
tions. It is clear, however, that both Cube and Micaragum are
already collaborating more closely and stopping up their assistance. If a major offensive were to show premise, it would have
a snowball effect, spurring recruitment, submorging textical and
personality differences among insergent groups, and excouraging
foreign supporters to applicate diplomatic and military aid by
several orders of magnitude.

Status of the Civil Military Government

The recent junta shakeup and the present government restructuring promise some greater efficiency and a higher political profile for junta President Duarts, but no greater civilian control over the armed forces. The Defense Ministry controls military affairs and retains veto power over policy in other important areas.

The copyrarning Christian Desceratio party did gain a commitment from the military to crack down on abuses by the security force and to begin clearing house. So far, the military's actions effer a hint of promise is some areas. But me more than a marginal mear term impact on the level of officially tolerated antileft terrorism is expected.

admitted responsibility for the secent murders of several campesino leaders, promising indemnification and disciplinary action
against those involved. The transfers of some high-level officers
associated with abuses are scheduled for January. He transfersif they take place—would be an important symbolic min But would
still fall well short of the Christian Democrats' objectives;
moreover, they would only be a superficial restructuring from the
military's perspective. The military is, manwhile, footdragging
in the investigations of the assussinations of six leftist
leaders and the murders of the four US Catholic vones.

Continuing indiscriminate werfare against the left will likely lead to another crisis between the military and the Christian Democratic movement. On the whole, the military still Christian Democratic movement. On the whole, the military still has a low opinion of the party for failing to attract broader popular and international support. There remains latent sentiment for throwing out the civilians entirely, even though the military high ocemand appears to recognise the political utility of the party's participation. The improved personal relationship between Christian Democratic leader Duarte and leading military between Christian Democratic leader Duarte and leading military of includes the glue holding the scaling the scaling and include several crises. But it has been at the expense of including Duarte from some elements of his party.

The US military sid extended to date has neither increased us influence over the Salvadoran armed forces nor made them substantially more diffective. The limited deliveries, attached conditions, and on again off again timetable have left many salvadoran officers believing 86 aid is illusory. This relationess their resolve to go it alone, employing their own standards and practices. and practices.


The recent US interruption of economic and military aid to the Salvadoran Government conveyed different signals to different elments of the military instimations

- -- Some officers, despite their resentment, perceived the halt as an effort by the US to show its displeasure. with security force abuses and encourage change.
- -- Other officers, however, read the US action as undermining the institution's long term chances for survival. In effect, they perceived the US siding with a small group of opportunistic Christian Democrats who--if they could not inspire the US to provide aid when it was most needed -- vere not worth retaining in the junta.
- -- When the economic and previously agreed upon military aid was then quickly restored, some officers felt the token offerings and promises to the Christian Democrats had already paid off, and their enthusiam for followthrough waned.

Any nove by the MS with regard to military mid will be subject to similarly verying interpretations. Continuing to withhold military mid will probably not restrain and may even execurage the extreme right. Rightwing plotters, feeling they have little to lose with the surrent US administration, would never gamble on a some in the next several woods. So far, however, they appear to lack critical high level support. Hany rightwing officers, in tandem with archoenservative civilians, believe the incoming US administration will allow them to deal with the left as they see fit. They would tend to interpret when the left as they see fit. They would tend to interpret to crush the left. Other officers might recognise that such an increase was conditioned on improved performance, but we doubt they would be willing to risk military disunity by cracking down such a potent threat.

Thus, US aid will not necessarily ensure the continuance of a civilian component in the government-indeed it could provoke an outright military takeover. Moreover, military aid also entails tradeoffs with other US interests. Assisting the government as resently constituted will, for example, strain US relations with maxico, which has publicly stated its opposition to US military laid; diplomatic complications would multiply were US assistance being given to a purely military rightwing government. Another consideration is that foreign supporters of the Salvadoran consideration is that foreign supporters of the Salvadoran excited up their con aid to the insurgents, feeding even more stepping up their con aid to the insurgents, feeding even more videopread violence. Finally, even under an optimistic scenario, it seems unlikely that the guerrilla threat can be permanently eliminated, so that some US support might have to continue for an extended period.

In our judgment, the Salvadoran Government will probably not the able to withstand, the threat from the left without substantial is or other external aid in the future. Arms flows to the insurgents, the likely policies of the foreign supporters supplying the radicals, and the weaknesses of the Salvadoran military institution arque such a need. It Salvador is a very small battlefield and the momentum could shift very quickly to the insurgents with the addition of only a thousand or so well armed insurgents with the addition of only a thousand or so well armed combatants and a weakening of the will of government forces.



The ultraright in El Salvador has a long history of using violence as a political tool, perhaps marked most vividly by the widespread repression and murder of campesinos following the unsuccessful peasant rebellion in 1932. In the 1960s, a surge of political activity among peasants and urban workers inspired the creation of many new rightwing organizations, both official and clandestine.

One such government-sponsored group--the National Democratic Organization (ORDEN)--was comprised of tens of thousands of conservative rural peasants and served as a tool of the landed elites. It included many former armed forces personnel who were part of the nation's reserve force, the Territorial Service. ORDEN served principally as an intelligence-gathering organization--identifying real or suspected ensules of the regime--but it also occasionally took direct action against them.

Augmenting the semiofficial organizations were a variety of secret vigilante groups that have faded in and out of existence. Traditionally, rightwing death squads have included civilian mercenaries, idealists tied to particular wealthy elites, and active and retired security force personnel. Given the impunity with which death squads continue to operate today, it is clear that security force personnel continue to cooperate with and participate in vigilants terror.

Leadership and Organization

Information on the leadership and organization of rightwing terroriet groups is sketchy. A small group of wealthy Salvadorans living in Miami, however, is believed to be behind the kidmaping and intimidation of businessmen who have shown sympathy for the civilmilitary government or for US policy in El Salvador. These individuals also may have ordered the assassinations of the two US AFL-Clo representatives in January. Tied to this group of wealthy expatriates are businessmen in El Salvador who belong to the Broad Metional Front, headed by Major D'Aubuisson and a young ultraconservative,

17 April 1981

Approved for Release NOV 1993 The extreme right wing therefore has limited need for external support, given its financing by millionaire exiles. The terror squads use a broad range of side arms, machine pistols, and rifles that are readily available on the regional black market and in the United States. The involvement of security force personnel in the rightist terrorism ensures a further supply of arms and license to use them. For example, the March attack on the Nicaraguan Embassy in San Salvador by assailants using RPG-2 rockets followed the capture of a substantial supply of these weapons by government troops.

Membership in rightwing terrorist groups probably approaches several hundred, but our information in this area is limited. Security force personnel operate on their own or are employed in an off-duty capacity by civilians. Hercenaries outside armed forces ranks are also utilized.

The rumor that foreign personnel--usually Nicaraquans or Guatamalans--are active in rightwing activities
is heard frequently, but there is little hard evidence.
Following Somosa's overthrow, some 1,300 Nicaraguan National Guard troops arrived in El Salvador, the vast
majority of whom were enlisted personnel.
suggested a large number of them were to be integrated
into the Salvadoran armed forces, but this was never confirmed and the numbers actually integrated were probably
quite modest. Many others may have been recruited into
the private guard forces of the elite. Numbers of either
group could easily be involved in rightwing violence,
but it is impossible to estimate numbers accurately.

charge that Quatemalan paramilitary forces are active in El Salvador. Contacts and consultations between right-wing Salvadoran and Quatemalan officials do occur--and some civilian terrorist personnel may have trained in Quatemala with like-minded organizations--but there is no persuasive evidence that significant assistance has been given. It seems extremely unlikely that the Quatemalan Government would have authorized the dispatch to El Salvador of government personnel, in mufti or otherwise, under prevailing conditions.

17 April 1981



Nevertheless, even prior to the self-exile of El Salvador's conservative economic elite, there were fremment contacts between hardlining businessmen in Guatemals and El Salvador and the soliciting of funds from the Guatemalan brethren. The travels of Major D'Aubulsson attest to continuing contacts, have discussed the possibility of providing funds or men to the Salvadoran right wing. Although the current level of rightwing activities in El Salvador could easily be maintained without resort to outside aid, in the event of a major Salvadoran crisis a segment of the Guatemalan right would probably provide concrete assistance if asked.

17 April 1981

	ROUTINI	E
18) 1	INTERIOR Cable IN	58
200	PAGE 1 OF	2 PAGES
Cices	TIDIAL TARMY NAVY AIR JOS SECDER NEA HIC AID USIA SOO ONE OUR DOS COS	CIANNOC
FBI,	I & NS	110 14, U.S.C.
This materi Secs. 193 as	I & NS al contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws. The transmission of revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.	
	THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.	
_	CITE	
	DIST 8 NOVEMBER 196	20.0
COUNTR	BOLIVIA/CUBA/BRAZIL NOV C 00 937Z	1.5(c) 3,4(b)(1)
DOI		
	1) CUBAN PROMISE TO BOLIVIAN EXILES TO STEP UP PACE OF	
SUBJECT	REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY	T
	2) POSSIBLE ASSASSINATION OF PROMINENT BOLIVIAL GUEVARA FEW MONTHS IN RETALIATION FOR DEATH OF "CHE" GUEVARA	52.30
	FIELD NO.	1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)
ACQ	4.4	
SOURCE		
	1. RAUL ROA GARCIA, CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER, ON HIS ARRIVAL	
THE	CARRIED A VERBAL MES	
-	CASTRO RUZ TO THE BOLIVIAN EXILES IN THE UNITED STATE	ES TO
-	THE BOLIVIAN CONFLICT WOULD BE RENEWED.	
11	ALSO STATED THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT NOT ONLY DID NOT PLAN TO CHANGE	
A	ITS PROGRAM OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY, BUT IT MIGHT EVEN STEP UP THE	
I	PACE OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY. ROA MENTIONED THAT TAMAYO (FNU), THE	
P	BOLIVIAN GUERRILLA, WAS STILL ALIVE. COMMENT: THIS MAY	
В	EFER TO CUBAN LT. LEONARDO TAMAYO NUNEZ WHO IS KNOWN AS "URBAN	10." ONS(c)
R	EFER TO CUBAN LT. LEONARDO TAMATO NORTHE AS ONE OF THE FOREIG	3.4(5) 5.
	1 OCTOBER 1967, "URBANO" WAS STILL ACTIVE AS ONE OF THE FOREIG	
	GUERRILLAS IN BOLIVIA.	1
1		
•	closes(feation) (dissem controls)	
-	TOTAL POR DELEASE	

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

(classification) (dissert controls)

2. A PROMINENT BOLIVIAN MILITARY PIGURE, POSSIBLY PRESIDENT
RENE BARRIENTOS ORTUNO OR GENERAL ALFREDO OVANDO CANDIA, MIGHT BE
ASSASSINATED WITHIN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE MONTHS, IN REVENGE FOR THE

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, AIR, CINCLANT, CINCSO.

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

d

3

1

.

(dissem controls)

DEATH OF "CHE" GUEVARA.

5

3 2

1

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 0913332

811 MAISTS

FRE-#1 ##1-#1 PPC-#1 ##5-#1 PP#-#1 \$52-#1 BCE#-#1

1878 LOC-80 MA-80 ST-86 AND-01 PA-16 PA-61 MC1-64 A-62 STC-90 M-81 MC9-61 /816 W

muni /it

P 0913912 OCT AS
ON PRIS CRIVA CRIVA PR
TO AIC 8678
WILDONER, ANT
PRIS ALT WEST FL
CON 2912 RI SM FT BAVIE PRIVATED-RI-C/2
PRIS ASSOCION PA
PRE CORDEM PR
SCCT FRPA-LUM

BRELAS BF

RUS /

THE 1 M 1 -- EL SALVESCH, FOR'S DECO EN EIGENFIRE, SINCOLE

PART | 261

THE SAL VANCE RADIO CADENS SONGER IN SPANISH STEE GAS 8 SET 45

INTESTED BLIEST (HONES AFTER THE ACCUMPTING OF PRELIDENT PAPOLICE DURSTE'S GARCINES, THE POLITICAL LETINISE ENVIRONCE TO MAY NOT LINK TO THE ARTED BUTSHING A PROLITICAL SECURES OF THE LOVELOWERS OF THE ACTION.

THE FIRST BUT THAT HE WINGLES AND FOR THE AND HE WAS THAT HE WAS BEEN AND THE THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF

THE COMMITTEE BURNTE WAS ELIGIMENTED TO STREET WITH MEN CECTICAN VILLEGO ON THE SEPTEMBER OF THE EXPITAL BY EAR AMED MEN MEN WERE LATER CONTINUES AS REMISERS OF THE PERSON PARKS CASSILLED FACET, WHICH THE SOVERMENT CLAUMS IS A PERSON OF THE PRINC.

AS OF TODAY, THE COURSELES FACULT HAS NOT CLAIMES RESPONSES ATT FOR THE MIGHAPPING, ALTHOUGH POLITICAL AND RIPLEMENTS DEPRETS

PORTICE TRAT IT WILL FACE PROBLEMS IN THE PUTTING IN CATHERING

HISTORY, JULIO ACOUTO SEY PREMORE SINCETTS IS DECIME
AND COMMISSION, SAID TALL INS RESEARCH TO AN SAIDLESS CLASSES CONTINUED OF THE BANK SCOT WITH THE
LEFTISTS WHICH WAS INITIATED AND INTERNETIED EAST NEAR ASSESSMENT
THIS CAN PRESIDENT ON WHICH TAID.

ENGLESS SECONDUCTS CHARGES OF MAY MAD DIFFERENT HISTOR AS THE THREE PER AND SUFFERENCE PART THREE SECONDUCTORS OF MAY BE NOTE THAT THE BLACK COME BOTH THE EXPENSES FOR MOST SHAM AS MOSTAT MAY US A POSTER BUT BOTH HE'S FEELECT THE REAL STRAFFOR

Frest has been no represent man anoth transf on the represent of the continuent preakcoins the assumption of the single market of the single respectively. I desired that this implicated and the cut fact represents the continuents for the single of the continuents and continuents that the cut factor of the cut factor

THE ART CASE, I RELEASE THAT THIS INCIDENT AND STREET NOTICE TO HOW COULD HAVE PROSITED BY REALISE RESIST TO AND SERVING TO HOW LACK SIDE VIEWS IT. IMPORTMENTALLY OF AND CARRIED BY THE RESIDENT AND RESIDENCE AND VIEW SERVE TO MAKE TENNEL SERVING HOLD AND THE RESIDENCE AND A DEAL SERVE TO MAKE TENNEL SERVE THE RESIDENCE AND SERVINGS THE SERVINGS SERVINGS.

IRALEGAUS DE MICO, RENTERE ME PRENETS SAID THAT

PRIZE TO THE ALDRAFFING. THEY WERE PLANNING TO MAKE A PROPOSAL TO THE FOR-FREN DN THE POSITION OF THE LEFT BEGARDING A METING IN EL EALVADOR, HE SAID THAT THEY MEET CONSTOCKING THE POSSIBILITY OF ACCEPTING TRAT PROPOSAL ONLY IF YOU ALSO ACCEPTED TO MEET PRIVATELY ARROAD.

FARLURE TO REEP ATE WORD; THE CONTRIVENT HAS FAILED TO HEEP ATE
WHOD SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST, I WILL GIVE TORSE CRIES ONLY.
FIRST, ENGINEER DOWNER WINSELF SAID A TEV BATS SCIENT THE MARCH
ELECTIONS THAT THE DIALOGUE WOULD CONTINUE AD MITTER AND THE LINNES
WAS, BUT HE DID NOT BEEP BIE WORD. APERL, HAT, JULE, JOET,
MODEUT, AND SEPTEMBER, 6 AND 1/2 MOMENT LATER, HE HAS STILL MOT
FREFILLED BIS PROVINCE.

THERE WAS AN ADDRESS OF THE STREET HE SIDES IN THE AVAIDAGE PRETTING. I REPORT INDISTINCTED CONTINUE WITH THE STALLOOUS IN THE SAME WAY IT WAS CORRECTED OUT TO EVALUATE HIMSELF PROPOSED THE MATERIAL IZATION OF THE STALLOOUS TO EMBLE TOAT ONLY THE MATERIAL IZATION OF THE STALLOOUS TO EMBLE TOAT ONLY THE MATERIAL IZATION OF THE STALLOOUS TO EMBLE TOAT ONLY THE MATERIAL IZATION OF THE STALLOOUS THE SAME IN POST OF THE SAME THE SAME THE POST OF THE SAME THE SAME

get

Rylin

Approved for Release

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM.

red m milest

9851 ARAZETS

MA FILE-DI MA-FI PIC-DI 043-01 PF4-DI 355-DI 0650-DI MG-FI [3-02 /FI] AI 80

180 - 100-10 Mai-10 Mai-10 FR-10 FA-12 SF-22 SL70-0

--- 367128 MINST /34

P MINETE OCT ES
PR FOIS CRIVA CRIVA PR
TO 445 4530
BECONSOL WAT
FRES NET MEST FL
COM 2918 RM SR FT DAPIE FOL/NFZU-NE-C//
FOIS ASSUCCION PA
FOE CONSUM PR
BCCCY FEPA-CUM

man w

SPEL

MET PARTITUE SAN SALTAGOR BADIS CASENA SOUDRA STANISM BEJTRAFFF MADE IN PARLIC.

TALE I M 1 -- EL EXCHANGE FOR'S MICH DE REDREFFIRE, BERLDUSE

PARSITAL

FRENTIAL FRAME CONTINUES FRIND. & EPCC .. EDMINISTION MADE OF OF PERMITS FROM SOTA LIGIS WAS ESTABLISHED PRIMARILY TO PROMOTE COCPURATION ON EMPERTHING ESTATED TO THE DISALOGUE. AS OF MAN, ME MANE AND FORMALIZED WAS MAD APPROVED TO ATACHALO, THAT IS, 1985 BY-LANS REGULATING THE OFFICIATION OF THIS COMMISSION. TO EXPECT THEM TO BE WEST THEY SAID INTY MERE COING TO DO DOES AND MANE SERVE MEN TOCY MAIN FRIENDS TO PROVING THE PROMISES IN THE PAST.

INCREPORE, THIS IS NO FEELEN WITH MOLDING A SHALDER ASSOCIATION TO CHEMOS PROGRESSION OF A SHALDER ASSOCIATION OF A SECTION OF CAMPYING OUT A RECYING ASSOCIATION OF A SECTION OF A SHALD OF A RECYING ASSOCIATION OF A SECTION OF A SHALD OF A SECTION OF A

WHAT IS THE REASON FOR MULDING A RESTING ARROAD. TO MAKE PRIVACE! PRIVACE CAN SE AND IN THE EMPRICATION. IS THE REASON TO BO IT BENIND THE PEOPLE'S SACKE SO AS NOT TO NOT MAKE TO MAKE ANY

ARTON, I THINK THAT WE TEST WANT FOR THE RESERVATION OF THE BIGMAPPING OF EDUTATE SOUTH TO BANKATER AND THEM WE WILL FOLLOW THE SATING THAT WILLIES AND BETTER THAN MODES!

CHAPTERALL) ACCORDING TO LOT ADDRESSMENT'S POSITION, MOICES BY MINISTER SET PRENSES, INC DIRECTUR BAS REEN MARKES. WEST IE NORE OF THE POSITION

INMEDIT OF ART STILL OPTICITIES. WE CONTINUE TO INSIST ON THE HIS SON A BIALDERS; WE RESENTED PRESENTED OUR POSITION DERING A FORM ORGANIZED BY THE PEN I MATERIAL CONC. IL LATER PARTIES. WE THINK THAT THE REST OFFICE IS A DIALDERS TO THEFT TO APPLE THIS SPIRAL THAT CONTINUES IS RESENTED THE WAR FROM BOTH SIDET.

EXCEPTION, I THINK I'M RECEIPE OF SHOULD ME HAVE LEGISLES OF INDICATE OF MEASURE OF THE PROPERTY OF MEASURE OF THE PROPERTY OF

FRANCE OF A FRANCE OF THE SECURITY OF THE PRESENCE OF THE PRES

SMARTERALI MET IL TITALE EL COMMUNICE TANDICE MANDAL MAD

tement ves, mat is tigat.

SEND OF THE COLPET OF THE AUGUSTICE THE THAT THE THE

STOREGIST OF DISCUSS THE ANCIDENT, AND MADE SOME CONNECTED AND AND THE FOR THE AND AND THE ENTERING DESCRIPTIONS OF THE ANDRESS OF THE ANDRES

EVIDENTLY MADE TO MANDLE THE PRIVATELY. WE DO NOT THEM IT ADVISABLE TO MEDIC IN THIS; THIS IS PERMANE THE DEST MAY TO SEACH A SATISFACTORY ADDICATED.

I GARRESTI THE CONTINUENT HAS PROTITIONED ACCUSED THE PINE OF THE EXCHAPPING AND THE FIRM HA MENTHER CONTINUED ACC TENED AT. HOUSEVER, IT CALLS OUR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE LETPETARY OF THE SOCIALIST PROTESSANTIONAL, I WOLF FRANCISCO -- FOIS: PERA, I BO NOT BECALL HIS DINER SHAWARE -- HE IS A DOMINICAL -- SAID THAT HE SPORT TO THE. HE STATE DISTANCE HE SAID THAT YOU TOLD WIN THAT RETURNS THE FOR NOT THE FIRM MEST CHANGE WED.


I BRESH! NO. I DID NOT SET THE FREE. I CAMPET SPEEL FOR CT. I AN ARE A SPORTSMAN FOR THE FREE. I PRODUCETE: PENA AND THEN PENA SEN! A CLASSIFICATION TO THE WORLD VESTERDAY. THE CONTERNED COUNTY OF PENA AL EAVISE SEVERAL TAYRES, BUT FENA SAID THAT THEY ME! FALSE, MINICA PENAS INF THE SOVERWEET GUALPHEATED THIS. (END DECOMPOSITE)

#0 ALLS #13780- 01/12367 0

...

Approved for Release

INQUIRE=DOC17D ITEM NO=00090740 ENVELOPE MCN = 92045/10062 TOR - 920450616 CDSH = LGX363 RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS1954 0450613-SSSS--RUEALGX. ZHY SSSSS HEADER R 140613Z FEB 92 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC INFO RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC RUEKCCG/USDP-CCC WASHINGTON DC RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL RUEALGX/SAFE R 140547Z FEB 92 FH CIA TO RUCLAPA/12AIS BERGSTROM AFB TX RHFIAAA/15AF HARCH AFB CA RUWMEGA/24 COMPN HOWARD AFB RUCIPGA/325FH TYNDALL AFB FL/IN RUHVAAA/3AD/IN HICKHAM AFB HI RUEBEJA/436 MAN/DOI DOVER AFB RUCIBBA/9TH AF SHAN AFB RHCDAAA/AFSDC HURLBURT FLD FL RUCBSAA/AIC NORFOLK VA RHCPMXA/AIR UNIVERSITY RULNNRA/ARMY WAR COLLEGE RHFJKXT/CARIBRDC KEY WEST FL RUEDFAA/CDR JSDC FT BRAGG NC RUEDHNA/CDR USASOC FT BRASS NC RUEDGHA/CDR193DINFBDE FT CLAYTON PM RUEDACC/CDR4THPSYDPGP FT BRAGG NC RUEATAC/CDRUSAITAC WASHDC RULYOWA/CG FOURTH MEB RUCBLFJ/CG II MEF RUCKHOA/CG SECOND FSSG RUCKDDA/CB SECOND MARDIV RUCKFCA/CG SECOND MAN RUCBLFA/CGFMFLANT RUSHNOA/CINCEUR RUCOSYA/CINCLANTFLT DET SO FT AHADOR PH RUCBSAA/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK RULSJGA/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC RULSJEA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC RHDLSDP/COMFAIR KEFLAVIK RUNDTAA/COMNAVSPECHARCOM CORONADO CA RULYVBA/COMSECONDFLT RUETIAS/COMUSARMY FT MEADE RUEBBJB/DEA EL PASO INTEL CENTER/CIA REP EPIC RUEAUSA/DEPT OF LABOR RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE



RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC RULKHIS/DIRHAVINVSERV WASHDC RUETIAA/DIRNSA RUKGNLA/DLA CAMERON STATION VA RUKGNHA/FAA RUCFAAA/FEMA SF WASH DC RUEBGHA/FEMA WASHDC RUCEAAB/HQ AFSPACECOM INTEL PETERSON AFB CO RUEBNBAZHO AFTAC-IN PATRICK AFB FL RUEADHD/HQ DA RHDIAAA/HQ TAC RUVESLA/HQ USSPACECOM/CIA REP PETERSON AFB COLO RUEBNJAZINS RUWSMXI/MAC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL RHCFMDD/MARDET UNITAS RUMMHJA/NAVSTKWARCEN RUEDASA/NAVY WAR COLLEGE RHCCAAA/NE AD SECTOR GRIFFIS AFB NY/IN RUEAIJU/NPIC RUMMFLA/NWADS/IN MCCHORD AFB RULWAAE/SAC CIA REP RHEPAAB/TAC IDHS FACILITY LANGLEY AFB VA RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT RULYHOV/THO THO MEU RUWMEGA/USAFSO/LA RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT HORFOLK VA RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONDLULU HI RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB RULYVGAZUSCOMSOLANT RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC RUNSHXI/USTRANSCOM INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL RUCHDT/USUN NEW YORK RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM BT CONTROLS

SECTION 1 OF 2 CITE CIA 229450

AFTAC PATRICK AFB/IN; DEPT OF STATE FOR SECSTATE AID; USUN NEW YORK FOR POLAD; DIA FOR LA; CIMCEUR FOR POLAD; USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY FOR STATE REP AND CIA REP; NAVY HAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP; TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR SPECIAL RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR TACOPS/INOI; HQS DLA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67 TRM/IN; HPIC FOR PB CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INDCN XPNN; MAC INTEL CENTER SCOTT AFB; CDRUSAITAC WASHDC FOR GIPD; HQ AFSDC HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//; CDR USASOC FT BRAGG NC//AQIN//; COMNAVSPECHARCOM CORONADO CA//N2//;

PAGE: 1156

CDR4THPSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF POG//; 24 COMP HING HOWARD AFB DOI; 26AD LUKE AFB ARIZ//INEZ; 92BMW FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN, 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR INI, INS ATTH COINT, 9TH AFB SHAW SC//IN//, CENTCOM HACDILL AFB FL//J2//, FAA//ATTH ACS-400; NE AD SECTOR GRIFFISS AFB PASS TO IN; CG II MEF//GZ//FOR SECOND SRI GROUP; HQ AFSPACECOM/IN; USTRANS INTELCEN SCOTT AFB//CIA REP; COMFAIR KEFLAVIK IC//NZ//; HQ AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO/INTEL/INO/INA/INU.

FROM:

CONTENTS

- 1. IN BRIEF
- 2. GUATEMALA: SHOWING PROGRESS ON KEY ISSUES
- 1. IN BRIEF



2. GUATEMALA: SHOWING PROGRESS ON KEY ISSUES

SINCE ASSUMING OFFICE A YEAR AGO, PRESIDENT SERRAND HAS DIRECTED A STRONG ECONOMIC RECOVERY.

ONE OF SERRAND'S CHIEF ACCOMPLISHMENTS HAS BEEN THE EARLY SUCCESS OF HIS ECONOMIC POLICIES. HIS REFORM PROGRAM HAS RESULTED IN REAL GNP CONTINUING TO GROW AT ABOUT 3 PERCENT, INFLATION FALLING FROM 60 TO 10 PERCENT, AND FOREIGH EXCHANGE RESERVES INCREASING FROM 450 MILLION TO 4600 MILLION. A POLL CONDUCTED THIS MONTH, HOMEVER, SHOWS SERRAND'S POPULAR APPROVAL RATING HAS SLIPPED FROM 42 TO 25 PERCENT SINCE JULY, IN PART BECAUSE OF HIS BELT-TIGHTENING POLICIES.

HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD IMPROVING

THE FIGHT AGAINST MARCOTICS

SERRANO HAS ACCEPTED DIRECT US ASSISTANCE

INCLUDING

SUPPORT FOR OPERATION CADENCE. A BILATERAL QUICK-REACTION FORCE. AS A RESULT, A RECORD 17.5 HETRIC TONS OF COCAINE WERE SEIZED LAST YEAR.

DUTLOOK

/*** BEGINNING OF SECTION DOZ ******/

BOX



DRVW 14 FEBRUARY 2012. ADMIN BT

11955

ниии

JEIS ASUNCION P 239266

DISTR: POL/ECON AMB DOM DSIA DAG

VICICPEO 062 RR RUEEPE DE RUESFB #9958 2521235 ZNE UUUAA ZYN ZPO CHECK ZPO P 090044 Z SEP 86 FF FPIS ASUNCION PA TO AIG 4673 AIG 4681 RUEOGFA/FRIS CHIVA CHIVA PM RUEEPE/AMEMPASST LIMA ACCT FEPT-EVEN FT

11

LOC: DISK 384 027 39 SEP 86 143R

CN: 29002 CHRG: PROG DIST: FBIS

CCPT TO LIFRART, LIAISON (2)

SUBJ

PERU: BUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL CREATED; 5 REPORTED

PI090044

UNCLAS SJ

PARIS AFP IN SPANISH 2012 GMT 5 SEP 96

((TEXT)) LIMA, 6 SEP (APP) -- LAST NIGHT, WHEN ANNOUNCING THE CREATION OF THE GOVERNMENT-IMPLEMENTED NATIONAL COUNCIL OF BUMAN RIGHTS, JUSTICE MINISTER CARLOS ELANCAS SAID THAT THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT CAN ONLY HOLD TALES WITH THE SHINING PATH, THE TUPAG AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MCVEMENT, AND OTHERS, IF THESE GROUPS LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND SURRENDER.

LET THEM CHANGE THEIR ATTITUDE FIRST. AND THEN THERE CAN BY DIALOGUE. THE GOVERNMENT IS READY TO ACCEPT THEIR REPENTANCE AND TALE WITH THEM, BLANCAS TOLD THE PRESS.

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PROVIDED FOR BY CONSTITUTION AND CREATED BY GOVERNMENT LECRES, IS AN ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IN CHARGE OF PROMOTING AND STRENGTHENING HUMAN RIGETS.

AFTER CONFIRMING THAT THIS COUNCIL WILL NOT REPLACE THE PEACE COMMISSION WHICH WAS DISSOLVED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE MUTINT IN THE THERE LIMA TRISONS ON 18 JULY, BLANCAS SAID THAT THE COUNCIL WILL BE PRESIDED OVER BY THE JUSTICE MINISTER AND MADE UP OF REPRESENTATIVES OF TWO OTHER MINISTRIES, THE CATBOLIC CHURCH, THE PERUVIAN UNIVERSITY, THE BAR ASSOCIATION, AND OTHER PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS.
THE COUNCIL WILL ANALYZE THE LAWS IN FORCE AND PROPOSE

THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO MAKE TEEM MORE EFFECTIVE. IT WILL ALSO ESTABLISH

BOT THE

RELATIONS WITH CONGRESSIONAL BUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

HE SAID THAT PERU'S DOORS ARE OPEN FOR THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS THAT DEFEND BUMAN RIGETS. AS IT HAS RECENTLY SEOWN TO (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL.

MEANVEILE, IN LIMA'S RESIDENTIAL AREA OF MIRAFLORES SUBVERSIVES CONDUCTED THREE DINAMITE ATTACES, KILLING ONE

UNCLASSIFIED

TBIS ASUNCION P 800006

WATCHMAN, AND SERIOUSLY INJURING ANOTHER. THE POLICE REPORTED THAT FIVE OTHER PEOPLE WFRE ALSO INJURED.

A SUBVERSIVE COMMANDO TESTERDAT LEF A BOMP ON THE SIXTH FLOCK OF THE BL PACIFICO BUILDING. THE BOMB FIPLODED WHILE

ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE, A REBEL COMMANDO MACHINE-GUNNED A CASINO IN MIRAPLORES, WHERE A LARGE GROUP VAS HOSTING A PARTY FOR FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE PETECPEBU EXECUTIVE ECARD ALFREDO CARRANZA. THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES OR DAMAGE. THE SOURCE ALSO REPORTED THAT TWO OTHER POMBS WERE DEPUSED DOWNTOWN IN SAN MARTIN SQUARE.

(INDALL) 262012 8912512 SEP

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

TBIS ASUNCION P 200006

IN BRIEF

Americas



— Panamanian opposition's first major election rally yesterday exceeded expectations, reportedly drawing 50,000... military did not interfere... Defense Chief Noriega probably wary of harassing opponents while OAS human rights group visiting.


-

__ JUN 1397)

258

Americas

Panamanian police killed one, wounded at least six Thursday . . . sporadic student demonstrations against regime in second week . . . university, high schools closed . . regime probably embarrassed during OAS mediators' visit.





SATTING THE SECOND



Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism

(B)(37



2 July 1980



000

2-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE APRIL 1997 DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

4 PAGES

NONRESPONSIVE



2 July 1980

INCAP Officials Kidnaped in Guatemala City by the PRTC

United States citizen Richard Newman and Gnatemalan Carlos Tejada, administrative officer and director of the Central America and Panama Nutrition Institute (INCAP), respectively, were abducted the morning of 24 June from INCAP headquarters in Gnatemala City. Four armed men invaded the office while a staff meeting was in session and specifically selected the two INCAP officials. The incident occurred without injury to any of those present, and the terrorists, with their captives, escaped in an INCAP vehicle. The abductors left a document at INCAP headquarters in which they identified themselves as a "vanguard organization of armed workers of the people of Gnatemala". According to anonymous telephone calls received on 25 June by the families "of both officials, the latter are unharmed, and contact with the families will continue.

On 27 June a package of papers for INCAF delivered at a Guatemala City volunteer fire station contained identical letters addressed to the United Nations Secretary General and to the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) from an organization identifying itself as the Central American Workers Revolutionary Farty (Partido Revolucionario de Los Trabajadores Centro Americanos -- PRTC). The letters describe three ransom terms for the release of the hostages. First. two PRTC communiques are to be published, one on a world-wide basis and the other at the Central American and U.S. level. The communiques are to be published immediately upon receipt in the official language of each country, using the most important local media. Second, a "war tax" is to be paid by the hostage families and the institutions involved in the current crisis. And last, the CPC (the Program and Coordinating Committee of INCAP) is to prepare itself for obtaining strict compliance with an as yet unidentified political petition 'ron the PRTC. On ?7 June the Guatemalan press also received a communique asking for the compliance with PRTC demands for the release of the INCAP officials. The INCAP is a Central American organization with administrative ties to the PANC.

Little is known about the actimaties and makeup of the PRTC in Guatemala. Occasionally PRTC graffitti appear on





2 July 1980

walls of buildings in Guatemala City. Neighboring El Salvador has an active terrorist organization also known as the PRTC. According to Salvadoran press reports the PRTC claimed responsibility for the armed attack during April against the Guatemalan Ambassador to El Salvador in retaliation for the death of one its members killed in Guatemala. During January the PRTC machine-gunned the Guatemalan Embassy causing property damage but no casualties. Before the January attack, the Salvadoran PRTC had been inactive since it kidnaped U.S. businessmen Dennis McDonald and Fausto Bucheli in September 1979.



13 PAGES

NONRESPONSIVE





Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism

(3)

9 July 1980



2-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE APRIL 1997 DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

2 PAGES

NONRESPONSIVE



63131

9 July 1980

ARTICLES

Developments in Kidnap Cases in Guatemala

Since the kidnaping on 24 June of American Richard Newman and Guatemaian Carlos Tejada, officials of the Central America and Panama Nutrition Institute (INCAP) in Guatemala City, few changes have developed on the situation. (See the issue of 3 July.) A cassette recording and a letter dated 30 June addressed to the captives' families from the group which claimed responsibility for the kidnaping, the Partido Revolucionario de Los Trabajadores Centro Americanos (PRTC) were delivered to the American captive's wife on the morning of 1 July by the newly-consecrated Auxiliary Bishop Monsignor Eduardo Euchtes. The letter contains two new themes, namely, that the publication of a bulletin (time and contents to be announced) will indicate to the PRTC the families' disposition to negotiate, and a warning that "entitles sympathetic to the families and INCAP" not publish pleas and testimonials. The cassette contained readings of a statement of previously issued demands and of a letter addressed to the acting INCAP director. Separately voiced statements from the kidnap victims are also included in the cassette recording. Both captives say they are being well treated and urge the families and colleagues not to contact the police or intelligence authorities, whether they be foreign or domestic. The American captive vouched for the well being of the Guatemalan official who had apparently suffered a nervous attack during the first day of captivity.

Additional notes from the captives were delivered to the families through INCAP personnel on 3 July. The personal messages assure the family members of their good care, which includes daily showers, exercise, access to medicines, music and reading materials.

U.S. officials in Guatemala have recently learned that the Guatemalan Government will not permit the Guatemalan press to publish a Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) manifesto to satisfy one of the demands for the release of Mexican citizen Juse de Lima, manager of the Swiss-owned Nestle Company who was kidnaped on 17 June in Guatemala City. (See



6737

KRET

9 July 1980

the issue of 25 June.) This Government action may possibly present scrious implications for negotiating the release of the INCAP officials.





Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism

(3)(3)



23 July 1980



APPROVED FOR RELEASE APRIL 1997 DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

2-4



23 July 1980

Developments in Kidnap Cases in Guatemala

The first specific demand from the Central American Morkers Revolutionary Party (PRTC), the self-proclaimed kidnapers of U.S. citizen Richard W. Newman, was received by his employer, the Central America and Panama Nutrition Institute (INCAP) on 10 July. It was for publication of the political manifesto which accompanied it, with a deadline date of 17 July. The manifesto consists of some 13 and one-half legal-size pages, double-spaced. The statements are standard rhetoric for such incidents. The PRTC asks for publication in eight Guatemalan newspapers (one of which went out of business months ago), nine other Central American newspapers, and some 14 Guatemalan radio and television newscasts, twice daily in the case of the radio broadcasts. The demand also includes publication in The New York Times and Newsweek in the U.S.

The accompanying letter addressed both to the INCAP and to the families of Newman and Carlos Triada, his Guatemalan co-worker who was kidnaped at the same time, warns again against bringing in the police, threatening that this would force the kidnapers to take "appropriate measures" that would have a bearing on the captives "life or death and length of their imprisonment". The letter repeats two carlier demands -- a "war tax" and "a political demand" but without further clarification.

According to an INCAP representative there has been frequent contact by the kidnapers with the families, largely through the Tejada family, and efforts to reassure them that the captives are being well treated. The captors have urged the families to select a "trusted priest". This would presumably be for some eventual role as intermediary.

In communications from the kidnapers since the letter accompanying the manifesto there has been no reference to the 17 July deadline for publication of the manifesto.






Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism

(6×3)

20 August 1980.



APPROVED FOR RELEASE APRIL 1997 DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION



20 August 1980


INCAP Officials Released in Guatemala City


On 11 August Nutrition Institute for Central America and Panama (INCAP) officials Carlos Tejada and Richard Newman, a U.S. citizen, were released from captivity after being held almost eight weeks by the Central American Workers Revolutionary Party (PRTC). The officials immediately departed the country. Specific details concerning their release are not available.

The members of the PRTC group which held the INCAP officials lacked training and professionalism in terrorist tactics--a deficiency which became evident as events unfolded in the case. The PRTC allowed face-to-face contact with an intermediary at a pre-arranged site, it failed to protest two published testimonials on Tejada's behalf issued by colleagues and associates following its warning of 30 June, and it allowed two deadlines [17 July and 8 August] to lapse without serious repercussions to the kidnap victims.

On I August the PRTC claimed responsibility for a 29 July hand grenade explosion at the Guardia de Honor Military Barracks in Guatemala. The incident killed one soldier and wounded seven others. This is the second action for which the PRTC in Guatemala has claimed credit. The Guatemalan Army, however, claims that the incident was actually a training accident.







2. BEVENS IS THE MANAGER OF THE GRAN INDUSTRIA DE NEUMATICOS CENTROAMERICA (GINSA), A LOCAL SUBSIDIARY OF GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER.


APPROVED FOR RELEASE APRIL 1997 DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DENIED IN FULL

PAGE 2

DOCUMENT DATED

DECEMBER 1980

(b)(1) (b)(3) 5 1.50



(6)(3)

(6)(1)

(3) (3)

1.560



THE ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE IN ARMS (ORPA), A MADICAL LEFTIST
GOATERALAN GROUP, CONTINUES TO BOLD CLIFFORD B E V E R S. A D.S.

CITIZEN ALDRAPPED BY ORPA IN DECEMBER 1980 IN CONTENALA CITY. A LEADER
OF THE GOATERALAN RATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY OWION (DRN), WRICH COMPRISES
THE POOR NAJOR RADICAL LEFTIST CONTENALAN GROUPS, EASD THAT OWAR PLANS
TO BE VERY FATIENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE SIDNAPPING OF REVERS, NEO IS
THE GENERAL MANAGER OF A SUBSIDIARY OF THE GOODTEAN TIME AND RUBBER
CONTANT IN CONTENALA. BE SAID TENT ONTA LEADERS BELIEVE TENT TRET HAT
BAVE, TO BOLD BEVERS FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD BEFORE TRETS DEFRAED FOR

312338 -3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE APRIL 1997 DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION



C5) (3)


MANSON OF U.S. \$10 NILLION IS NET, (CONNENT: A D.S. \$FOUR
HILLION RANSON DEMANDED BY ONPA FOR THE EFLEASE OF BLANCA ESTELA
H O L I N A, BISTER OF A PROMISENT GUATEMALAN INDOSTRIALIST, NAT BAVE
BEEN RECEIVED IN TEXT MOLINA REPORTEDLY WAS RELEASED DURING THE LAST
WEEK OF FEMBUART 1981. IF SU, ORPA IS DECEM NO PRESEURE TO SETTLE FOR
LESS THAN THE RANSON DEMANDED FOR BEVENS.)

THE DRN LEADER SAID THAT THE GUERRILLA ARMY OF THE POOR (EGF), A RADICAL LEFTIST GUATERALAN GROUP ALSO PART OF THE URN, CONTINUES TO HOLD AUSTRALIAN BUSINESSHAM, LEON DON R I C S A R D S O N, NBO WAS KIDNAFFED IN RID-FERROART 1981, SOON AFTER SE ARRIVED IN GUATERALA. COMPRENT: THERE IS NO FURTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE CONCERNING THE EGF FLANS OR THE TERMS, IF ANY, FOR RICHARDSON'S RELEASE.)




BX3

.



Weekly Situation Report

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM



(6×37

000 29 April 1981

2-11

APPROVED FOR RELEASE APRIL 1997 DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION



29 April 1981



Americans Kidnapped in Guatemala and El Salvador



6767 6×37


Father Roy Bourgeois, a priest with the Maryknoll Order, was reported missing from his hotel room in San Salvador on 26 April, Father Bourgeois, who was working as an interpreter for a Chicago-based CBS television crew, had left his room to purchase medicine. Father Bourgeois spent five years as a missionary in Bolivia and had been giving talks in the Chicago area about fighting in El Salvador. (U)

Unnamed sources have claimed that Ted Honeychurch, held captive by Rastafarians in Dominica since 12 February, has most probably been slain by his captors. (See the issue of 4 March.) (U)


Clifford Bevens, manager of the Gran Lidustria de Neumaticos. Centroamerica, a subsidiary of Goodynar, is still being held by his kidnappers in Guatemala. Bevens was abducted on 7 December 1980 by an unnamed group. Goodynar has decided to offer the sum of US\$5 million for his release.







40183554 273



INDICATED THAT THE MENT AND A SHOP AND STORE FOR THE RILLING. AND THAT THERE HAS NO INDICATION OF PROCED ENTRY

INTO THE PRIEST'S HUME. CO-MENT: SEE

FOR A CONFLICTING REPORT.)

PRIEST HAD OFFI ON A "DEATH LIMI" RECARSE OF ALLEGED

"SUMMERSIVE" ACTIVITIES BUT ADDED THAT THE ARRY HAD BUT

BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION. CO-MENT:

THERE IS NO INFORMATION TO INDICATE THAT THE PRIEST ANS

LAVOLNEO IN EXTREME LEFTIST ACTIVITIES.)

Climate ALT

(b)(37 (b)(37 10

IT IS MICHAI INTERMANCE THAT THE EURITUALIAN MICH COMMAND MOREU MANE AUTHORIZED THE ASSASSIFIATION OF A MATTER STATES PRIESE AT THIS TIME, THERE IS STILL OF CONCLUSIVE EXIDENCE CONCERNING THE IDENTITY OF THE ATTACKERS.)



401823555

DENIED IN FULL

PAGE 3

DOCUMENT DATED

AUGUST 1981

(b)(1) (b)(3)



Weekly Situation Report

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM



000

5 August 1981

APPROVED FOR RELEASE APRIL 1997 DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

2-14

C6 737

5 August 1981



67637

American Priest Slain in Goatemala

Father Stanley F. Rother, an American missionary priest in Santiago Atitlan, Guatemala, was murdered in his bedroom in the parish house at approximately 0400 hours local time on 28 July. The sole witness to part of the murder, Francisco Bocel, who is the brother of Father Rother's former assistant, stated that three tall men waring civilian clothes and ski masks entered his room and asked where Padre Francisco was. The men, who spoke Spanish and were "Ladines" (non-Indian), had looked in the upstairs rooms before entering Bocel's room. They placed a gun to his head and ordered him to call Father Rother, who was alceping downstairs. (Father Rother had not slept in his bedroom upstairs since he returned from Oklahoma City in April after leaving Guatemala in January because of death threats.) Bocel refused the order, but they forced him downstzirs where he knocked on the door and told Rother that some men wanted to see him. When Rother opened the door, the men jumped him and ordered Bocal to return to his room and lock the door. Bocel heard noises of a struggle, followed by two shots. After staying in his room about 20 minutes, during which time he heard the men going through the house, Bocel found Rother's body on the floor. He then ran to the back of the church property where the nuns and an American nurse were staying. The nurse determined that Rother was dead.

Medical personnel stated that two bullets had entered Father Rother's head. One bullet entered the lower jaw and remained lodged in the bone on the opposite side. The second bullet, which caused the death, entered the left temple and passed through the head, leaving a large hole on the right side. A slug and a casing found at the scene indicated that the bullets were 9mm of Smith and Wesson manufacture. The priest had bruises on his body, probably inflicted by the attackers, and on his hands.

A motive for the murder is still unclear even though three men have been arrested in connection with the crime. The three in custody have admitted to an attempted robbery. If robbery were the motive, only a small amount of each was taken from a perty cash box and such items as a transistor radio, calculator, and hunting knife were left in place. Effects in Rother's room, other than an overturned end table and lamp, were in order. Rooms in the rest of the house "appeared" to have been ransacked; drawers had been pulled out and the contents emptied on the floor but boxes and a chest had not been touched. The unanswered question is why in a robbery attempt the men would specifically ask for Fatner Rother, as Boxel testified.

Rother spoke fluent Cachiquel, one of the major local dialects, and spent 13 years working among the Txutujil Indians. In January, a parishioner warned the priest that he was in "extreme danger" and that he





5 August 1981

(6)(3)

should leave immediately. On 28 January, Rother and his Indian priest assistant, Father Pedro Bocel (Francisco's brother), left Guatemala for Oklahoma City. In April Rother returned to Santiago Atitlan believing that things had quieted down for him, but Bocel remained in semi-hiding in Guatemala City because he was still marked for execution. In an April interview, Rother believed that the troubles in the area began in January 1980 when a group of guerrillas took over the town. As a consequence, military patrols entered the area and were believed to have established a network of "orejas" (ears/informers). In October 1980 the Guatemalan Army set up a camp close to Santiago Atitlan. In the ensuing months, according to Rother, people would be taken away and either be killed or disappear.

The missionaries in the area working with Rother were not known to be social activists and had scaled down their socially oriented programs. The work of the clinic in which Rother had been involved was transferred to Project Concern, and he no longer ran the co-op farm nor the school that translated the Bible into the Indian dialect. Radio Atitlan, which had been funded by the Oklahoma Diocese of the Roman Catholic Church, had been shut down. In recent months, Rother had been occupied solely with pastoral work.

Guatemalan President Fernando Romeo Lucas Garcia has ordered a full investigation and promised his cooperation. Whether a right-wing death squad was responsible for Rother's murder remains to be seen, It seems unlikely, however, that Lucas or other high-level government officials would have sanctioned the murder of a U.S. priest when the Government of Guatemala is trying to improve relations with the U.S. Government.





5 August 1981

NOTE

Clifford Berens Remains a Hostage in Gustecusia

Clifford Bevens, the American manager of the Gustemalan subsidiary of Goodyear Tire Company who was kidnapped on 7 December 1980, remains in the hands of his captors. (See the issue of 10 December 1980.) (U)

Recent raids on safehouses belonging to the Organization of People in Arms (ORPA) by Guaternalan officials turned up documents that indicate ORPA was responsible for the kidnspring. The documents do not provide leads as to the location of Bevens, and there is no current information on the status of the negotiations. The answert ORPA has demanded for his release is US\$10 million. Bevens in the only U.S. citizen currently being held hostage anywhere by a terrorist group.







1. PARAGRAPH 1 WAS SCRAMBLED BETWEEN
DRAFT AND TRANSMISSION. PARA 1 SHOULD READ: "THE GOVERNMENT
OF GUATEMALA (GOG) SECURITY SERVICES RECENTLY RECEIVED

- *INFORMATION THAT UNITED STATES CITIZEN<CLIFFORD>
- *E V E N S WAS BEING HELD IN AN ORGANIZATION OF THE PEOPLE IN ARMS (ORPA) SAFEHOUSE IN GUATEMALA CITY. GOG FORCES SURROUNDED THE HOUSE, LOCATED IN AN UPPER-CLASS RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOOD AND, AFTER DETERMINING THAT IT WAS UNOCCUPIED, ENTERED THE PREMISES ON 6 AUGUST 1981. COMMENT: BEVENS WAS KIDNAPPED BY THE ORPA ON 7 DECEMBER 1980; HE WAS THE GENERAL MANAGER OF THE GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY SUBSIDIARY IN GUATEMALA.)"

C67637



PAGES 2-5



*E. AMERICAN MISSIONARY MURDERED IN GUATEMALAS

JOHN TROYER, PASTOR OF THE CONSERVATIVE MEMONITE FELLOWSHIP MISSION IN ALDEA PALAMA, LOCATED IS MILES NORTHWEST OF CHIMALTENANGO, WAS MURDERED BY A GROUP OF APPROXIMATELY 10 ARMED MEN ABOUT 0100 ON 14 SEPTEMBER. GARY MILLER, ANOTHER AMERICAN AFFILIATED WITH THE *MISSION, WAS SHOT IN THE CHEST AND IS RECUPERATING IN GUATEMALA > CITY.

PRIOR TO THE SHOOTING, THE ARMED MEN SPENT AN HOUR RANSACKING THE TROYER RESIDENCE AND ACCUSING THEM OF BEING SPIES FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, IMPEDING THE PROGRESS OF THEIR "MOVEMENT" AMONG THE PEASANTS, AND EXPRESSING RESENTMENT OF THE U.S. LIFESTYLE, TROYER'S WIFE, PIVE CHILDREN, AND THEIR GUATEMALAN MAID WITNESSED THE SHOOTING BUT WERE NOT HARMED. NO GROUP HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MURDER.

IN SPITE OF THE INCREASING VIOLENCE IN GUATEMALA, FATHER PERDINAND COSSELIN AND PATHER BREEN, MARYKNOLL PRIESTS, HAVE EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO RETURN TO THE PETEN AREA.

FATHER TED CUSTER, ALSO A MARYWOOLL PRIEST WORKING IN *<GUATEMALA>CITY, RECEIVED TWO DEATH THREATS AND LEFT<GUATEMALA>IN LATE AUGUST. FATHER BRUCE (NO LAST NAME AVAILABLE), WHO HAD BEEN WORKING IN HUEHUETENANGO, ASKED TO BE SENT HOME BECAUSE THE KILLING AND VIOLENCE IN THE INDIAN HIGHLANDS WAS BECOMING OVERWHELMING. EVEN


(B)(3) (B)(3)



*THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA SORDERED A FULL INVESTIGATION INTO *THE DEATH OF FATHER STANLEY ROTHER STHE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT RESPONDED TO REQUESTS BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FOR AN INVESTIGATION.

INCREASED CONCERN BY U.S. BUSINESSMEN REGARDING GUATEMALAN TERRORISM

*F. U.S. BUSINESSMEN IN-GUATEMALA-ARE EXPRESSING GROWING CONCERN FOR THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY IN THE WAKE OF THE INCREASED TERRORIST THREAT. THE KIDNAPPING/MURDER OF CLIFFORD BEVENS HAS CAUSED MANY BUSINESSMEN TO TAKE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS IN ORDER TO LOWER THEIR VULNERABILITY TO TERRORIST ACTIONS. MANY HAVE SOUGHT PROFESSIONAL SECURITY COUNSELING AND ARE CARRYING ARMS.



PAGES 8-9

SECRET


PAGE 001

FEB 82

APPROVED FOR RELEASE APRIL 1997
DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION


D. AMERICAN PRIEST MURDERED IN<GUATEMALA>
SECRET

PAGES 2-3



AMERICAN PRIEST MURDERED IN-GUATEMALA>

BROTHER<JAMES>ALFRED<MILLER, >AN AMERICAN CHRISTIAN BROTHERS MISSIONARY FROM WISCONSIN, WAS SHOT AND KILLED AT 1630 HOURS ON 13 FEBRUARY AS HE WAS REPAIRING A WALL OF THE DE LA SALLE INDIAN HOUSE



*IN HUEHUETENANGO, <GUATEMALA. > MILLER WAS STRUCK BY SEVERAL BULLETS IN THE CHEST AND NECK WHEN FOUR UNIDENTIFIED HEN OPENED FIRE ON HIM FROM A CAR AND THEN SPED OFF. I

THE CHRISTIAN BROTHERS ORDER HAS FACILITIES IN FIVE LOCATIONS IN *<GUATEMALA, >THREE OF WHICH HAVE U.S. CITIZENS IN RESIDENCE. THE *LOCATION AND NUMBER ARE: CHIQUIMULA (3), < GUATERALA > CITY (1), AND HUEHUETENANCO (4). THE CHRISTIAN BROTHERS', ALSO KNOWN AS THE LA SALLE BROTHERS ORDER OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, MISSION IS BUILT AROUND SCHOOLS TO TEACH THE POOR. IN HIS LAST POSITION MILLER, KNOWN AS BROTHER SANTIAGO, PROVIDED CARE AND EDUCATION FOR SOME 150 YOUNG INDIANS OF THE GUATEMALAN HIGHLANDS WHO ARE IN TRAINING TO BE *TEACHERS IN THE RURAL, INDIAN AREAS OF GUATEMALA.>

*MILLER HAD ARRIVED IN<GUATEMALA>IN 1981. HE IS THE THIRD AMERICAN *CLERGYMEN TO HAVE BEEN SLAIN IN<GUATEMALA>SINCE 28 JULY 1981. THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED ON 12 FEBRUARY THAT BECAUSE OF THE *INCREASED DANGER TO FOREIGN CLERGY IN<GUATEMALA, >IT WOULD NO LONGER PERMIT RELICIOUS WORKERS TO ENTER THE COUNTRY AS MISSIONARIES UNLESS THEY HAD PERMANENT RESIDENCE STATUS. IN THE PAST, MANY MISSIONARIES HAD ENTERED WITH TOURIST CARDS AND SOUCHT TO ADJUST THEIR STATUS AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL. THE NEW ORDER REQUIRES PRIOR SPONSORSHIP AND *PERMITS TO ENTER AND EXIT<GUATEMALA; >IT APPLIES TO ALL RELIGIOUS WORKERS REGARDLESS OF AFFILIATION.



PAGE 6


DENIED IN FULL

PAGE 1

DOCUMENT DATED

MARCH 1982


(b)(1) (b)(3) PAGES 2-9



- J. ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON ASSASSINATION OF AMERICAN PRIEST IN *CUATEMALA>
- * WHEREAS EARLY REPORTS OF THE 13 FEBRUARY MURDER IN CUATEMALA OF AMERICAN PRIEST JAMES ALFRED MILLER HAD HIM BEING SHOT BY FOUR ASSASSING IN AN AUTOMOBILE, EYEVITNESS ACCOUNTS NOW HAVE HIM BEING SHOT BY THREE MEN ON FOOT WHO ESCAPED IN A CAR WHICH HAD BEEN PARKED NEARBY. TWO SISTERS OF A RELIGIOUS ORDER WITNESSED THE SHOOTING FROM ONLY A BLOCK AND A HALF AWAY AND WATCHED AS THE THREE MEN RAN FROM THE SCENE TO THE CAR. THE ASSAILANTS USED HANDGUNS, NOT AUTOMATIC WEAPONS.



PAGES 11-12



STATED THAT THE AMERICAN AND
SPANISH CITIZENS, HICHAEL GLENN ((GENNEST)) MAND MARIA MAGDALENA
((GHONTEVERDE)) MASCANIO, ARRESTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA
(GOG) ON 14 JANUARY 1983 WILL BE TURNED OVER TO THE JUDICIAL
TRIBUNAL ON 17 OR 18 JANUARY AND PROBABLY RELEASED TWENTY-FOUR
TO FORTY-EIGHT HOURS AFTER THAT. THE GOG HAS DETERMINED THAT
NEITHER INDIVIDUAL IS GUILTY OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, BUT THE
COST SAFFERS THAT THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM RELEASE THEM SO THAT THE

2-23

SECUT

ARMY WILL NOT BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED AND EMBARRASSED BY THE INCIDENT. COMMENT: ON 14 JANUARY THE LOCAL PRESS ANNOUNCED THE ARREST OF AN AMERICAN AND A SPANIARD IN SAN LUCAS TOLIMAN (1438N 9108W), DEPARTMENT OF SOLOLA, WHO WERE LEADERS OF THE GUERRILLA GROUP, THE ORGANIZATION OF PEOPLE IN ARMS (ORPA).

HAD POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED THE AMERICAN AS BEING THE HURDERER OF A RANCH ADMINISTRATOR LATER CHANGED THEIR TESTIMONIES UPON CLOSER QUESTIONING. THE INDIANS ARE NOT BEING BLAHED FOR THEIR HISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION OF THE AMERICAN SINCE TO THEM ALL ANGLOS HAVE A SIMILAR APPEARANCE. THE AMERICAN AND SPANIARD ARGUSED SUSPICION IN THE SMALL COMMUNITY OF SAN LUCAS TOLIHAN BECAUSE THEY KEPT TO THEMSELVES AND DID NOT SOCIALIZE WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS. THEY APPARENTLY DID NOT SOCIALIZE WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS BECAUSE THE SPANIARD WAS FEARFUL

THAT HER HUSBAND, FROM WHON SHE IS SEPARATED, WOULD LEARN WHERE SHE WAS LIVING. COMMENT: ACCORDING TO RESIDENTS IN THE SAN LUCAS TOLINAN AREA THE ARRESTED AMERICAN BEARS A STRONG RESEMBLANCE TO AN UNIDENTIFIED ORPA LEADER WHO OPERATES IN THE SAN LUCAS TOLINAN AREA. THE INCIDENT WAS AN UNFORTUNATE CASE OF HISTAKEN IDENTITY.)



(b) (1) (b) (3)


APPROVED FOR RELEASE APRIL 1997 DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

HE SAID THAT ON 11 JANUARY

2-25

THREE PEASANTS FROM SANTO TOWAS WHO WERE IN SAN LUCAS TOLINAN OBSERVED SPANISH CITIZEN MARIA ((CHONTEVERDE)) CASCANIO AND U.S. CITIZEN HICHAEL CLEMN ((CERNEST)) WIN THE TOWN AND REPORTED THEM TO THE MILITARY AS THE LEADERS OF THE ORPA GROUP THAT BURNED THEIR FAR. THE TWO FOREIGNERS WERE ARRESTED THE SAME DAY. TALKED TO ONE OF THE PEASANTS WHO CLAIMED THAT HE WAS CERTAIN OF HIS IDENTIFICATION ESPECIALLY THE SPANISH WOMAN BECAUSE SHE HAD HELD A GUN ON HIM AND LATER MURDERED THE FARM HANAGER. NONETHELESS, SAID THAT HOST RESIDENTS OF SAN LUCAS TOLIHAN BELIEVE THAT THE THREE PEASANTS ARE HISTAKEN BECAUSE THE TWO FOREIGNERS WOULD NOT BE LIVING OPENLY IN TOWN IF THEY INDEED WERE LEADERS OF AN ORPA GROUP.





ALLOW INVESTIGATIONS OF ITS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. U.S. CITIZEN MICHAEL GLENN ERNEST AND MAGDALENA MONTEVERDE ASCANCIO WERE RELEASED 9 FEBRUARY 1983. THERE HAVE BEEN A TOTAL OF 15 EXECUTIONS AS OF THIS DATE. THE RIOS MONTE COVERNMENT IS STRUGGLING WITH THE PROBLEM OF HOW BEST TO DEAL WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS WHILE FIGHTING A LEFTIST INSURGENCY. ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL CURRENT OBJECTIVES IS TO CONVINCE YOUNG MILITARY OFFICERS WHO ARE IN THE FRONT LINES OF BATTLE THAT THEY MUST BE MORE SENSITIVE TO THE CIVILIAN INDIGENOUS POPULATION, MANY OF WHOM ARE GEOGRAPHICAL VICTIMS OF THE WAR.

UZ37



(6×37



Weekly Situation Report

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM



000

19 August 198

676

2-17

APPROVED FOR RELEASE APRIL 1997 DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

2 PAGES



19 August 1981

(b)(3)

ARTICLES

Clifford Bereas Found Mardered in Gustemala

Members of the Guerrilla Army of the Peor (EGP) murdered Clifford Bevens, the kidnapped American manager of the Guatemalan subsidiary of the Goodyear Tire Company, on 13 August, when Government of Guatemala security forces, unaware that Bevens was inside, raided a wooden frame safehouse in Santo Domingo Xenacoj near Santa Maria Cauque (14 38 N 90 42 W). In the firefight, five guerrillas, including two women were killed. Bevens had been kidnapped on 7 December 1980. (See the issue of 10 December 1980.)

Bevens, who was clad in pajamas, was found in an underground "people's jail"/cache with three bullet holm in his head. Guatemalan authorities speculate that the Revolutionary Organization of the Poople in Arms (ORPA), which originally abducted Bevens for US\$10 million ransom, recently turned Bevens over to the EGP because of the numerous raids by Guatemalan forces on ORPA safehouses. They believe ORPA ordered the EGP to kill Bevens rather than have him returned alive. Four of the guerrillas were killed while attempting to defend the site or escape. The fifth guerrilla apparently killed Bevens and then committed suicide when he realized there was no escape; his body was found near that of Bevens in the underground site.

The safehouse contained numerous weapons including five Chinese RPG-2 type rocket launchers, 60mm mortar shells, one U.S. M60 machinegun, one 57mm recoilless rifle with ammunition, and one .50 caliber machinegun. A large EGP banner was also found. Authorities believe that two .50 caliber machinegums and four 57mm recoilless rifles are still in the hands of the guerrillas.

This was one of five more guerrilla safe bouses/caches raided by Guatemalan forces on 13-14 August, bringing the total to either 22 or 27, depending on the source. Guatemalan forces are taking procautions to secure the area around the sites so that innocent bystanders are not caught in the crossfire.



18 PAGES

Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION




(b)(b) (b)(b)


GUATEMALA: VOLUME VII INDEX AND GLOSSARIES (95-0024-IG)

July 15, 1995

Frederick P. Hitz Inspector General


A. R. Cinquegrana
Deputy Inspector General
for Investigations





All portions are classified SECRET

SECRET



Approved for Release Date Octobie 1997

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
GLOSSARY OF KEY INDIVIDUALS	1
	(6.0
INDEX OF INDIVIDUAL NAMES	11
NOTE THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPE	
GLOSSARY OF TERMS	26
01 000 LDV 00 DT L 000	2.5
GLOSSARY OF PLACES	34

